RE: Reliable Email

Michael Kaminsky (Intel Research Pittsburgh)

Scott Garriss (CMU)
Michael Freedman (NYU/Stanford)
Brad Karp (University College London)
David Mazières (Stanford)
Haifeng Yu (Intel Research Pittsburgh/CMU)

Motivation

- Spam is a huge problem today
  - More than 50% of email traffic is spam.
  - Large investment by users/IT organizations ($2.3b in 2003 on increased server capacity)
- But, more importantly…

Email is no longer reliable

- Users can't say what they want any more
  - Ex: Intel job offer goes to spam folder
  - Ex: Discussion about spam filtering

<u>Goal:</u>

Improve email's reliability

Outline

- Background / Related Work
- Design
  - Social networks and Attestations
  - Preserving Privacy
- Re: in Practice
- Evaluation
- Implementation
- Conclusion

Basic Terminology

- False Positives (FP)
  - *Legitimate email marked as spam*
  - Can lose important mail
  - Email less reliable
- False Negatives (FN)
  - *Spam marked as legitimate email*
  - Annoying and/or offensive

A Typical Spam Defense System



Related Work

- People use a variety of techniques
  - Content filters (SpamAssassin, Bayesian)
  - Whitelists

Idea:
Whitelist friends of friends

Re: is complementary
to existing systems.

Traditional Whitelist Systems



Traditional WLs suffer from two problems:

1) Spammers can forge sender addresses

Traditional Whitelist Systems

Use anti-forgery mechanism to handle (1), similar to existing techniques.

Handle (2) with *social networks*

Traditional WLs suffer from two problems:

1) Spammers can forge sender addresses
2) Whitelists don't help with strangers

Approach: Use Social Networks



Attestation: B→A

A is a *friend* of B

B trusts A not to send him spam

- Bob whitelists people he trusts
- Bob *signs* attestation B→A
  - No one can forge attestations from Bob
  - Bob can share his attestations

Approach: Use Social Networks



- What if sender & recipient are not friends?
  - Note that B→A and A→C
  - B trusts C because he's a *friend-of-friend* (FoF)

Find FoFs: Attestation Servers



Note: no changes to SMTP, incremental deployment

Sharing attestations reveals your correspondents!

Privacy Goals



- Email recipients never reveal their friends
- Email senders only reveal specific friends queried for by recipients
- Only users who have actually received mail from the sender can query the sender for attestations

Outline

- Background / Related Work
- Design
  - Social networks and Attestations
  - Preserving Privacy
- Re: in Practice
- Evaluation
- Implementation
- Conclusion

Cryptographic Private Matching



PM Details

- First implementation & use of PM protocol
- Based on our previous work [Freedman04]
- Attestations encoded in encrypted polynomial
- Uses Homomorphic Encryption
  - Ex: Paillier, ElGamal variant
  - $enc(m1+m2) = enc(m1) \cdot enc(m2)$
  - $enc(c \cdot m1) = enc(m1)^c$

Restricting FoF Queries



- Sender can use token to restrict FoF query
  - Users have a public/secret key pair

Restricting FoF Queries



- Sender can use token to restrict FoF query
  - Users have a public/secret key pair
- Recipient can use token to detect forgery

Outline

- Background / Related Work
- Design
  - Social networks and Attestations
  - Preserving Privacy
- Re: in Practice
- Evaluation
- Implementation
- Conclusion

Scenario 1: Valid Mail Rejected



Scenario 2: Direct Acceptance



Scenario 3: FoF Acceptance



Outline

- Background / Related Work
- Design
  - Social networks and Attestations
  - Preserving Privacy
- Re: in Practice
- Evaluation
- Implementation
- Conclusion

Evaluation

- How often do content filters produce false positives?
- How many opportunities for FoF whitelisting beyond direct whitelisting?
- Would Re: eliminate actual false positives?

Trace Data

- For each message:
  - Sender and recipient (anonymized)
  - Spam or not as assessed by content-based spam filter
- Corporate trace
  - One month
  - 47 million messages total (58% spam)

False Positive Data

- Corporate mail server bounces spam
- Bounce allows sender to report FP
- Server admin validates reports and decides whether to whitelist sender
- We have a list of ~300 whitelisted senders
  - 2837 messages in trace from these senders that were marked as spam by content filter
  - These are almost certainly false positives

Opportunities for FoF Whitelisting

- FoF relationships help most when receiving mail from *strangers*.
- When user receives non-spam mail from a stranger, how often do they share a mutual correspondent?
  - **18%** of mail from strangers
  - Only counts mutual correspondents in trace
- Opportunity: when correspondents = friends

Saved FPs: Ideal Experiment

- Ideally: run Re: & content filter side-by-side
  - Measure how many FPs avoided by Re:



Saved FPs: Trace-Driven Experiment

- We have an implementation, but unfortunately, no deployment yet
- No social network data for traces
  - Infer friendship from previous non-spam messages
- Recall that 2837 messages were from people who reported FPs
- How many of these would Re: whitelist?

Re: would have saved 87% of these FPs
(71% direct, 16% FoF)

Implementation

- Prototype implementation in C++/libasync
  - Attestation Server
  - Private Matching (PM) implementation
  - Client & administrative utilities
  - 4500 LoC + XDR protocol description
- Integration
  - Mutt and Thunderbird mail clients
  - Mail Avenger SMTP server
  - Postfix mail client

Performance

- Direct attestations are cheap
- Friend-of-friend is somewhat slower
  - PM performance bottleneck is on sender's AS
    - Ex: intersecting two 40-friend sets takes 2.8 sec versus 0.032 sec for the recipient
  - But…
    - Many messages accepted by direct attestation
    - Can be parallelized
    - Performance improvements possible

Nuances

- Audit Trails
  - Recipients always know why they accepted a message (e.g., the mutual friend)
- Mailing Lists
  - Attest to list
  - Rely on moderator to eliminate spam
- Profiles
  - Senders use only a subset of possible attestations when answering FoF queries

Conclusion

- Email is no longer reliable because of FPs

Idea:

Whitelist friends of friends

- Preserve privacy using PM protocol
- Opportunity for FoF whitelisting
- Re: could eliminate up to 87% of real FPs
- Acceptable performance cost

Backup Slides

Coverage Tradeoff

- Trusting a central authority can get you more coverage (DQE)
  - Ex: random grad student



Coverage Tradeoff

- Social relationships can help avoid the need to trust a central authority (Re:)
  - Ex: friends, colleagues



Forgery Protection



- Users have a public/secret key pair
- Sender attaches a *signed authentication token* to each outgoing email message

Forgery Protection



- Recipient asks sender's AS to verify token
  - Assume: man-in-the-middle attack is difficult
  - Advantage: Don't need key distribution/PKI
- Sender can use token to restrict FoF query

Revocation

- What if A's key is lost or compromised?
- Two things are signed
  - Authentication tokens
  - Attestations

- Authentication tokens
  - User uploads new PK to AS
  - AS rejects tokens signed with the old key

Revocation: Attestations

- Local attestations
  - Delete local attestations (A→*)
- Remote attestations: *expiration*
  - If A gave A→B to B, Re: does not currently provide a way for A to tell B to delete the attestation
    - When A→B expires, B will stop using it for FoF
  - If C→A, C should stop trusting attestations signed by A's old key
    - When C→A expires, C will re-fetch A's public key

False Negatives

- Assumption: people will not attest to spammers
  - Therefore Re: does not have false negatives
- What if this assumption does not hold?
  - Remove offending attestations using audit trail
  - Attest without transitivity
    - A trusts B, but *not* B's friends
  - Don't share attestation with attestee
    - Ex: a mailing lists

PM Protocol Details

Sender's Attestation Server (AS)

Recipient (R)

$$P(y) = (x_1 - y)(x_2 - y)\ldots(x_{k_R} - y) = \sum_{u=0}^{k_R} a_u y^u$$

R has k_R friends

Canonical version of P(y)

Each x_i is one of R's friends

R constructs the P(y) so that each friend is a root of the polynomial

PM Protocol Details

Sender's Attestation Server (AS)

Recipient (R)

$$P(y) = (x_1 - y)(x_2 - y)\ldots(x_{k_R} - y)$$

$$= \sum_{u=0}^{k_R} a_u y^u$$

PM Protocol Details

Sender's Attestation Server (AS)

Recipient (R)

$$P(y) = (x_1 - y)(x_2 - y)...(x_{k_R} - y)$$

$$= \sum_{u=0}^{k_R} a_u y^u$$

Note: R never sends its attestations

$$enc(a_0), enc(a_1), ..., enc(a_{k_R})$$

<u>Use homomorphic encryption</u>
[Paillier, ElGamal variant]

enc(m1+m2) = enc(m1) · enc(m2)
enc(c · m1) = enc(m1)^c

PM Protocol Details

Sender's Attestation Server (AS)

Recipient (R)

$$P(y) = (x_1 - y)(x_2 - y)...(x_{k_R} - y)$$

$$= \sum_{u=0}^{k_R} a_u y^u$$

$$enc(a_0), enc(a_1), ..., enc(a_{k_R})$$

For each $y_1 ... y_{k_S}$ compute (people who have attested to S):

$$enc\left(P(y_i)\right) = enc\left(\sum_{u=0}^{k_R} a_u y_i^{\,u}\right) = enc(a_0) + enc(a_1)\, y_i + ... + enc(a_{k_R})\, y_i^{\,k_R}$$

PM Protocol Details

Sender's Attestation Server (AS)

Recipient (R)

$$P(y) = (x_1 - y)(x_2 - y)\ldots(x_{k_R} - y) = \sum_{u=0}^{k_R} a_u y^u$$

Computation complexity is $O(k_S^2)$

$$enc(a_0), enc(a_1), \ldots, enc(a_{k_R})$$

For each $y_1 \ldots y_{k_S}$ compute (people who have attested to S):

$$enc\left(P(y_i)\right) = enc\left(\sum_{u=0}^{k_R} a_u y_i^{\,u}\right) = enc(a_0) + enc(a_1)\, y_i + \ldots + enc(a_{k_R})\, y_i^{\,k_R}$$

Then

$$enc\left(r \cdot P(y_i) + \{y_i \longrightarrow S\}\right) \longrightarrow$$

Recover $y_i \longrightarrow S$ or a random value

random value: r

attestation: $\{y_i \longrightarrow S\}$

PM Performance



WL Effectiveness: Conservative



WL Effectiveness: Strangers Only, Conservative



WL Effectiveness: Best Case



WL Effectiveness: Strangers Only, Best Case