
Measuring Unnecessary Exposure of Network Traffic To Nation States

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Method

 Examined over 23,000,000 traceroute paths from Ripe Atlas Traceroutes Data Mapped each IP address in the path back to an 	• As No
AS/Nation state tuple	
• Compressed repeated tuple instances down to a single	Ľ
instance	
 Path considered normal if no countries outside our 	
previously defined set are found	• The
 Only considered nations and ASes with over 200 	• The
traceroutes where they are the source, destination, and	exp
transit entity separately.	

Regional Degree of Normality

	Africa	Americas	Asia	Europe	Oceania
DoN From	.1464	.5707	.2356	.4202	.2110
DoN To	.1791	.5807	.1898	.4098	.1404
DoN Transit	.1799	.2849	.1666	.3806	.1507
To \ From	Africa	Americas	Asia	Europe	Oceania
Africa	.2943	.3365	.0663	.1660	.0196
Americas	.1863	.7157	.3829	.5975	.4048
	.1863 .0576	.7157 .3341	.3829 .2091	.5975 .1643	.4048 .1023
Asia					
Asia Europe	.0576	.3341	.2091	.1643	.1023
Americas Asia Europe Oceania	.0576 .1453 .0070	.3341 .5680	.2091 .2043 .1336	.1643 .4331 .0353	.1023 .1020 .7620

 The logical and geographical topologies of the internet do not necessarily line up

- Question: Does the logical topology of make sense geographically?
- Answer: In the majority of instances it does not.
- Example: a compressed observed traceroute path at a nation level:
- France \rightarrow United States \rightarrow Great Britain \rightarrow Germany Non-logical geographical paths like the example to the left occur frequently, needlessly exposing traffic
- to extraneous nation states • Challenge: How do we algorithmically measure the irregularity of the geographical topology of the Internet?

a metric of normalcy, we have defined **Degree of** ormality (DoN) as:

$$PoN = \frac{total "normal" paths seen}{total paths seen}$$

e DoN over all of the paths examined was 0.409 ne majority (3 out of 5) paths examined nedlessly pose traffic to extraneous nation states


he Americas have a higher than average DoN when they re the source or destination of a path, but when providing ansit for a path they have a *much lower* DoN contrast, Europe sees very little change in DoN given neir role in the path


II regions but Africa and Asia have above average DoN hen staying inside the region


path from Europe to the Americas has a better chance of eing normal than a path staying inside Europe

oN from one region to another is highly symmetrical

- **Challenge:** Need to mathematically define the set of expected countries traffic could be exposed to, which we term geographically normal
- **Solution:** Using the *convex hull* between a set of points defining the source country and a set of points defining the destination country
- **Challenge**: A nation's political borders do not necessarily
- reflect where the bulk of the Internet infrastructure resides **Solution:** Define two polygons for each country: one using the political borders of the country, and one using the locations of the 15 most populous cities in each country.







Case Study: Unnecessary Exposure to the Five Eyes

- The Five Eyes is a known intelligence sharing alliance including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States
- The DoN for paths from a Five Eyes country to a Five Eyes country is .471, about 13% higher than the overall average
- Country A *"benefits"* from country B if country B needlessly exposes its traffic to country A, illustrated with the Five Eyes to the left
- 4 out of the 5 members of the Five Eyes are in the top 15 countries that the group "benefits" from the most

