

# Hiding Amongst the Clouds

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A Proposal for Cloud-based Onion Routing

**Nicholas Jones**



Matvey Arye

Jacopo Cesareo


Michael J. Freedman

Princeton University

# How Tor Works: 2



We



and




**AVAILABLE  
ONLINE  
FOR  
FREE**

but...





YouTube




0:00 / 4:47





and





DOGMAS

PROTOCOLS

AUTHORITY

DOCTRINES

ORDERS

CODE OF CONDUCT

NORM

ESTABLISHMENT  
PRINCIPLES

CENSORSHIP

Benttime



**C**loud-based

**O**nion

**R**outing

# Benefits, Risks, and Challenges

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- Potential benefits of cloud infrastructure
  - High performance
  - Adaptability to censorship
- Economic challenges
- New security problems

# Benefits of Cloud Infrastructure


Performance (latency, throughput)

Censorship Resistance

# Performance

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- Individual nodes are higher bandwidth
- Ability to add and remove nodes to meet demand




5:00 P.M.

# Performance

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
**NETFLIX**

7:00 P.M.

# Performance

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**NETFLIX**


8:00 P.M.



# Performance

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
**NETFLIX**

11:00 P.M.

# Performance

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- Individual nodes are higher bandwidth
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


12:00 A.M.

# Performance

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


**NETFLIX**

2:00 A.M.


# COR has higher throughput than Tor

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


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
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
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
# Multi-homed Datacenters are Harder to Monitor

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
1-10 Mbps



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

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
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
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
10-100 Gbps




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
10-100 Gbps




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



10-100 Gbps



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





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
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
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



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
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
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


10-100 Gbps




# Blocking Clouds Causes Collateral Damage

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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# Benefits of Clouds

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- Higher performance
- Elasticity to scale to demand
- Multi-homing and scale makes eavesdropping difficult
- Elasticity forces sensors to make hard choices:  
collateral damage or unblocked access

# Economics

Cloud pricing is affordable for end users



# Cost of running COR in the cloud

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- Cloud providers charge for CPU and bandwidth

# Cost of running COR in the cloud

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- Cloud providers charge for CPU and bandwidth
- CPU is cheap

# Cost of running COR in the cloud


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- Cloud providers charge for CPU and bandwidth
- CPU is cheap
  - 100+ users on a 34¢/hr node

# Cost of running COR in the cloud

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
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
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- Cloud providers charge for CPU and bandwidth
- CPU is cheap
  - 100+ users on a 34¢/hr node
- Bandwidth is dominant cost



# Cost of running COR in the cloud

- Cloud providers charge for CPU and bandwidth
- CPU is cheap
  - 100+ users on a 34¢/hr node
- Bandwidth is dominant cost
  - 100MB as low as 1¢




Data Transfer IN	
All data transfer in	\$0.000 per GB
Data Transfer OUT	
First 1 GB / month	\$0.000 per GB
Up to 10 TB / month	\$0.120 per GB
Next 40 TB / month	\$0.090 per GB
Next 100 TB / month	\$0.070 per GB
Next 350 TB / month	\$0.050 per GB

Amazon EC2 Pricing

# Tor's Total Bandwidth Cost in the Cloud

Total relay bandwidth

— Advertised bandwidth  
— Bandwidth history



← Approximately  
900 MB/s

376 TB/month

The Tor Project - <https://metrics.torproject.org/>

COR Cost:  
\$61,200/month

# Security Challenges and Solutions

Involved Parties and Trust Model

Building Tunnels

Paying for Tunnels

Learning About Relays




# Distributing Trust

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- Tor

- Tunnels between volunteer relays



- COR

- Tunnels between clouds from different providers

Is that sufficient?

---

- Should users pay cloud providers directly?
  - Not anonymous: Credit cards and Paypal leak info

Is that sufficient?

---

- Should users pay cloud providers directly?
  - Not anonymous: Credit cards and Paypal leak info
- Another layer of indirection: Anonymity Service Providers
  - Operate relays and pay cloud providers
  - Mask users' identities
  - Accept anonymous payment for access

# System Roles

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- Cloud Hosting Providers (CHPs)

- Provide infrastructure for COR relays



Windows Azure™

- Anonymity Service Providers (ASPs)


- Run relays and directory servers

- Sell tokens

- Redeemable for XX MB of connectivity or XX amount of time




# System Architecture Example




Organizations used above are examples only

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
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
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
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
- Two relays within each datacenter




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
- Different entry and exit ASPs




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
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
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
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
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
- Different entry and exit ASPs



- Different entry and exit CHPs



- ASP and CHP relays are contiguous within a circuit



# Paying for Access

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- Users purchase tokens
- Redeem tokens for access (bandwidth or time)
- Chaum's e-cash:
  - Cryptographically untraceable



# How do users gain access?

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- Users need two things:
  - Tokens
  - COR Directory



# How do users gain access?

---

- Users need two things:
  - Tokens
  - COR Directory
- Solution: Bootstrapping Network
  - Low speed
  - High Latency
  - Free

# Adversaries enumerate and block ingress

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- Current technologies
  - Tor Bridges
- Two separate problems:
  - COR Relays
    - High speed, low latency, not free
  - Bootstrapping
    - Low speed, high latency, free

Summary

Tor

COR

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Summary

Tor

COR

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Secure



# Summary

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Tor

COR

Secure



High Speed



# Summary

---

Tor

COR

Secure



High Speed



Dynamic Scaling



# Summary

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Tor

COR

Secure



High Speed



Dynamic Scaling



Adaptive to censorship



# Summary

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Tor

COR

Secure



High Speed



Dynamic Scaling



Adaptive to censorship



Free

