

Verifying Concurrent Programs with VST

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1 Introduction

VST 2.1 includes support for verifying concurrent programs with user-defined ghost state, as in modern concurrent separation logics. This document describes how to use Verifiable C to prove the correctness of concurrent programs, using examples from the `progs` folder that ships with VST. We will assume familiarity with the basics of VST, as described in the VST manual.

2 Verifying a Concurrent Program with Locks

A concurrent C program is a sequential C program with a few additional features. It may create new *threads* of execution, which execute functions from the program in parallel, but with a single shared memory: any data on the heap (including global variables and `malloced` memory) can potentially be accessed by every thread. Threads can thus communicate by passing values to each other through memory locations, and threads may also *synchronize*, blocking each other's control flow to ensure that operations happen in a certain order. In Verifiable C, synchronization is provided by a *lock* data structure, which supports functions `acquire` and `release`. Each lock in a program can be held by at most one thread at a time; when a thread tries to *acquire* a lock that is not currently available, it pauses its execution (“blocks”) until the lock becomes available. Locks can be used to enforce *mutual exclusion*, ensuring that a memory location is only accessed by one thread at a time. VST ships with a C header file `threads.h` that declares the concurrency primitives (locks and thread creation), and should be `#included` in any Verifiable C concurrent program.

The file `progs/incr.c` contains a simple concurrent C program. It has a global integer variable `ctr` that is used as shared data, with two accessor functions: `incr`, which increases the value of `ctr` by one, and `read`, which reads the current value of `ctr`. These functions use the lock `ctr_lock` to synchronize access to `ctr`. This synchronization is necessary because `incr` changes the value of `ctr`: if a thread tries to access a memory location while another thread writes to that location, a *data race* occurs, leading to unpredictable (formally, *undefined*) behavior. This is considered an error in C. This is reflected in Verifiable C by the existence of *shares*, as described in section 44 of the manual. A thread can only write to a memory location if it holds a sufficiently large share of the location that no other thread can possibly read from it. If we want to

have a memory location that can be modified by multiple threads, we must move shares between threads via locks, as described below. A consequence of this is that if we prove any pre- and postcondition in Verifiable C for a program, we also know that as long as the precondition is met, the program does not have any data races (just as proving correctness of a sequential program also implies that it has no null-pointer dereferences). In this section, we will focus on the verification of the `incr` and `read` functions, and demonstrate how to prove correctness of programs with locks.

The proof of correctness for `incr.c` is in `progs/verif_incr_simple.v`. It has several elements that do not appear in sequential Verifiable C proofs. First, it imports `VST.progs.conclib`, a library of lemmas and tactics that are useful for concurrent program verification. It then declares specifications for the built-in concurrency primitives of VST. Their specifications are already defined in `concurrency/sem_max_conc.v`, so we only need to associate them with their function identifiers. We will go through the specifications of each concurrency primitive in the following sections; the concurrent separation logic rules are summarized in Section 6.

The first thing we need to do to verify functions on `ctr` is to define a *lock invariant*, a predicate describing the resources protected by the lock `ctr_lock`. A lock invariant can be any Verifiable C assertion (i.e., `mpred`), subject to a condition described later. In this case, the lock protects the data in `ctr`. We want to know specifically that `ctr` always contains an unsigned integer value, so we use the lock invariant `cptr_lock_inv` \triangleq `EX z : Z, data_at tuint (Vint(Int.repr z)) ctr`. We use the `lock_inv` predicate to assert that a lock exists in memory with a given invariant: `lock_inv sh p R` means that the current thread owns share `sh` of a lock at location `p` with invariant `R`. Shares of a lock can be combined and split in the same way as shares of `data_at`, and any readable share is enough to acquire or release the lock¹.

Now we can give specifications to the lock functions.

```

DECLARE _incr
  WITH ctr : val, sh : share, lock : val
  PRE [ ]
    PROP (readable_share sh)
    LOCAL (gvar _ctr ctr; gvar _ctr_lock lock)
    SEP (lock_inv sh lock (cptr_lock_inv ctr))
  POST [ tvoid ]
    PROP () LOCAL () SEP (lock_inv sh lock (cptr_lock_inv ctr))

DECLARE _read
  WITH ctr : val, sh : share, lock : val
  PRE [ ]
    PROP (readable_share sh)
    LOCAL (gvar _ctr ctr; gvar _ctr_lock lock)

```

¹This contrasts with ordinary `data_at`, in which we need a writable share to write to a location; multiple threads can try to acquire a lock at the same time, and the lock's built-in synchronization will prevent any race conditions.

```

    SEP (lock_inv sh lock (cptr_lock_inv ctr))
  POST [ tuint ]
  EX z : Z,
  PROP ()
  LOCAL (temp ret_temp (Vint (Int.repr z)))
  SEP (lock_inv sh lock (cptr_lock_inv ctr))

```

These are surprisingly boring specifications! The `read` function needs to know that the lock exists, and returns some number, about which we know nothing; the `incr` function does even less, taking the `lock_inv` assertion and returning it as is. These are enough to prove *safety* of the program, to show that it is a valid C program, but not enough to learn much about what the program actually computes. This is a product of our invariant: when a thread acquires the lock, the *only* thing it knows about the memory it gains access to is that it satisfies the invariant. This is a well-known limitation of basic concurrent separation logic, and it is generally solved using *ghost state*, which we describe in Section 4. For now, we will describe how to prove safety for this program; later we will see how the proof of correctness builds on the safety proof.

There is one more important step before we can prove that the counter functions satisfy their specifications. In order to use a resource invariant, we need to show that it is *exclusive*, i.e., that it can only hold once in any given state. This is represented in VST by a property `exclusive_mpred` $R \triangleq R * R \vdash \text{FF}$. This allows us to know that if the current thread holds the invariant, it also holds the lock. Fortunately, most common assertions (e.g., `data_at` for a non-empty type) are exclusive, so we can fairly easily prove the desired property `ctr_inv_exclusive`. It is useful to add this lemma to `auto`'s hint database via `Hint Resolve`, so that the related proof obligations can be discharged automatically.

Now we can verify the bodies of `read` and `incr`, using the same Verifiable C tactics that we would use for a sequential program. The only new element is the use of the `acquire` and `release` functions, which allow threads to interact with locks and transfer ownership of resource invariants. We interact with these functions using the ordinary `forward_call` tactic. Their witnesses take three arguments: the location ℓ of the lock, the share sh of the lock it owned by the caller, and the lock invariant R . Their pre- and postconditions are as follows:

$$\{\!\!|\text{readable_share } sh \wedge \text{lock_inv } sh \ell R\}\ \text{acquire}(\ell) \{R * \text{lock_inv } sh \ell R\}$$

$$\{\!\!|(\text{readable_share } sh \wedge \text{exclusive } R) * R * \text{lock_inv } sh \ell R\}\ \text{release}(\ell) \{\text{lock_inv } sh \ell R\}$$

When we acquire the lock, we also gain access to the invariant; when we release the lock, we must re-establish the invariant.

Consider the proof of `body_read`: we begin with the usual invocation of `start_function`. We then use `forward_call` to process the `acquire` call, adding `cptr_lock_inv` to the SEP clause. Unfolding its definition tells us that we now have access to `ctr`, and the integer stored in it, which we introduce as z . We assign z to the local variable `t`, and then release the lock. We use the `lock_props` tactic to discharge the exclusive obligation of `release` automatically, so that we need only prove that the invariant holds again. In

this case, since we have not changed the value of `ctr`, its value is still z . The return value of the function is that same z , and the proof is complete. The proof of `body_incr` is almost identical, except that at the call to `release` the invariant now holds at $z + 1$.

3 Thread Creation and Joining

Every C program starts its execution as a single-threaded program. It becomes concurrent when it calls an external function that spawns a new thread, such as with Verifiable C's `spawn` function. The `spawn` function takes two arguments: a pointer to a function that the new thread should execute, and a `void*` that will be passed as an argument to that function. The new thread begins execution at the start of the indicated function, and continues to execute until it returns from that function; until then, it can assign to local variables, perform memory operations, and call other functions just as a single-threaded program would. Each thread has its own local variables, but memory is shared between all threads in a program. Currently, the starting function for a thread must take a single argument of type `void*` and return a value of type `void*`; the value returned is ignored completely, so it will usually be `NULL`.

The separation logic rule for `spawn` is:

$$\{P(y) * f : x. \{P(x)\}\{\text{emp}\}\} \text{spawn}(f, y) \{ \}$$

From the parent thread's perspective, we give away resources satisfying the precondition of the spawned function f , and get nothing back. Those resources now belong to the child thread, whose behavior is invisible to all other threads; the postcondition of `emp` reflects the fact that any resources held by the thread when it returns will be lost forever.

If we want to *join* with a spawned thread once it finishes, retrieving its resources and learning the results of any computations it performed, we can do so with a lock, which we can either pass as the argument to f or provide as a global variable. In order to recover *all* the resources the thread owned, including the share of the lock that we use for joining, we need to use a *recursive* lock, one whose invariant includes a share of the lock itself. We can make such an invariant with the `selflock` function, as we can see in the definition of `thread_lock_inv`, and use it with the lemma `selflock_eq`: $\forall Q \text{ sh } p, \text{selflock } Q \text{ sh } p = Q * \triangleright \text{lock_inv sh } p \text{ (selflock } Q \text{ sh } p)$.

In Verifiable C, functions that will be passed to `spawn` must have specifications of a certain form, as in `thread_func_spec`:

```

DECLARE _thread_func
WITH y : val, x : val * share * val * val
PRE [ _args OF (tptr tvoid) ]
  let '(ctr, sh, lock, lockt) := x in
  PROP (readable_share sh)
  LOCAL (temp _args y; gvar _ctr ctr; gvar _ctr_lock lock;
         gvar _thread_lock lockt)
  SEP (lock_inv sh lock (cptr_lock_inv ctr));

```

```

        lock_inv sh lockt (thread_lock_inv sh ctr lock lockt))
POST [ tptr tvoid ]
PROP () LOCAL () SEP ()

```

The WITH clause must have exactly two elements: one of type `val` that holds the argument passed to the function, and another that holds the entire rest of the witness, usually as a tuple. We can then destruct the tuple inside the precondition to access the rest of the witness. In the precondition, `LOCAL` must hold a `temp` for the argument followed by zero or more global variables. The `PROP` and `SEP` clauses are unrestricted. The postcondition must be completely empty, reflecting the separation logic rule for `spawn`. In this example, the thread function takes a readable share of the lock protecting `ctr`, along with the same share of a recursive lock for joining; the pointers to the locks and to `ctr` are taken from global variables, while the argument to the function is ignored entirely. The proof of this specification is straightforward until we reach the last line, where the spawned thread releases its lock (using the `release2` function, which is specialized to recursive locks). At that point, we unroll the definition of `selflock` and show that the invariant is satisfied by precisely all the resources held by the thread.

Verifying the `main` function, which spawns the thread, is more complicated. First, we create the locks used by `ctr` and `thread_func`, using the `make_lock` function:

$$\{\!|\text{writable_share } sh \wedge \ell \xrightarrow{sh} _ \}\!| \text{make_lock}(\ell) \{\text{lock_inv } sh \ell R\}$$

To make a location into a lock, all we need is a writable share of the location. We do *not* need to know that the invariant R holds; we create the lock in the locked state, and only need to provide R when we release it. This is particularly convenient for making join-style locks, which are only released once (when the associated thread finishes its computation). In Verifiable C, the location to be converted into a lock needs to point to a memory block of the appropriate size, so the caller must provide the predicate `data_at_sh tlock ℓ`.

Next, we divide the locks into shares: one for the spawned function, and one retained by `main`. The file `progs/conclib.v` includes lemmas that for splitting shares into readable pieces: the key ones are `split_readable_share` (of which `split_Ews` is a special case) and `split_shares` (which produces a list of shares of any desired length).

Next, we spawn the child thread using the `forward_spawn` tactic, a `spawn`-specific wrapper around `forward_call`. Its general form is `forward_spawn id arg w`, where `id` is the identifier of the function to be spawned, `arg` is the value of the provided argument, and `w` is the rest of the witness for the spawned function. The tactic automatically discharges the proof obligations of the spawn rule, leaving us to prove only the precondition of the spawned function. In this example, we split off a share of each of the locks and provide it to the spawned thread to satisfy the precondition of `thread_func`, while retaining the other share so that `main` can invoke the `incr` function in parallel with the spawned thread.

Finally, we join with the spawned thread by acquiring its lock. Because the lock is recursive, acquiring it allows us to retrieve the other half of both locks, regaining full

ownership. This allows us to deallocate the locks with calls to `freelock` (for the non-recursive `ctr` lock) and `freelock2` (for the recursive thread lock). We must hold a lock in order to free it, as seen in the `freelock` rule:

$$\{!!(\text{writable_share } sh \wedge \text{exclusive } R) * R * \text{lock_inv } sh \ell R\} \text{freelock}(\ell) \{R * \ell \xrightarrow{sh} _ \}$$

The freed lock converts back into an ordinary memory location, and we can store data in it or convert it into a lock with a different invariant. In this example, we simply end the program instead.

4 Using Ghost State

In the previous section, we proved that `progs/incr.c` is safe, but not that `ctr` is 2 after being incremented twice. To prove that, our threads need to be able to record information about the actions they have performed on the shared state, instead of sealing all knowledge of the value of `ctr` inside the lock invariant. We can accomplish this with *ghost variables*, a simple form of auxiliary state.

In `progs/verif_incr.v`, we augment the proof of the previous section with ghost variables and prove that the program computes the value 2. To do so, we use the new `ghost_var` assertion: `ghost_var sh a g` asserts that g is a *ghost name* (`gname` in Coq) associated with the value a , which may be of any type. We can split and join shares of ghost variables in the same way as memory locations, but they are not modified by program instructions. Instead, they can change by *view shifts*, which can be introduced at any point in the proof of a program. Whenever a thread holds full ownership (`Tsh`) of a ghost variable, it can change the value of the variable arbitrarily. For `incr.c`, we will add two ghost variables, each tracking the contribution of one thread to the value of `ctr`. We will divide ownership of each ghost variable between the lock invariant and the related thread. By maintaining the invariant that `ctr` is the sum of the two contributions, we will be able to conclude that after two increments, the value of `ctr` is 2.

4.1 Extending the Specifications

Previously, the lock invariant for the `ctr` lock was

$$\text{EX } z : Z, \text{data_at tuint (Vint(Int.repr } z)) \text{ctr}$$

Now, we want to augment it with shares of two ghost variables. For our convenience, `conclib.v` defines shares `gsh1` and `gsh2` that are readable halves of the total share `Tsh`. So our new invariant will be

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{EX } z : Z, \text{data_at tuint (Vint(Int.repr } z)) \text{ctr} * \\ &\quad \text{EX } x : Z, \text{EX } y : Z, !!(z = x + y) \ \&\& \ \text{ghost_var } gsh1 \ x \ g1 * \text{ghost_var } gsh1 \ y \ g2 \end{aligned}$$

The thread that holds the other half of $g1$ or $g2$ can thus record its contribution to `ctr`, but can only change that contribution while holding the lock, and only while maintaining the invariant that $z = x + y$.

Next, we modify each specification to take the ghost variables into account. Our specification for `incr` now needs to know which ghost variable the caller wants to increment, so it takes a boolean `left` telling it whether we are looking at the left ($g1$) or right ($g2$) ghost variable. (We can imagine generalizing this to allow the caller to pass any `gname` from a list.)

```

DECLARE _incr
  WITH ctr : val, sh : share, lock : val,
       g1 : gname, g2 : gname, left : bool, n : Z
  PRE [ ]
    PROP (readable_share sh)
    LOCAL (gvar _ctr ctr; gvar _ctr_lock lock)
    SEP (lock_inv sh lock (cptr_lock_inv g1 g2 ctr);
        ghost_var gsh2 n (if left then g1 else g2))
  POST [ tvoid ]
    PROP ()
    LOCAL ()
    SEP (lock_inv sh lock (cptr_lock_inv g1 g2 ctr);
        ghost_var gsh2 (n+1) (if left then g1 else g2)).

```

Holding one of the ghost variables is not enough to guarantee anything about the value returned by `read`, but if we hold both of them, we should be able to predict the result.

```

DECLARE _read
  WITH ctr : val, sh : share, lock : val,
       g1 : gname, g2 : gname, n1 : Z, n2 : Z
  PRE [ ]
    PROP (readable_share sh)
    LOCAL (gvar _ctr ctr; gvar _ctr_lock lock)
    SEP (lock_inv sh lock (cptr_lock_inv g1 g2 ctr);
        ghost_var gsh2 n1 g1; ghost_var gsh2 n2 g2)
  POST [ tuint ]
    PROP ()
    LOCAL (temp ret_temp (Vint (Int.repr (n1 + n2))))
    SEP (lock_inv sh lock (cptr_lock_inv g1 g2 ctr);
        ghost_var gsh2 n1 g1; ghost_var gsh2 n2 g2).

```

Finally, we add ownership of ghost variable $g1$ to the resources passed to `thread_func` (and collected by its lock when it terminates):

```

DECLARE _thread_func

```

```

WITH y : val, x : val * share * val * val * gname * gname
PRE [ _args OF (tptr tvoid) ]
  let '(ctr, sh, lock, lockt, g1, g2) := x in
  PROP (readable_share sh)
  LOCAL (temp _args y; gvar _ctr ctr; gvar _ctr_lock lock;
         gvar _thread_lock lockt)
  SEP (lock_inv sh lock (cptr_lock_inv g1 g2 ctr);
       ghost_var gsh2 0 g1;
       lock_inv sh lockt (thread_lock_inv sh g1 g2 ctr lock lockt))
POST [ tptr tvoid ]
  PROP () LOCAL () SEP ().

```

The value of $g1$ starts at 0, and should be 1 by the time the thread terminates, as reflected in `thread_lock.R`.

4.2 Proving with Ghost State

The proof for `incr` begins in the same way as before: we acquire the lock, unfold the invariant, and introduce the variables x, y , and z . This also gains us `gsh1` shares of both ghost variables. The code that reads and increments `ctr` proceeds in the same way as before; even though the value of `ctr` has increased, the ghost variables are not yet updated. We do the update after the increment, but in fact we are free to do it anytime between acquiring and releasing the lock: the relationship between the values of the ghost variables and the real value in memory is part of the lock invariant, so we can break it freely while the lock is held, as long as we restore it before calling `release`.

When we are ready, we gather together all the shares of ghost variables that we hold, and use the new `viewshift_SEP` tactic to update the ghost variables. This tactic is analogous to `replace_SEP`, but it adds a modifier that we have not seen before: instead of proving $P \vdash Q$, we instead prove $P \Rightarrow Q$ (written as `P |-- |==> Q` in ASCII). This *view shift* relation includes the ordinary derives relation, but also has a number of special rules that allow us to modify ghost state. Of particular interest here is lemma `ghost_var_update`, which says that `ghost_var Tsh v p \Rightarrow ghost_var Tsh v' p`. As long as we have total ownership of a ghost variable, we can change its value to anything of the same type.

The call to `viewshift_SEP` here does several things at once. First, we pick out the other half of the ghost variable that was passed to the function (i.e., if `left then g1 else g2`) and join them together. We use the lemma `ghost_var_share_join'`, which tells us that we can join two `ghost_var` assertions with compatible shares, and learn that they agree on the value of the variable in the process: if we are updating $g1$ then $x = n$, and if we are updating $g2$ then $y = n$, where n is the value of the ghost variable provided by the caller. We then use the lemma `bupd.frame.r` to frame out the unused ghost variable from the view shift, and finally apply `ghost_var_update` to change the value of our ghost variable from n to $n + 1$.

Once this operation is complete, we have reestablished the lock invariant: the value

of `ctr` has been changed from z to $z+1$, and exactly one of x and y has been incremented to match. Because the frame depends on whether we passed in $g1$ or $g2$, we instantiate it before doing the case analysis on left; other than that, the proof is straightforward.

The proof of correctness of `read` is similar, but we do not need to do a view shift: instead, we use an ordinary `assert_PROP` to join the shares of both ghost variables, so that we know exactly the values of both x and y (and thus z). The only change we need to make to the proof for `thread_func` is to pass the extra arguments to `incr`, telling it that we are the thread holding $g1$ and its starting value is 0. The remaining interesting change is in the proof of `main`, where we need to create the ghost variables that we use in the rest of the program. We do this using a `ghost_alloc` tactic that takes the ghost assertion we want to allocate without its `gname`; the tactic allocates a new `gname` at which the assertion holds, which we can then introduce as normal with `Intro`. Once we allocate the two ghost variables with starting value 0, we can then incorporate them into the lock invariants when we call `makeLock`, and the rest of the proof proceeds as before. When we spawn the child thread, we pass it the `gsh2` share of ghost variable $g1$ along with the shares of the locks, as its precondition now requires. When we reclaim its share of the ghost variable and call `read`, we can now use our half-shares of both ghost variables with value 1 to conclude that the value of t is 2.

5 Defining Custom Ghost State

The ghost variables of the previous section are a special case of a much more general *ghost state* mechanism. In fact, any Coq type can be used as ghost state, as long as we can describe what happens when two elements of that type are joined together. To do so, we create an instance of the `Ghost` typeclass. A number of instances can be found in `progs/ghosts.v`. An instance of the `Ghost` typeclass is a *separation algebra* with associated join relation, with an additional valid predicate marking those elements of the algebra that can be used in assertions. For instance, ghost variables of type A are drawn from the separation algebra over the type `option (share * A)`, where valid elements have nonempty shares. An element `Some(sh, a)` represents a share sh of value a , and `None` represents no ownership or knowledge of the variable. Two `Some` elements join by combining their shares, but only if they agree on the value; a `None` element joins with any other element and is the identity.

Every ghost state assertion is a wrapper around the predicate `own g a pp`, where g is a `gname`, a is an element of a `Ghost` instance, and pp is a separation logic predicate. For instance, `ghost_var sh v g` is defined as `own g (Some (sh, v)) NoneP`. (For most kinds of ghost state, pp will be the empty predicate `NoneP`, but its inclusion also allows us to create *higher-order ghost state*, in the style of Iris.) The `own` predicate is governed by a few simple rules:

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{own_alloc} \frac{\text{valid } a}{\text{emp} \Rightarrow \text{EX } g : \text{gname}, \text{own } g \ a \ pp} \\ \text{own_op} \frac{\text{join } a1 \ a2 \ a3}{\text{own } g \ a3 \ pp = \text{own } g \ a1 \ pp * \text{own } g \ a2 \ pp} \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
\text{own_valid_2} \frac{}{\text{own } g \ a1 \ pp * \text{own } g \ a2 \ pp \Rightarrow !!(\exists a3, \text{join } a1 \ a2 \ a3 \wedge \text{valid } a3)} \\
\text{own_update} \frac{\text{fp_update } a \ b}{\text{own } g \ a \ pp \Rightarrow \text{own } g \ b \ pp} \\
\text{own_dealloc} \frac{}{\text{own } g \ a \ pp \Rightarrow \text{emp}}
\end{array}$$

Of these rules, `own_alloc` and `own_dealloc` let us create and destroy ghost state, `own_op` lets us split and combine it according to its join relation, `own_valid_2` tells us that any two pieces of ghost state that we hold at the same `gname` are consistent with each other, and `own_update_ND` lets us do *frame-preserving updates* to our ghost state: we can change its value arbitrarily as long as this does not invalidate any other piece of the same ghost state that might be held by another thread. Formally, $\text{fp_update } a \ b \triangleq \forall c, (\exists d, \text{join } a \ c \ d \wedge \text{valid } d) \rightarrow (\exists d, \text{join } b \ c \ d \wedge \text{valid } d)$.

The frame-preserving updates allowed by the join relation of each kind of ghost state determines what the ghost state can be used for. For instance, two pieces of a ghost variable only join if they have the same value; thus we can only change the value of a ghost variable when we have all its shares, because then we know that no other thread is restricting its value. Some ghost constructions allow smaller or older values to join with larger or newer ones, so that we can change a value without needing to update the records of all parties; others have extremely restrictive joins that ensure that a piece of ghost state belongs to only one thread at a time. Most concurrent programs can be verified with some combination of the types of ghost state defined in `ghosts.v`, but we are always free to define new `Ghost` instances for more complicated patterns of sharing and recording.

6 The Rules of Concurrent Separation Logic

6.1 Lock and Thread Functions

These specifications can be found in `concurrency/semac_conc.v`.

$$\begin{array}{l}
\{!!\text{writable_share } sh \wedge \ell \xrightarrow{sh} _ \} \text{make_lock}(\ell) \{ \text{lock_inv } sh \ \ell \ R \} \\
\{!!\text{readable_share } sh \wedge \text{lock_inv } sh \ \ell \ R \} \text{acquire}(\ell) \{ R * \text{lock_inv } sh \ \ell \ R \} \\
\{!!(\text{readable_share } sh \wedge \text{exclusive } R) * R * \text{lock_inv } sh \ \ell \ R \} \text{release}(\ell) \{ \text{lock_inv } sh \ \ell \ R \} \\
\{!!(\text{writable_share } sh \wedge \text{exclusive } R) * R * \text{lock_inv } sh \ \ell \ R \} \text{free_lock}(\ell) \{ R * \ell \xrightarrow{sh} _ \} \\
\{ P(y) * f : x. \{ P(x) \} \{ \text{emp} \} \} \text{spawn}(f, y) \{ \}
\end{array}$$

6.2 Ghost Operations

These rules can be found in `msl/ghost_seplog.v`.

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{own_alloc} \frac{\text{valid } a}{\text{emp} \Rightarrow \text{EX } g : \text{gname}, \text{own } g \ a \ pp} \\
 \\
 \text{own_op} \frac{\text{join } a1 \ a2 \ a3}{\text{own } g \ a3 \ pp = \text{own } g \ a1 \ pp * \text{own } g \ a2 \ pp} \\
 \\
 \text{own_valid.2} \frac{}{\text{own } g \ a1 \ pp * \text{own } g \ a2 \ pp \Rightarrow !!(\exists a3, \text{join } a1 \ a2 \ a3 \wedge \text{valid } a3)} \\
 \\
 \text{own_update_ND} \frac{\text{fp_update_ND } a \ B}{\text{own } g \ a \ pp \Rightarrow \text{EX } b, !!(\text{B } b) \ \&\&\ \text{own } g \ b \ pp} \\
 \\
 \text{own_update} \frac{\text{fp_update } a \ b}{\text{own } g \ a \ pp \Rightarrow \text{own } g \ b \ pp} \\
 \\
 \text{own_dealloc} \frac{}{\text{own } g \ a \ pp \Rightarrow \text{emp}}
 \end{array}$$