

# Security Verification of Virtual Memory Implementations with CheckMate



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# CheckMate: early stage verification tool for detecting hardware vulnerabilities to exploits

- Evaluates microarchitectural susceptibility to known security exploit classes and synthesizes security litmus tests for susceptible designs




# SandyBridge model: $\mu$ arch model with address translation for security analysis of VM systems

Features for security analysis	Prior OoO processor model	SandyBridge model
<b>Supported operation types</b>	User-level operations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Memory access</li> <li>• Memory fence</li> <li>• Branch</li> <li>• Cache flush</li> </ul>	User-level operations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Memory access</li> <li>• Memory fence</li> </ul> System-level operations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Remap V-to-P address mapping</li> <li>• TLB entry invalidation</li> </ul> Hardware-level operations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Page table walk</li> <li>• Dirty bit update</li> </ul>
<b>Structures accessible for exploits</b>	Cache	Cache, TLB
<b>Virtual memory assumptions</b>	One-to-one V-to-P address mapping (no synonyms)	Synonyms permitted



# TLB flush+reload pattern synthesized on SandyBridge model



	Attacker T0 on C0	Victim T1 on C0
	(i0) R [VA1] → r2	
	(i1) ptwalk [VA0] → TLB entry1	
<b>Flush</b> →	(i2) INVLPG [VA1]	
		(i0) R [VA1] → r1
		(i1) ptwalk [VA0] → TLB entry2
<b>Reload</b> →	(i3) R [VA1] → r2	

