

Security Issues in Web Programming (Part 4)

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Princeton University

Objectives

- We will cover:
 - Data storage attacks
 - Data comm attacks
 - Third-party authentication (briefly):
 - CAS authentication
 - Microsoft EntraID authentication
 - Google authentication
 - Auth0 authentication

Agenda

- **Data storage attacks**
- Data comm attacks
- Third-party authentication (briefly)
 - CAS authentication
 - Microsoft EntraID authentication
 - Google authentication
 - Auth0 authentication


Data Storage Attacks

- **Problem:**
 - PennyAdmin app stores passwords in DB
 - If attacker gains access to DB
 - ... Then attacker learns passwords

Data Storage Attacks

- **Insight:**

- PennyAdmin doesn't really need to store passwords
- It's sufficient for PennyAdmin to know if a given password is correct



How can PennyAdmin know if a given password is correct if passwords are not stored in its DB? (No fair looking at the next slide.)

Data Storage Attacks

- **Solution:**
 - Store *password hash codes* instead of passwords
 - `hash_code = hash(password)`

Data Storage Attacks

- Which hash function?
 - *md5*?
 - `hash_code = md5(password)`
 - No! See <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD5>
 - *sha256*?
 - `hash_code = sha256(password)`
 - Yes! See <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-2>

Data Storage Attacks

- See **PennyAdmin8aHash** app
 - runserver.py
 - **penny.sql**, penny.sqlite
 - database.py
 - header.html, footer.html
 - index.html, show.html,
 - add.html, delete.html, reportresults.html
 - login.html, signup.html, loggedout.html
 - top.py, penny.py, **auth.py**

Data Storage Attacks

- **Problem:**

- PennyAdmin app stores password hash codes in DB
- If attacker gains access to DB, then...
 - Attacker learns password hash codes
- If a password is common, then...
 - Attacker might find password hash code in a *rainbow table* (huge malevolent list of hash codes), and thereby learn the password

Data Storage Attacks

- **Example:**

- Password:

- xxx


- sha256 hash code of that password:

- cd2eb0837c9b4c962c22d2ff8b5441b7b45805887f
051d39bf133b583baf6860

- See <https://crackstation.net/>

- Can derive xxx

Data Storage Attacks



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the title "CrackStation - Online Password Hash Cracking - MD5, SHA1, Linux, Rainbow Tables, etc. - Chromium". The address bar shows "crackstation.net". The website has a dark header with the "CrackStation" logo and links to "Defuse.ca" and "Twitter". A navigation menu includes "CrackStation", "Password Hashing Security", and "Defuse Security".

Free Password Hash Cracker

Enter up to 20 non-salted hashes, one per line:

```
cd2eb0837c9b4c962c22d2ff8b5441b7b45805887f051d39bf133b583baf6860
```

[6860](#)

[Crack Hashes](#)

Supports: LM, NTLM, md2, md4, md5, md5(md5_hex), md5-half, sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, ripeMD160, whirlpool, MySQL 4.1+ (sha1 sha1_bin), QubesV3.1BackupDefaults

Download CrackStation's Wordlist

How CrackStation Works

CrackStation uses massive pre-computed lookup tables to crack password hashes. These tables store a mapping between the hash of a password, and the correct password for that hash. The hash values are indexed so that it is possible to quickly search the database for a given hash. If the hash is present in the database, the password can be recovered in a fraction of a second. This only works for "unsalted" hashes. For information on password hashing systems that are not vulnerable to pre-computed lookup tables, see our [hashing security page](#).

Data Storage Attacks

CrackStation - Online Password Hash Cracking - MD5, SHA1, Linux, Rainbow Tables, etc. - Chromium

CrackStation - Online Password x +

crackstation.net

CrackStation


Defuse.ca · Twitter

CrackStation Password Hashing Security Defuse Security

Free Password Hash Cracker

Enter up to 20 non-salted hashes, one per line:

cd2eb0837c9b4c962c22d2ff8b5441b7b45805887f051d39bf133b583baf6860

☐ I'm not a robot 
reCAPTCHA
Privacy - Terms

Crack Hashes

Supports: LM, NTLM, md2, md4, md5, md5(md5_hex), md5-half, sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, ripeMD160, whirlpool, MySQL 4.1+ (sha1 sha1_bin), QubesV3.1BackupDefaults

Hash	Type	Result
cd2eb0837c9b4c962c22d2ff8b5441b7b45805887f051d39bf133b583baf6860	sha256	xxx

Color Codes: Green Exact match, Yellow Partial match, Red Not found.

Data Storage Attacks

- **Solution:**

- Store hash codes of *salted* passwords
 - `hash_code = sha256('!@#$%^' + password)`
 - hash codes of salted passwords will not be found in a rainbow table

Data Storage Attacks

- **Problem:**

- If an attacker learns the app's salt string, then the attacker (with lots of effort) might generate a rainbow table that contains hash codes for common salted passwords
 - ... And so might discover the app's (common) passwords

- **Solution:**

- Use a different salt string for each password

Data Storage Attacks

Salting and sha256 hashing in Python

```
$ python
>>> import werkzeug.security
>>> h = werkzeug.security.generate_password_hash('xxx', 'pbkdf2')
>>> h
'pbkdf2:sha256:600000$G8hNoAKf6ttD5iBa$262b04f2f287889ddffd77b0a735
b543491954d917d20bb36ae6ce2bd0ee5fde'
>>> werkzeug.security.check_password_hash(h, 'xxx')
True
>>> werkzeug.security.check_password_hash(h, 'yyy')
False
>>> quit()
$
```

Data Storage Attacks

Salting and sha256 hashing in Python

algorithm

salt

hashcode

```
pbkdf2 : sha256 : 600000$G8hNoAKf6ttD5iBa$262b04  
f2f287889ddffd77b0a735b543491954d917d20bb36a  
e6ce2bd0ee5fde
```


Data Storage Attacks

- See **PennyAdmin8bSaltHash** app
 - runserver.py
 - **penny.sql**, penny.sqlite
 - database.py
 - header.html, footer.html
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 - login.html, signup.html, loggedout.html
 - top.py, penny.py, **auth.py**

Data Storage Attacks

- Q: Project concern?
- A: **Yes**
 - If your app does its own checking of user passwords

Agenda

- Data storage attacks
- **Data comm attacks**
- Third-party authentication (briefly)
 - CAS authentication
 - Microsoft EntraID authentication
 - Google authentication
 - Auth0 authentication

Data Comm Attacks

- **Problem:**
 - Attacker may access data during comm between PennyAdmin app and browser
- **Solution:**
 - *Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS)*

Data Comm Attacks

- **Technical** advantages of using HTTPS
 - Confidentiality
 - Prohibits *message eavesdropping attacks*
 - Integrity
 - Prohibits *message tampering attacks*
 - Authentication
 - Prohibits *message forgery attacks*

Data Comm Attacks

- **Business** advantages of using HTTPS
 - Increases user confidence/trust in website
 - Increases Google search rank of website

Data Comm Attacks

- How HTTPS works:

Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS)

Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)

Data Comm Attacks

- How to use HTTPS:
 - Configure server & app to use (& require use of) HTTPS
 - Command browser to send request specifying HTTPS as protocol
 - `https://...`

Data Comm Attacks

- How to configure server & app to use (& require use of) HTTPS:
 - Depends upon server...

Data Comm Attacks

- **Render server**

- Already configured to use (& require use of) HTTPS
 - When server receives `http://something` request, it sends redirect for `https://something` request
- So:
 - **Server:** Do nothing!
 - **App:** Do nothing!

Data Comm Attacks

- **Heroku server**

- Already configured to use (but not require use of) HTTPS
 - When server receives **https**://*something* request, it uses HTTPS
 - When server receives **http**://*something* request, it uses HTTP
- So
 - **Server:** (Regrettably) Do nothing!
 - **App:** Small change...

Data Comm Attacks

- **Solution 1:**
 - App explicitly performs redirects

Data Comm Attacks

- See **PennyAdmin9aHttps** app
 - runserver.py
 - penny.sql, penny.sqlite
 - database.py
 - header.html, footer.html
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Data Comm Attacks

- **Solution 2:**
 - *flask_talisman* module

Data Comm Attacks

- See **PennyAdmin9bHttps** app
 - runserver.py
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 - header.html, footer.html
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 - login.html, signup.html, loggedout.html
 - top.py, **penny.py**, auth.py

Data Comm Attacks

- Notes:
 - Good to design your app to require use of HTTPS even when the app server already forces use of HTTPS
 - flask_talisman implements some additional security measures
 - Need not configure Flask test server to use (or require use of) HTTPS
 - But if you want to...
 - Or if you're using Google authentication...

Data Comm Attacks

- How to configure Flask test server & app to use (& require use of) HTTPS:

Data Comm Attacks

- **Preliminary step:** Get a *certificate* for your app
- **Option 1:** Get a certificate that is signed by a *certificate authority*

Data Comm Attacks

Certificate authorities:

Rank	Authority	Market Share
1	Let's Encrypt	59.9%
2	GlobalSign	21.0%
3	Sectigo	5.6%
4	GoDaddy	3.9%
5	DigiCert	3.1%

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority#Providers

(as of July 2024, the most recent data available on Wikipedia as of Nov 2025)

Data Comm Attacks

- **Preliminary step:** Get a certificate for your app
- **Option 1:** Buy a certificate that is signed by a certificate authority
- **Option 2:** Create a ***self-signed certificate***

Data Comm Attacks

Linux, Mac, MS Windows Git Bash:

```
$ openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -out cert.pem -keyout key.pem -days 365
Generating a RSA private key
.....+++++
.....+++++
writing new private key to 'key.pem'
-----
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
-----
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]: US
State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]: NJ
Locality Name (eg, city) []: Princeton
Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]: Princeton University
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:
Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) []: localhost
Email Address []:
$
```

Output: cert.pem, key.pem

Data Comm Attacks


- Self-signed certificate
 - Confidentiality: yes
 - Integrity: yes
 - Authentication: no

Data Comm Attacks

- See **PennyAdmin09cHttpsLocal** app
 - **runserver.py**
 - penny.sql, penny.sqlite
 - database.py
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
Data Comm Attacks

- See **PennyAdmin09cHttpsLocal** app
 - On local computer with Flask test server (using self-signed certif)




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Data Comm Attacks

- See **PennyAdmin09cHttpsLocal** app
 - On local computer with Flask test server (using self-signed certif)



Data Comm Attacks

- Q: Project concern?
- A: **Yes**

Agenda

- Data storage Attacks
- Data comm attacks
- **Third-party authentication (briefly)**
 - CAS authentication
 - Microsoft EntraID authentication
 - Google authentication
 - Auth0 authentication

Agenda


- Data storage attacks
- Data comm attacks
- Third-party authentication (briefly)
 - **CAS authentication**
 - Microsoft EntraID authentication
 - Google authentication
 - Auth0 authentication

CAS Authentication

- See **PennyAdminCas** app
 - Its behavior...

CAS Authentication

- See **PennyAdminCas** app (cont.)



CAS Authentication

- See **PennyAdminCas** app (cont.)

CAS - Central Authentication Service Login - Chromium

CAS - Central Authentication

fed.princeton.edu/cas/login?service=http%3A//localhost%3A5555/

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Central Authentication Service

NetID*

rdondero

Password*

.....

LOGIN


[Change my Password or Get Help](#)

By proceeding to access and use University computing and network resources through this sign-on, you agree to abide by applicable laws and University policies in your use of these resources. The University's right to access, preserve, and review information stored on or transmitted through these resources is described in the [Access to Accounts Policy](#).

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
CAS Authentication

- See **PennyAdminCas** app (cont.)




CAS Authentication

- See **PennyAdminCas** app (cont.)




CAS Authentication

- See **PennyAdminCas** app (cont.)




CAS Authentication

- See **PennyAdminCas** app (cont.)




CAS Authentication

- See **PennyAdminCas** app (cont.)




CAS Authentication

- See **PennyAdminCas** app (cont.)



CAS Authentication

- See **PennyAdminCas** app (cont.)



The screenshot shows a web browser window titled "CAS - Central Authentication Service Login - Chromium". The address bar displays the URL "fed.princeton.edu/cas/login?service=http%3A//localhost%3A55555/index". The page content is enclosed in a white box with an orange border. At the top, the Princeton University logo is followed by the text "PRINCETON UNIVERSITY" and "Central Authentication Service". Below this, there are two input fields: "NetID*" and "Password:". The "NetID*" field is empty, and a red error message "NetID is a required field." is displayed below it. The "Password:" field has a toggle icon (an eye) to its right. A dark blue "LOGIN" button is centered below the input fields. At the bottom of the box, there is a link "Change my Password or Get Help" and a paragraph of legal text: "By proceeding to access and use University computing and network resources through this sign-on, you agree to abide by applicable laws and University policies in your use of these resources. The University's right to access, preserve, and review information stored on or transmitted through these resources is described in the [Access to Accounts Policy](#)." Below the box, the footer text reads "© 2023 The Trustees of Princeton University".

CAS Authentication

- See **PennyAdminCas** app (cont.)
 - See optional lecture material for:
 - The code
 - How to run it on your local computer
 - How to run it on Render
 - How it works

CAS Authentication

- **Pros**

- Application need not manage usernames or passwords
- Application ***cannot*** access passwords!
- Application is constrained to one user community
- Princeton OIT will support for the foreseeable future

CAS Authentication

- **Cons**

- Complex
- Adds overhead, but only during user's first visit to the app per browser session
- Application is constrained to one user community!
- Princeton OIT is phasing out
- Deployment requires (minimal) Princeton OIT intervention

Agenda


- Data comm attacks
- Third-party authentication (briefly)
 - CAS authentication
 - **Microsoft EntraID authentication**
 - Google authentication
 - Auth0 authentication

EntraID Authentication

- See **PennyAdminEntraID** app
 - Its behavior...


EntraID Authentication

- See **PennyAdminEntraID** app (cont.)



EntraID Authentication


- See **PennyAdminEntraID** app (cont.)



The screenshot shows a web browser window titled "Sign in to your account - Chromium". The address bar shows "login.microsof...". The page content includes the Princeton University logo and the text "PRINCETON UNIVERSITY". Below this is a "Sign in" section with a text input field containing "rdondero@princeton.edu". A red box highlights this input field. Below the input field is a link "Can't access your account?". To the right of the input field is a blue "Next" button, also highlighted with a red box. Below the "Next" button is a link "Change my Princeton password or Get help from Princeton OIT". At the bottom of the sign-in section is a "Sign-in options" section with a key icon. At the very bottom of the page are links for "Terms of use" and "Privacy & cookies".

EntraID Authentication


- See **PennyAdminEntraID** app (cont.)



The screenshot shows a web browser window titled "Sign in to your account - Chromium". The address bar displays "login.microsof...". The page content includes the Princeton University logo and name, followed by the email address "rdondero@princeton.edu". Below this is the heading "Enter password" and a password input field, which is highlighted with a red rectangle. A "Forgot my password" link is positioned below the input field. To the right of the input field is a blue "Sign in" button, also highlighted with a red rectangle. At the bottom of the page, there is a link to "Change my Princeton password or Get help from Princeton OIT". The footer contains links for "Terms of use" and "Privacy & cookies".


EntraID Authentication

- See **PennyAdminEntraID** app (cont.)




EntraID Authentication

- See **PennyAdminEntraID** app (cont.)




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
EntraID Authentication

- See **PennyAdminEntraID** app (cont.)




EntraID Authentication

- See **PennyAdminEntraID** app (cont.)




EntraID Authentication

- See **PennyAdminEntraID** app (cont.)




EntraID Authentication

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
EntraID Authentication

- See **PennyAdminEntraID** app (cont.)



EntraID Authentication


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
EntraID Authentication

- See **PennyAdminEntraID** app (cont.)



EntraID Authentication

- See **PennyAdminEntraID** app (cont.)



EntraID Authentication

- See **PennyAdminEntraID** app (cont.)
 - See optional lecture material for:
 - The code
 - How to run it on your local computer
 - How to run it on Render

EntraID Authentication

- **Pros**

- Application need not manage usernames or passwords
- Application ***cannot*** access passwords!
- Application is constrained to one user community
- More standards-based than CAS
- Princeton OIT is phasing in
- No need for Princeton OIT intervention

EntraID Authentication

- **Cons**

- Complex
- Adds overhead, but only during user's first visit to the app per browser session
- Application is constrained to one user community!

Agenda


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Google Authentication

- See **PennyAdminGoogle** app
 - Its behavior...


Google Authentication

- See **PennyAdminGoogle** app (cont.)



Google Authentication

- See **PennyAdminGoogle** app (cont.)



The screenshot shows a Chromium browser window titled "Sign in - Google Accounts - Chromium". The address bar displays "accounts.google.com/v3/signin/identifier?opparams=%253F&...". The page content includes the Google logo and the text "Sign in with Google". Below this, the heading "Sign in" is followed by the text "to continue to PennyAdmin". A text input field labeled "Email or phone" is highlighted with a red rectangle. Below the input field is a link "Forgot email?". Further down, a message states: "To continue, Google will share your name, email address, language preference, and profile picture with PennyAdmin." At the bottom right, there are two buttons: "Create account" and a blue "Next" button, which is also highlighted with a red rectangle. The footer of the page shows "English (United States)" with a dropdown arrow, and links for "Help", "Privacy", and "Terms".

Google Authentication

- See **PennyAdminGoogle** app (cont.)

Sign in - Google Accounts - Chromium

Sign in - Google Accounts

accounts.google.com/v3/signin/challenge/pwd?TL=AEzbmXzNS...

Incognito

Sign in with Google

Welcome

Enter your password

☐ Show password


To continue, Google will share your name, email address, language preference, and profile picture with PennyAdmin.

[Forgot password?](#) [Next](#)

English (United States) [Help](#) [Privacy](#) [Terms](#)


Google Authentication

- See **PennyAdminGoogle** app (cont.)




Google Authentication

- See **PennyAdminGoogle** app (cont.)




Google Authentication

- See **PennyAdminGoogle** app (cont.)




Google Authentication

- See PennyAdminGoogle app (cont.)



Google Authentication

- See PennyAdminGoogle app (cont.)



How to
show
loggedout
page?

Google Authentication

- See **PennyAdminGoogle** app (cont.)
 - See optional lecture material for:
 - The code
 - How to run it on your local computer
 - How to run it on Render
 - How it works

Google Authentication

- **Pros**

- Users need not remember (yet another) password
- Application need not manage usernames or passwords
- Application ***cannot*** access passwords
- Application can access profile info that user provided to Google
 - Given name, family name, picture, ...

Google Authentication

- **Cons**

- Complex
- Adds overhead, but mostly only during first user visit per browser session
- Application is constrained to users who have Google accounts
- Must use HTTPS with local server
- If attacker learns user's password for **Google**, then attacker learns user's password for **your app**

Agenda

- Data comm attacks
- Third-party authentication (briefly)
 - CAS
 - Microsoft EntraID authentication
 - Google authentication
 - **Auth0 authentication**

Auth0 Authentication

- *Auth0*

- <https://auth0.com>
- A private company
- Sells authentication services
- Has a free tier




Auth0 Authentication

- See **PennyAdminAuth0** app
 - Its behavior...


Auth0 Authentication

- See **PennyAdminAuth0** app (cont.)




Auth0 Authentication

- See **PennyAdminAuth0** app (cont.)




Auth0 Authentication

- See **PennyAdminAuth0** app (cont.)




Auth0 Authentication

- See **PennyAdminAuth0** app (cont.)




Auth0 Authentication

- See **PennyAdminAuth0** app (cont.)




Auth0 Authentication

- See **PennyAdminAuth0** app (cont.)



Auth0 Authentication

- See **PennyAdminAuth0** app (cont.)



Auth0 Authentication

- See **PennyAdminAuth0** app (cont.)
 - See optional lecture material for:
 - The code
 - How to run it on your local computer
 - How to run it on Render

Auth0 Authentication

- **Pros**

- Application need not manage usernames or passwords
- Application ***cannot*** access passwords
- Application can access profile info that user provided to Auth0
- Many options available
 - Two-factor authentication
 - Google login alternative
- Good documentation
- Users not constrained to Princeton or Google

Auth0 Authentication

- **Cons**

- Complex
- Adds overhead, but mostly only during first user visit per browser session
- Free tier limits login count (but the limit is generous)

Lecture Summary

- In this lecture we covered:
 - Data storage attacks
 - Data comm attacks
 - Third-party authentication (briefly)
 - CAS authentication
 - Microsoft EntraID authentication
 - Google authentication
 - Auth0 authentication

Lecture Series Summary

- In this lecture series we covered:
 - SQL injection attacks
 - Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks
 - Authentication & authorization
 - Cookie forgery attacks
 - Cookie privacy attacks
 - Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks
 - Data storage attacks
 - Data comm attacks
 - Third-party authentication (briefly)

More Information

- The COS 333 *Lectures* web page provides references to supplementary information