Schedule

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All talks will take place on Friday, June 23rd. Location TBD.

Session I: Learning and Mechanism Design

1:00-1:30pm: Vasilis Syrgkanis, overview/survey.

1:30-1:40pm: Tim Roughgarden, Learning simple auctions.

1:40-1:50pm: David Kempe, Incentivizing Exploration.

1:50pm-2:00pm: Break/poster session.

Session II: Duality in Mechanism Design

2:00-2:30pm: Yang Cai, overview/survey.

2:30-2:40pm: Costis Daskalakis, Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist.

2:40-2:50pm: Kira Goldner, The FedEx Problem.

2:50pm-3:00pm: Break/poster session (cont.).

Session III: Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms

3:00-3:30pm: Matt Weinberg, overview/survey.

3:30-3:40pm: Aviad Rubinstein, 99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition.

3:40-3:50pm: Balu Sivan, Revenue Maximization via Prophet Inequalities.

3:50-4:00pm: Mingfei Zhao, Approximating gains-from-trade in two-sided markets.

4:00pm-4:30pm: Poster session.