COS 217: Introduction to Programming Systems

The Assignment 6 'B' Attack





A Program

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(void)
{
    char name[12], c;
    int i = 0, magic = 42;
    printf("What is your name?\n");
    while ((c = getchar()) != '\n')
        name[i++] = c;
    name[i] = '\0';
    printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
    printf("The answer to life, the universe, "
        "and everything is %d\n", magic);
    return 0;
}
```



```
$ ./a.out
What is your name?
John Smith
Thank you, John Smith.
The answer to life, the universe, and everything is 42
```



A Reason Why People With Long Names Can't Have Nic

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\$./a.out
What is your name?
Christopher Moretti
Thank you, Christopher Mor
tti.
The answer to life, the universe, and everything is 6911092

Explanation: Stack Frame Layout

When there are too many characters, program carelessly writes beyond space "belonging" to name.

- Overwrites other variables
- This is a *buffer overrun*, or stack smash
- The program has a security bug!

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    int i = 0, magic = 42;
    printf("What is your name?\n");
    while ((c = getchar()) != '\n')
        name[i++] = c;
    name[i] = '\0';
    printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
    printf("The answer to life, the universe, "
        "and everything is %d\n", magic);
    return 0;
}
```





Example Trace



5 Second t makes magic 29812 (2 high-order bytes still 0) Final i makes magic 6911092 (1 high-order byte still 0)





It Gets Worse...

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Buffer overrun can overwrite return address of a previous stack frame!





It Gets Worse...

Buffer overrun can overwrite return address of a previous stack frame!

• Value can be an invalid address, leading to a segfault,...







It Gets Much Worse...



• Value can be an invalid address, leading to a segfault, or it can cleverly cause unintended control flow!



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VET NOV

It Gets Much, Much Worse...

Buffer overrun can overwrite return address of a previous stack frame!

 Value can be an invalid address, leading to a segfault, or it can cleverly cause unintended control flow, or even cause arbitrary malicious code to execute!

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(void)
{
    char name[12], c;
    int i = 0, magic = 42;
    printf("What is your name?\n");
    while ((c = getchar()) != '\n')
        name[i++] = c;
    name[i] = '\0';
    printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
    printf("The answer to life, the universe, "
        "and everything is %d\n", magic);
    return 0;
}
```





Defenses Against This Attack Best: program in languages that make array-out-of-bounds impossible (Java, C#, ML, python,) The strcpy() function copies the string pointed to by src, including the terminating null byte ('\0'), to the buffer pointed to by dest. The strings may not overlap, and the destination string dest must be large enough to receive the copy. Beware of buffer overruns! (See BUGS.) BUGS Never use gets(). Because it is impossible to tell without knowing the data in advance how many characters gets() will read, and because gets() will continue to store characters past the end of the buffer, it is extremely dangerous to use. It has been used to break computer security. Use fgets() instead. If you must program in C: use discipline and None of these would have software analysis tools to check bounds of prevented the array subscripts "Heartbleed" attack Otherwise, stopgap security patches: • Operating system randomizes initial stack pointer

- "No-execute" memory permission
- "Canaries" at end of stack frames



Assignment 6: Attack the "Grader" Program

```
enum {BUFSIZE = 48};
char grade = 'D';
char name[BUFSIZE];
int main(void) {
   mprotect(...);
   getname();
   if (strcmp(name, "Andrew Appel") == 0)
      grade = 'B';
   printf("%c is your grade.\n", grade);
   printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
   return 0;
```

\$./grader
What is your name?
Bob
D is your grade.
Thank you, Bob.
\$./grader
What is your name?
Andrew Appel
B is your grade.
Thank you, Andrew Appel.

Assignment 6 : Attack the "Grader" Program





Assignment 6: Attack the "Grader" Program

```
int main(void) {
   getname();
   if (strcmp(name, "Andrew Appel") == 0)
      grade = 'B';
   printf("%c is your grade.\n", grade);
   printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
   return 0;
}
```

\$./grader

What is your name?

Bob\0(#@&\$%*#&(*^!@%*!!(&#\$%(@*

B is your grade.

```
Thank you, Bob.
```





Assignment 6: Attack the "Grader" Program

```
int main(void) {
   getname();
   if (strcmp(name, "Andrew Appel") == 0)
      grade = 'B';
   printf("%c is your grade.\n", grade);
   printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
   return 0;
}
```

\$./grader

What is your name?

Bob\0(#@&\$%*#&(*^!@%*!!(&#\$%(@*

B is your grade.

```
Thank you, Bob.
```





Construct Your Exploit String (createdataB.c)

1. Your name.

After all, the grader program's last line of output must be: "Thank you, [your name]."

2. A null byte.

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- Otherwise the grader program's last line of output will be corrupted.
- 3. Filler to overrun until x30.
 - Presumably more null bytes are easiest, but easter eggs are fine.

4. The address of grade = 'B'.

- Open the file dataB and write your name into that file (e.g. with fprintf)
- See "Writing Binary Data" precept handout. '\0' is just a single byte of binary data.

The address is a little-endian two's complement unsigned long.

Summary

- This lecture:
 - Buffer overrun attacks in general
 - Assignment 6 "B Attack" principles of operation
- Next precept:
 - Assignment 6 "B Attack" recap
 - Memory map using gdb
 - Writing binary data
- Final 2 lectures:
 - Assignment 6 "A Attack" overview
 - Machine language details needed for "A Attack"
 - *Finally* finishing the 4-stage build process: the Linker!
- Final precept:
- MiniAssembler and "A Attack" details