


COS 217: Introduction to Programming Systems

Buffer Overrun Vulnerabilities and Assignment 6 (The 'B' Attack)



CYBERSECURITY FINAL EXAMS

xkcd.com/2385



PRINCETON UNIVERSITY



Yet another character reading loop program ...

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(void)
{
    char name[12], c;
    int i = 0, magic = 42;
    printf("What is your name?\n");
    while ((c = getchar()) != '\n')
        name[i++] = c;
    name[i] = '\0';
    printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
    printf("The answer to life, the universe, "
           "and everything is %d\n", magic);
    return 0;
}
```

\$./a.out

What is your name?

John Smith

Thank you, John Smith.

The answer to life, the universe, and everything is 42





Why People With Long Names Have Issues with Computer Sys

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(void)
{
    char name[12], c;
    int i = 0, magic = 42;
    printf("What is your name?\n");
    while ((c = getchar()) != '\n')
        name[i++] = c;
    name[i] = '\0';
    printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
    printf("The answer to life, the universe, "
        "and everything is %d\n", magic);
    return 0;
}
```

\$./a.out

What is your name?

Szymon Rusinkiewicz

Thank you, Szymon Rusinkie

icz.

The answer to life, the universe, and everything is 8020841

? ???!!?!?

(Note: this is just the number that's actually printed when you actually run the code. It's not an attempt to Easter egg a phone number or anything like that. Please don't try to call it. kthx)




Explanation: Stack Frame Layout

When there are too many characters, program carelessly writes beyond space “belonging” to name.

- Overwrites other variables
- This is a *buffer overrun*, or *stack smash*
- The program has a security bug!

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(void)
{
    char name[12], c;
    int i = 0, magic = 42;
    printf("What is your name?\n");
    while ((c = getchar()) != '\n')
        name[i++] = c;
    name[i] = '\0';
    printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
    printf("The answer to life, the universe, "
        "and everything is %d\n", magic);
    return 0;
}
```






It Gets Worse...

Buffer overrun can overwrite onto its caller function's stack frame!

```
#include <stdio.h>
int callee(void)
{
    char name[12], c;
    int i = 0, magic = 42;
    printf("What is your name?\n");
    while ((c = getchar()) != '\n')
        name[i++] = c;
    name[i] = '\0';
    printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
    printf("The answer to life, the universe, "
           "and everything is %d\n", magic);
    return 0;
}
```






It Gets Worse...

And somewhere on caller's stack frame is the saved return address for that function ...

Buffer overrun can overwrite caller's return address!

- Replacement value can be an invalid address, leading to a segfault, or ...

```
#include <stdio.h>
int callee(void)
{
    char name[12], c;
    int i = 0, magic = 42;
    printf("What is your name?\n");
    while ((c = getchar()) != '\n')
        name[i++] = c;
    name[i] = '\0';
    printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
    printf("The answer to life, the universe, "
           "and everything is %d\n", magic);
    return 0;
}
```






It Gets **Much** Worse...

And somewhere on caller's stack frame is the saved return address for that function ...

Buffer overrun can overwrite caller's return address!

- Replacement value can be an invalid address, leading to a segfault, or **it can cleverly cause unintended control flow!**

```
#include <stdio.h>
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{
    char name[12], c;
    int i = 0, magic = 42;
    printf("What is your name?\n");
    while ((c = getchar()) != '\n')
        name[i++] = c;
    name[i] = '\0';
    printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
    printf("The answer to life, the universe, "
           "and everything is %d\n", magic);
    return 0;
}
```





It Gets Much, Much Worse...

And somewhere on caller's stack frame is the saved return address for that function ...


Buffer overrun can overwrite caller's return address!

- Replacement value can be an invalid address, leading to a segfault, or it can cleverly cause unintended control flow, **or even cause arbitrary malicious code to run!**

```

#include <stdio.h>
int callee(void)
{
    char name[12], c;
    int i = 0, magic = 42;
    printf("What is your name?\n");
    while ((c = getchar()) != '\n')
        name[i++] = c;
    name[i] = '\0';
    printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
    printf("The answer to life, the universe, "
           "and everything is %d\n", magic);
    return 0;
}

```





Attacking a Web Server

URLs


Input in web forms

Crypto keys for SSL



etc.



Client PC



Web Server



this is a really long search term that overflows a buffer



Attacking Everything in Sight

webp image library ([9/2023](#))

C/C++ MP4 video library ([4/2023](#))

OpenSSL crypto library ([11/2022](#))


Smart UPS devices ([3/2022](#))

Zoom ([11/2021](#))

VLC media player ([1/2019](#))

Nintendo Switch ([4/2018](#))

...



E-mail clients

PDF viewers

Operating-system kernels

TCP/IP Stack

Any application that ever sees input directly from the outside!



Defenses Against This Attack

Best: program in languages that make array-out-of-bounds impossible (Java, python, C#, ML, ...)

But if you need to use C...



Defenses Against This Attack

In C: use discipline and software analysis tools to check bounds of array subscripts

DESCRIPTION

The `strcpy()` function copies the string pointed to by `src`, including the terminating null byte (`'\0'`), to the buffer pointed to by `dest`. The strings may not overlap, and the destination string `dest` must be large enough to receive the copy. **Beware of buffer overruns!** (See BUGS.)

BUGS

Never use `gets()`. Because it is impossible to tell without knowing the data in advance how many characters `gets()` will read, and because `gets()` will continue to store characters past the end of the buffer, it is extremely dangerous to use. It has been used to break computer security. Use `fgets()` instead.

Augmented by OS- or compiler-level mitigations:

- Randomize initial stack pointer
- “No-execute” memory permission for sections other than `.text`
- “Canaries” at end of stack frames


None of these would have prevented the “Heartbleed” attack






Half a billion dollars worth of heartburn ...

Heartbeat – Normal usage



Heartbeat – Malicious usage





Assignment 6: Attack the “Grader” Program

```
enum {BUFSIZE = 48};
char grade = 'D';
char name[BUFSIZE];
...
int main(void)
{
    mprotect(...);
    getname();
    if (strcmp(name, "Andrew Appel") == 0)
        grade = 'B';
    printf("%c is your grade.\n", grade);
    printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
    return 0;
}
```

```
$ ./grader
What is your name?
Joe Student
D is your grade.
Thank you, Joe Student.
$ ./grader
What is your name?
Andrew Appel
B is your grade.
Thank you, Andrew Appel.
```



Assignment 6: Attack the "Grader" Program

```
/* Prompt for name and read it */  
void getName() {  
    printf("What is your name?\n");  
    readString();  
}
```

```
/* Read a string into name */  
void readString() {  
    char buf[BUFSIZE];  
    int i = 0;  
    int c;  
  
    /* Read string into buf[] */  
    for (;;) {  
        c = fgetc(stdin);  
        if (c == EOF || c == '\n')  
            break;  
        buf[i] = c;  
        i++;  
    }  
    buf[i] = '\0';  
  
    /* Copy buf[] to name[] */  
    for (i = 0; i < BUFSIZE; i++)  
        name[i] = buf[i];  
}
```

Unchecked
write to
buffer!



Assignment 6: Attack the "Grader" Program

```
enum {BUFSIZE = 48};
char grade = 'D';
char name[BUFSIZE];
...
int main(void)
{
    mprotect(...);
    getname();
    if (strcmp(name, "Andrew Appel") == 0)
        grade = 'B';
    printf("%c is your grade.\n", grade);
    printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
    return 0;
}
```


```
$ ./grader
```

```
What is your name?
```

```
Joe Student\0(#@&$%*#&(*^!@%*!(&$
```

```
B is your grade.
```


```
Thank you, Joe Student.
```



Smash the
stack!



Memory Map of STACK Section




Keep writing past end of buf

Get to getName's stackframe



getName's saved x30!
(somewhere on stack)

Overwrite it!





Assignment 6: Attack the “Grader” Program

```
enum {BUFSIZE = 48};
char grade = 'D';
char name[BUFSIZE];
...
int main(void)
{
    mprotect(...);
    getname();
    if (strcmp(name, "Andrew Appel") == 0)
        grade = 'B';
    printf("%c is your grade.\n", grade);
    printf("Thank you, %s.\n", name);
    return 0;
}
```

```
$ ./grader
```

```
What is your name?
```


```
Joe Student\0(#@&$%*#&(*^!@%*!(&$
```

```
B is your grade.
```

```
Thank you, Joe Student.
```



Memory Map of TEXT Section



(All of these instructions are actually machine code, not flattened C, of course!)

```
...  
checkappel:  
    if (strcmp(name, "Andrew Appel") != 0)  
        goto afterb  
    grade = 'B' ← HERE!  
afterb:  
    print ...  
...
```



Construct Your Exploit String (createdataB.c)

1. Your name.

- After all, the grader program's last line of output must be:
"Thank you, [your name]."

fopen the file "dataB" and write your name into that file (e.g. with fprintf)

2. A null byte.

- Otherwise, the grader program's last line of output will be corrupted.

See "Writing Binary Data" precept handout. '\0' is just a single byte of binary data.

3. Filler to overrun until x30.

- Presumably more null bytes are easiest, but easter eggs are fine.

4. The address of the target

- The statement `grade = 'B'`.

Address is a 64-bit (little-endian) unsigned integer: C unsigned long



Let's Not Get Thrown in Jail, Please

Legal Information Institute [LII]
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ABOUT LII ▶ GET THE LAW ▶ LAWYER DIRECTORY LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA ▶ HELP OUT ▶

LII > U.S. Code > Title 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 47 > § 1030

18 U.S. Code § 1030 - Fraud and related activity in connection with computers

[U.S. Code](#) [Notes](#) [State Regulations](#)

[prev](#) | [next](#)

(a) Whoever—

(1) having knowingly accessed a [computer](#) without authorization or exceeding authorized access, and by means of such conduct having obtained information that has been determined by the United [States](#) Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or any restricted data, as defined in paragraph y. of section 11 of the [Atomic Energy Act of 1954](#), with reason to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the injury of the United [States](#), or to the advantage of any foreign nation willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate,

<https://www.law.cornell.edu/>

Summary



- This lecture:
 - Buffer overrun attacks in general
 - Assignment 6 “B Attack” principles of operation
- Next precept:
 - Assignment 6 “B Attack” recap
 - Memory map using gdb
 - Writing binary data
- Final 2 lectures:
 - Assignment 6 “A Attack” overview
 - Machine language details needed for “A Attack”
 - *Finally* finishing the 4-stage build process: the Linker!
- Final precept:
 - MiniAssembler and “A Attack” details



Final Exam Info

What: Final Exam!

When: ~3 weeks from today
Thursday, Dec 21
7:30pm – 10:30 pm

Where: McDonnell A01/A02

How: On paper. Closed book, but 1 two-sided study sheet allowed.

Why: Cumulative assessment. You've learned a lot, so show us!

Info: <https://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/fall23/cos217/exam2.php>