# Democratizing content distribution

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# ••• Overloading content publishers

- Feb 3, 2004: Google linked banner to "julia fractals"
- Users clicked onto University of Western Australia web site
- ...University's network link overloaded, web server taken down temporarily...

# ••• Adding insult to injury...



- Next day: Slashdot story about Google overloading site
- ...UWA site goes down again



- Many clients want content
- Server has insufficient resources
- Solving the problem requires more resources

••• Serving large audiences possible...



• Where do their resources come from?

Must consider two types of content separately



Dynamic

# ••• Static content uses most bandwidth

Purchased Videos | Uploaded Videos | Search History | My Account | Sign





- Dynamic HTML: 19.6 KB
- Static content:
  - 1 flash movie
  - 18 images
- 6.2 MB
- 5 style sheets
  - 3 scripts

### A Good comic video found some where on Net

Avg: Avg: 42833 ratings

All time views: 6,888,549 »

Copyrighted to who ever has created it 1 min 3 sec - May 25, 2006 Browse: orkut, awesome, url, more »

Add tag - Mark tag as Spam

Download for Windows/Mac

Email - Blog - Post to MySpace

A Good comic video found some where on Net

« Prev - Next video »

-

Playlist - Details - From user - Related -Comments - Flag as inappropriate

1 min

Continuous Playback: ON - OFF



A Good comic video found some where on Net Copyrighted to who ever has created it



Pixar Hippo & Dog The Lion Sleeps Tonight goldskorpion 3 min

••• Serving large audiences possible...



• How do they serve static content?



Content distribution networks (CDNs)
 <u>Centralized CDNs</u>

- Static, manual deployment
- Centrally managed
- Implications:
  - Trusted infrastructure
  - Costs scale linearly



# ••• Not solved for little guy



### • Problem:

- Didn't anticipate sudden load spike (flash crowd)
- Wouldn't want to pay / couldn't afford costs

# ••• Leveraging cooperative resources

- Many people want content
- Many willing to mirror content
  - e.g., software mirrors, file sharing, open proxies, etc.
- Resources are out there

... if only we can leverage them

• Contributions

Theme throughout talk: How to leverage previously untapped resources to gain new functionality





- Reverse proxies handle all client requests
- Cooperate to fetch content from one another

## • • • A comparison of settings

Centralized CDNs

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- Centrally managed
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### **Decentralized CDNs**

- Use participating machines
- No central operations
- Implications:
  - Less reliable or untrusted
  - Unknown locations



# ••• A comparison of settings

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Reliability itoring Network Deploymen

Security Monitoring Internet Health

Costs scale linearly  $\Rightarrow$  scalability concerns

- "The web infrastructure...does not scale" -Google, Feb'07
- BitTorrent, Azureus, Joost (Skype), etc. working with movie studios to deploy peer-assisted CDNs

Performance Troubleshooting Alerts

Scalability Ensuring Capacity Global Insight Watching Network Traffic





- Participants run CoralCDN software, no configuration
- O Clients use CoralCDN via modified domain name example.com/file → example.com.nyud.net:8080/file



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### • Goals

- Reduce load at origin server
- Low end-to-end latency
- Self-organizing



- Why participate?
  - Ethos of volunteerism
  - Cooperatively weather peak loads spread over time
  - Incentives: Better performance when resources scarce



- 3. Using these for measurements: Illuminati [NSDI '07]
- 4. Finally, adding security to leverage more volunteers





- Currently deployed on 300-400 PlanetLab servers
  - CoralCDN running 24 / 7 since March 2004
- An open CDN for any URL:

example.com/file → example.com.nyud.net:8080/file







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- Map name to location: URL  $\Rightarrow$  {IP<sub>1</sub>, IP<sub>2</sub>, IP<sub>3</sub>, IP<sub>4</sub>}
- lookup(URL)  $\Rightarrow$  Get IPs of caching nodes
- insert(URL,myIP,TTL) ⇒ Add me as caching URL
   for TTL seconds
- Can't index at central servers
  - No individual machines reliable or scalable enough
- Need to distribute index over participants



- Use DHT to store mapping of URLs (keys) to locations
- DHTs partition key-space among nodes
- Contact appropriate node to lookup/store key
  - Blue node determines red node is responsible for URL
  - Blue node sends lookup or insert to red node

# ••• Strawman: distributed hash table (DHT)



- Partitioning key-space among nodes
  - Nodes choose random identifiers: hash(IP)
  - Keys randomly distributed in ID-space: hash(URL)
  - Keys assigned to node nearest in ID-space
    - Minimizes XOR(hash(IP), hash(URL))



- Provides "efficient" routing with small state
  - If *n* is # nodes, each node:
  - Monitors O(log n) peers
  - Discovers closest node (and URL map) in O(log n) hops
  - Join/leave requires O(log n) work
- Spread ownership of URLs evenly across nodes

# ••• Is this index sufficient?



### o Problem: Random routing

# ••• Is this index sufficient?



# o Problem: Random routingo Problem: Random downloading

# ••• Is this index sufficient?



- o Problem: Random routing
- o Problem: Random downloading
- Problem: No load-balancing for single item
  - All insert and lookup go to same closest node

# ••• Don't need hash-table semantics

### • DHTs designed for hash-table semantics

- Insert and replace:  $URL \Rightarrow IP_{last}$
- Insert and append: URL  $\Rightarrow$  {IP<sub>1</sub>, IP<sub>2</sub>, IP<sub>3</sub>, IP<sub>4</sub>}

### • We only need few values

- $lookup(URL) \Rightarrow \{IP_2, IP_4\}$
- Preferably ones close in network

# ••• Next...



- Solution: Bound request rate to prevent hotspots
- Solution: Take advantage of network locality



• O(log n) nodes are 1 hop from root



• Route convergence

- O(log n) nodes are 1 hop from root
- Request load increases exponentially towards root



Leaf nodes (distant IDs)

• Bound rate of inserts towards root

- Nodes leak through at most β inserts per min per URL
- Locations of popular items pushed down tree
  - Refuse if already storing max # "fresh" IPs per URL



**Theorem:** Fixing *b* bits per hop, root receives  $\beta \cdot (2^{b} - 1) \cdot \left[\frac{\log_{b+1} n}{b}\right]$  insertion requests per time period



- Nodes aggregate request rate: ~12 million / min
- Rate-limit per node (β): 12 / min
- Requests at closest fan-in from 7 others: 83 / min

# ••• Next...



- Solution: Bound request rate to prevent hotspots
- Solution: Take advantage of network locality

# ••• Cluster by network proximity



- Organically cluster nodes based on RTT
- Hierarchy of clusters of expanding diameter
- Lookup traverses up hierarchy
  - Route to node nearest ID in each level

# ••• Cluster by network proximity



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• Prefer values stored by nodes within faster clusters





# • • • CoralCDN's deployment



PLANETLAB

Deployed on 300-400 PlanetLab servers
Running 24 / 7 since March 2004

# ••• Current daily usage

- 20-25 million HTTP requests
- 1-3 terabytes of data
- 1-2 million unique client IPs
- 20K-100K unique servers contacted (Zipf distribution)

### • Varied usage

- Servers to withstand high demand
- Portals such as Slashdot, digg, …
- Clients to avoid overloaded servers or censorship



- 3. Using these for measurements: Illuminati [NSDI '07]
- 4. Finally, adding security to leverage more volunteers

# ••• Strawman: probe to find nearest



Negates goal of faster e2e download

 $\Rightarrow$  Cache after first lookup?





- Lots of probing
- Slow to redirect
- Every service pays same cost

# ••• Whither server-selection?

🧐 qmail mirror selection - Mozilla Firefox						
Eile Edit View Go Bookmarks Iools Help						
🕞 • 🏐 • 😪 🔯 隆 http://w	ww.qmail.org/			• G.		
PGetting Started 📄 Latest Headlines						
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USA	ASIA/OCEANIA	EUROPE		WORLD		
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Cerberus (Miami, Orlando, San	Australia 2	Austria 2	Poland 1 Warszawa	Argentina 2		
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Alaska	Australia 4	Oct 23)	Poland 3 (timestamp.html	Argentina 4		
Arizona	Australia 5	Belaium 2	bad)	Brazil 1		
California 1: CRL. Above	Australia 6	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Poland 4	Brazil 2		
California 2; UUNET & BBN & AT&T	China 1	1	Poland 5	Canada 1		
California 3	Hong Kong 1	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Poland 6 Lubin	Canada 2		
California 4; Level3 & XO	Hong Kong 2	2	Poland 7	Canada 3		
California 5; San Jose	Hong Kong 3	Bulgaria 1	Portugal 1	Canada 4		
Florida 1; UUNet	Hong Kong 4	Bulgaria 2	Portugal 2.4: IPv4	Canada 5		
Florida 2; Level3	Hong Kong 5	Croatia	Portugal 2.6; IPv6	Canada 6		
Georgia; Nivis	Hong Kong 6	Czech Republic 1	Portugal 3	Canada 7		
Illinois	Indonesia 1	Czech Republic 2	Portugal 4	Chile		
Indiana; Sprint & AT&T	Indonesia 2	Denmark 1	Portugal 5	Egypt		
Kansas	Indonesia 3(last	Denmark 2	Romania 1	(timestamp.html		
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Massachusetts		Estonia	Romania 3(last updated Nov	Israel		
Michigan; UUNET	Indonesia 4	Finland 1	1)	Mexico		
Missouri 1; SBC & Sprint	Indonesia 5	France 1	Russia 1	South Africa		
Missouri 2; Sprint & C&W	Iran	France 2 (timestamp.html	Russia 2	Venezuela		
New Jersey; Algx & XO	Japan 1	bad)	Slovak Republic 1			

Goal: Knew answer without probing on critical path



• OASIS: a shared server-selection infrastructure

- Amortize measurement cost over services' replicas
  - Total of ~20 GB/week, not per service
  - More nodes  $\Rightarrow$  higher accuracy and lower cost each
- In turn, services benefit from functionality



- 1. Client issues DNS request for *mycdn.nyuld.net*
- 2. OASIS redirects client to nearby application replica

# ••• What would this require?

• Measure the entire Internet in advance

- Reduce the state space
- Intermediate representation for locality
- Detect and filter out measurement errors

• Architecture to organize nodes and manage data

# ••• Reduce the state space



- 3-4 orders of magnitude by aggregating IP addresses
- [IMC '05]: nodes in same IP prefix are often close
  - 99% of prefixes with same first three-octets (x.y.z.\*)
- Dynamically split prefixes until at same location

### [IPTPS '05]

# ••• Representing locality



- o Use virtual coordinates?
  - Predicts Internet latencies, fully decentralized
  - But designed for clients participating in protocol
  - Cached values useless: Coordinates drift over time





- Combine geographic coordinates with latency
  - Add't assumption: Replicas know own geo-coords
  - RTT accuracy has real-world meaning
    - Check if new coordinates improve accuracy





# ••• Measurements have errors



### Israeli node 3 ms from NYU ?

Many conditions cause wildly wrong results
Need general solution robust against errors

# ••• Finding measurement errors



### • Require measurement agreement

 At least two results from different services must satisfy constraints (e.g., speed of light)



### OASIS core

- Global membership view
- Epidemic gossiping
  - Scalable failure detection
  - Replicate network map
- Consistent hashing
  - Probing assignment, liveness of replicas

### o Service replicas

- Heartbeats to core
- Meridian overlay for probing
  - O(log<sup>2</sup> n) probes finds closest

### ••• E2E download of web page



# ••• Deployed with thousands of replicas

- AChord topology-aware DHT (KAIST)
- Chunkcast block anycast (Berkeley)
- **CoralCDN** content distribution (NYU)
- **DONA** data-oriented network anycast (Berkeley)
- Galaxy distributed file system (Cincinnati)
- Na Kika content distribution (NYU)
- **OASIS:** RPC, DNS, HTTP interfaces
- **OCALA** overlay convergence (Berkeley)
- **OpenDHT** public DHT service (Berkeley)
- **OverCite** distributed library (MIT)
- SlotNet overlay routing (Purdue)

### ••• Systems as research platforms

### • Measurements made possible by CoralCDN

- Can't probe clients behind middleboxes
- CoralCDN clients execute active content



# Measuring the edge: illuminati

- DNS redirection: Clients near their nameservers?
  - Mostly within 20ms; diminishing returns to super-optimize
- Client blacklisting: Safe to blacklist an IP?
  - Quantify collatoral damage: NATs small, DHCP slow
- Client geolocation: Where are clients truly located?
  - Product for real-time proxy detection with Quova



Use of anonymizer networks by single class-C network



- Cooperative content distribution
  - Locate and deliver cached content
  - Select good servers

- $\Rightarrow CoralCDN \\\Rightarrow OASIS$
- Adding security enables *untrusted* resources
  - Shark: scaling distributed file systems [NSDI '06]
    - Mutually-distrustful clients use each others' file caches

### [S&P '04]

# Large-file delivery via rateless erasure codes

- Encode blocks of large file, block negotiation unneeded 0
  - Exponential number of potential code blocks
- Prevents traditional hash trees for verification



- Instead, hashing based on homomorphic accumulator 0
  - Given  $h(f_1)$ ,  $h(f_2)$ ,  $c_{1+2} = f_1 + f_2$ , compute  $h(c_{1+2}) = h(f_1) \cdot h(f_2)$
- By batching PK operations, can verify at 60 Mbps

•••	Need not be security or functional				
	StolenID Search <sup>™</sup> Is Your Social Security or Credit Card Number Safe? Search more than 2,353,394 compromised numbers				
	Free, Fast, & Secure Search. Learn More.  StolenID Search  Enter your social security or credit card number in the box.				

### • Private matching (PM)

### [EUROCRYPT '04]

- Parties compute set intersection (oblivious polynomials)  $P \text{ encodes } x_i$ 's  $\longrightarrow \forall y_i, E(r_i P(y_i) + y_i) \Rightarrow O(n \text{ Ig Ig } n)$
- e.g., Passenger manifests ∩ govt. no-fly lists [NSDI '06]
- e.g., Social path in email correspondence for whitelisting
- Private keyword search (KS)

[TCC '05]

# Future: Securing and managing distributed systems

### • Building and running large-scale systems difficult

- Security, managability, reliability, scalability, …
- Especially when decentralized, untrusted, …
- Hard to reason about, hard to audit, hard to ensure QoS, …
- New architectures
  - Ethane: auditable, secure enterprise networks [Sec '06]
- New algorithms
  - Smaller groups with well-defined properties [IPTPS '06]
- New tools
  - Tracing transactions across hosts

# ••• Research approach

- Today:
  - Techniques for cooperative content distribution
  - Production use for 3 years, millions of users daily
- Generally:
  - New functionality through principled design
    - Distributed algorithms, cryptography, game theory, ...
  - Build and deploy real systems
    - Evaluates design and leads to new problems
    - Hugely satisfying to have people use it





source code (GPL), data, papers available online