
A Distributed Reputation Approach to Cooperative Interdomain Routing Protection

Harlan Yu, Jennifer Rexford, Edward W. Felten


Department of Computer Science Princeton University

BGP Interdomain Routing




• Border Gateway Protocol is vital to the Internet

BGP Interdomain Routing




• AS88 (Princeton) announces it owns 128.112.0.0/16

BGP Prefix Announcement



• AS7 routes to $128.112.0.0/16 \ (7 \to 4 \to 3 \to 2 \to 88)$

BGP Prefix Hijack



• AS666 maliciously announces it owns 128.112.0.0/16

Problem of Trust

- ASes blindly use advertised routes
- What if trustworthy ASes could cooperate?
 - Multiple vantage points for troubleshooting
 - Share existing local debugging results
- Can leverage existing real-world trust relationships
 - Personal relationships (i.e. NANOG)
 - Institutional trust


Online Reputation Systems

- Most deployments:
 - Centralized model (eBay)
 - Focus on reputation of actors (people)
- Our work:
 - Decentralized peer-to-peer model (overlay network)
 - Focus on reputation of objects (BGP routes)

Proposed Architecture


- 1. Trust-based overlay network
- 2. Distributed voting protocol

Trust-based Overlay Network




• Trusted links not confined to physical neighbors

Trust-based Overlay Network




• Trusted links not confined to physical neighbors

Distributed Voting Protocol



- Vote on truth of propositions: $\{-1, 0, +1\}$
 - "Can AS666 originate prefix 128.112.0.0/16?"


Distributed Voting Protocol



• Apply weight function on average of neighbors' votes

$$V = \alpha V_N + (1 - \alpha) V_{avg} \qquad (0 \le \alpha \le 1)$$

Distributed Voting Protocol



- AS7 recalculates V until convergence
- If $V \leq$ threshold T, re-install old route to AS88.

Advantages

• Difficult to shill the entire system



- Incrementally deployable
- Multiple vantage points
 - A shortcut to valuable debugging information
- Agnostic to the nature of the fault
- Automated router reconfiguration upon detection

Limitations

- Not inherently capable of detecting faults
- Possible to propagate false information
- Overlay network susceptible to the same faults

Summary

- Leverage real-world network operator trust relationships
- Build trust directly into the network architecture
- Distributed voting for cooperative information sharing
- Enhance ability to fix and avoid faults in BGP routing

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Questions?