# End-to-End Routing Behavior in the Internet

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## Abstract

The large-scale behavior of routing in the Internet has gone virtually without any formal study, the exceptions being Chinoy's analysis of the dynamics of Internet routing information [Ch93], and recent work, similar in spirit, by Labovitz, Malan and Jahanian [LMJ97]. We report on an analysis of 40,000 end-to-end route measurements conducted using repeated "traceroutes" between 37 Internet sites. We analyze the routing behavior for pathological conditions, routing stability, and routing symmetry. For pathologies, we characterize the prevalence of routing loops, erroneous routing, infrastructure failures, and temporary outages. We find that the likelihood of encountering a major routing pathology more than doubled between the end of 1994 and the end of 1995, rising from 1.5% to 3.3%. For routing stability, we define two separate types of stability, "prevalence," meaning the overall likelihood that a particular route is encountered, and "persistence," the likelihood that a route remains unchanged over a long period of time. We find that Internet paths are heavily dominated by a single prevalent route, but that the time periods over which routes persist show wide variation, ranging from seconds up to days. About 2/3's of the Internet paths had routes persisting for either days or weeks. For routing symmetry, we look at the likelihood that a path through the Internet visits at least one different city in the two directions. At the end of 1995, this was the case half the time, and at least one different autonomous system was visited 30% of the time.

## 1 Introduction

The large-scale behavior of routing in the Internet has gone virtually without any formal study, the exceptions being Chinoy's analysis of the dynamics of Internet routing information [Ch93], and recent work, similar in spirit, by Labovitz, Malan and Jahanian [LMJ97]. In this paper we analyze 40,000 end-to-end route measurements conducted using repeated "traceroutes" between 37 Internet sites. The main questions we strive to answer are: What sort of pathologies and failures occur in Internet routing? Do routes remain stable over time or change frequently? Do routes from $A$ to $B$ tend to be symmetric (the same in reverse) as routes from $B$ to $A$?

Our framework for answering these questions is the measurement of a large sample of Internet routes between a number of geographically diverse hosts. We argue that the set of routes is large enough to offer a plausibly representative cross-section of the behavior of Internet routes in general. In addition, because we have end-to-end routing measurements from two different periods, from the data we can also gain some insight into how routing behavior changes over time.

In § 2 and § 3 we give overviews of related research and how routing works in the Internet. In § 4 we discuss the experimental and statistical methodology for our analysis. § 5 gives an overview of the participating sites and the raw data. We classify a number of routing pathologies in § 6, including routing loops, rapid routing changes, erroneous routes, infrastructure failures, and temporary outages. We find that the likelihood of encountering a major routing pathology more than doubled between the end of 1994 and the end of 1995, rising from 1.5% to 3.3%.

After removing the pathologies, we analyze the remaining measurements to investigate routing stability (§ 7) and symmetry (§ 8), summarizing our findings in § 9.

## 2 Related research

The problem of routing traffic in communication networks has been studied for well over twenty years [SS80]. The subject has matured to the point where a number of books have been written thoroughly examining the different issues and solutions [Pe92, St95, Hu95].

A key distinction we will make is that between routing *protocols*, by which we mean mechanisms for disseminating routing information within a network and the particulars of how to use that information to forward traffic, and routing *behavior*, meaning how in practice the routing algorithms perform. This distinction is important because while routing protocols have been heavily studied, routing behavior has not.

The literature contains many studies of routing proto-

*This paper appears in *IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking* 5(5), pp. 601-615. An earlier version appears in the Proceedings of SIGCOMM '96. The work was supported by the Director, Office of Energy Research, Office of Computational and Technology Research, Mathematical, Information, and Computational Sciences Division of the United States Department of Energy under Contract No. DE-AC03-76SF00098.

cols. In addition to the books cited above, see, for example, discussions of the various ARPANET routing algorithms [MFR78, MRR80, KZ89]; the Exterior Gateway Protocol used in the NSFNET [Ro82] and the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) that replaced it [RL95, RG95, Tr95a, Tr95b]; the related work by Estrin et al. on routing between administrative domains [BE90, ERH92]; Perlman and Varghese's discussion of difficulties in designing routing algorithms [PV88]; Deering and Cheriton's seminal work on multicast routing [DC90]; Perlman's comparison of the popular OSPF and IS-IS protocols [Pe91]; and Baransel et al.'s survey of routing techniques for very high speed networks [BDG95].

For routing behavior, however, the literature contains considerably fewer studies. Some of these are based on simulation, such as Zaumen and Garcia-Luna Aceves' studies of routing behavior on several different wide-area topologies [ZG-LA92], and Sidhu et al.'s simulation of OSPF [SFANC93]. In only a few studies do measurements play a significant role: Rekhter and Chinoy's trace-driven simulation of the tradeoffs in using inter-autonomous system routing information to optimize routing within a single autonomous system [RC92]; Chinoy's study of the dynamics of routing information propagated inside the NSFNET infrastructure [Ch93]; Floyd and Jacobson's analysis of how periodicity in routing messages can lead to global synchronization among the routers [FJ94]; and a recent analysis by Labovitz, Malan and Jahanian of Internet routing instability as seen in the BGP routing information recorded at popular exchange points [LMJ97].

This is not to say that studies of routing protocols ignore routing behavior. But the presentation of routing behavior in the protocol studies is almost always qualitative. Furthermore, of the measurement studies only Chinoy's and that of Labovitz et al. are devoted to characterizing routing behavior in-the-large.

Chinoy found that for those routers that send updates periodically regardless of whether any connectivity information has changed, the vast majority of the updates contain no new information. He also found that most routing changes occur at the edges of the network and not along its "backbone." Outages during which a network is unreachable from the backbone span a large range of time, from a few minutes to a number of hours. Finally, most networks are nearly quiescent, while a few exhibit frequent connectivity transitions.

Labovitz et al. found that pathological BGP routing updates—such as withdrawing a route already withdrawn, or sending an update that replaces a route with itself—are so common that the total volume of BGP routing updates is 1–2 orders of magnitude higher than necessary. They also found that routing instability is clearly correlated with network load; that instabilities have a wide range of causes, and are not due simply to a single or few poorly engineered providers; that instabilities and updates exhibit 30-second and 60-second periodicities; and that, excluding the pathological updates, 80% of Internet routes exhibit a high degree of stability.

Both of these studies concern how routing information propagates *inside* the network. It is not obvious, though, how these dynamics translate into the routing dynamics seen by an end user. An area noted by Chinoy as ripe for further study is "the end-to-end dynamics of routing information."

We will use the term *virtual path* to denote the network-level abstraction of a "direct link" between two Internet hosts. For example, when Internet host $A$ wishes to establish a network-level connection to host $B$, as far as $A$ is concerned the network layer provides it with a link directly to $B$. We will denote the notion of the virtual path from $A$ to $B$ as $A \Rightarrow B$.

At any given instant in time, the virtual path $A \Rightarrow B$ is realized at the network layer by a single *route*, which is a sequence of Internet routers along which packets sent by $A$ and destined for $B$ are forwarded. Over time, the virtual path $A \Rightarrow B$ may oscillate between different routes, or it may be quite stable (§ 7). Chinoy's suggested research area is then: given two hosts $A$ and $B$ at the edges of the network, how does the virtual path $A \Rightarrow B$ behave? This is the question we explore in our study.

A longer version of this study is available as Part I of [Pa97].

# 3 Routing in the Internet

For routing purposes, the Internet is partitioned into a disjoint set of *autonomous systems* (AS's) [Ro82]. Originally, an AS was a collection of routers and hosts unified by running a single "interior gateway protocol" (IGP). Over time, the notion has evolved to be essentially synonymous with that of *administrative domain* [HK89], in which the routers and hosts are unified by a single administrative authority, and a set of IGP's. Routing between autonomous systems provides the highest-level of Internet interconnection. RFC 1126 outlines the goals and requirements for inter-AS routing [Li89], and [Re95] gives an overview of how inter-AS routing has evolved.

BGP, currently in its fourth version [RL95, RG95], is now used between all significant AS's [Tr95a]. BGP allows arbitrary interconnection topologies between AS's, and also provides a mechanism for preventing routing loops between AS's (§ 6.1).

The key to whether use of BGP will scale to a very large Internet lies in the *stability* of inter-AS routing [Tr95b]. If routes between AS's vary frequently—a phenomenon termed "flapping" [Do95]—then the BGP routers will spend a great deal of their time updating their routing tables and propagating the routing changes. Daily statistics concerning routing flapping are available from [Me97].

It is important to note that stable inter-AS routing does *not* guarantee stable end-to-end routing, because AS's are large entities capable of significant internal instabilities.

# 4 Methodology

In this section we discuss the methodology used in our study: the measurement software; the utility of sampling at exponentially distributed intervals; which aspects of our data are plausibly representative of Internet traffic and which not; and some problems with our experimental design.

For brevity we assume that the reader is familiar with the workings of the `traceroute` utility for measuring Internet routes ([Ja89]; see [St94] for detailed discussion).

## 4.1 Experimental apparatus

We conducted our experiment by recruiting a number of Internet sites (see Table 1 in § 5) to run a "network probe daemon" (NPD) that provides several measurement services. These NPD's were then contacted at exponentially-distributed intervals by a control program, "npd_control," running on our local workstation, and asked to measure the route to another NPD site using `traceroute`. A key property of the NPD framework is that it exhibits $N^2$ scaling: if the framework consists of $N$ sites, then the framework can measure $O(N^2)$ Internet paths between the sites. This scaling property means that a fairly modest (in terms of $N$) framework can potentially observe a wide range of Internet behavior.

For our first set of measurements, termed $\mathcal{D}_1$, we measured each virtual path between two of the NPD sites with a mean interval of 1–2 days. For the second set of measurements, $\mathcal{D}_2$, we made measurements at two different rates: 60% with a mean inter-measurement interval of 2 hours, and 40% with an mean interval of about 2.75 days.

The $\mathcal{D}_1$ interval was chosen so that each NPD would make a `traceroute` measurement on average of once every two hours. As we added NPD sites to the experiment, the rate at which an NPD made measurements to a *particular* remote NPD site decreased, in order to maintain the average load of one measurement per two hours, which led to the range of 1–2 days in the mean measurement interval. Upon analyzing the $\mathcal{D}_1$ data we realized that such a large sampling interval would not allow us to resolve a number of questions concerning routing stability (§ 7). Therefore, for $\mathcal{D}_2$ we adopted the strategy of making measurements between pairs of NPD sites in "bursts," with a mean interval of 2 hours between measurements in each burst. We also continued to make lower frequency measurements between pairs of sites in order to gather data to assess routing stability over longer time periods. Overall, 60% of the measurements were made in "bursts," and 40% more widely spaced.

The bulk of the $\mathcal{D}_2$ measurements were also *paired*, meaning we would measure the virtual path $A \Rightarrow B$ and then immediately measure the virtual path $B \Rightarrow A$. This enabled us to resolve ambiguities concerning routing symmetry (§ 8), which again we only recognized after having captured and analyzed the $\mathcal{D}_1$ data.

## 4.2 Exponential sampling

We devised our measurements so that the time intervals between consecutive measurements of the same virtual path were independent and exponentially distributed. Doing so gains two important (and related) properties. The first is that the measurements correspond to *additive random sampling* [BM92]. Such sampling is unbiased because it samples all instantaneous signal values with equal probability. The second important property is that the measurement times form a Poisson process. This means that Wolff's *PASTA principle*—"Poisson Arrivals See Time Averages"—applies to our measurements: asymptotically, the proportion of our measurements that observe a given state is equal to the amount of time that the Internet spends in that state [Wo82]. Two important points regarding Wolff's theorem are (1) the observed process does *not* need to be Markovian; and (2) the Poisson arrivals need not be *homogeneous* [Wo82, § 3]. This last property means that we can compare time averages computed for $\mathcal{D}_1$ and $\mathcal{D}_2$ even though their sampling rates differed.

The only requirement of the PASTA theorem is that the observed process cannot *anticipate* observation arrivals. There is one respect in which our measurements fail this requirement. Even though our observations come exponentially distributed, the network *can* anticipate arrivals as follows: *When the network has lost connectivity between the site running "npd_control" and a site potentially conducting a* `traceroute`*, the network can predict that* no *measurement will occur.* The effect of this anticipation is a tendency to *underestimate* the prevalence of network connectivity problems (see also § 4.4 and § 5).

## 4.3 How representative are the observations?

37 Internet hosts participated in our routing study. This is a miniscule fraction of the estimated 6.6 million Internet hosts as of July, 1995 [Lo95], so clearly behavior we observe that is due to the particular endpoint hosts in our study is not plausibly representative. Similarly, the 34 different stub networks to which these hosts belong are also a miniscule fraction of the more than 50,000 known to the NSFNET in April, 1995 [Me95].

On the other hand, we argue that the *routes* between the 37 hosts give us a considerably richer cross-section of Internet routing behavior, because they include a non-negligible fraction of the AS's which together comprise the Internet. We expect the different routes within an AS to have similar characteristics (e.g., prevalence of pathologies, routing stability), because they fall under a common administration, so sampling a significant number of AS's lends representational weight to a set of measurements.

By analyzing a BGP routing table dump obtained from an AS border router, we found that at the time of $\mathcal{D}_2$ the Internet had about 1,000 active AS's. After removing those specific to the router from which we obtained the dump, we found

that the routes in our study traversed 8% of the remainder. In addition, not all AS's are equal—some are much more prominent in Internet routing than others. If we weight each AS by its likelihood of occurring in an AS path, then the AS's sampled by the routes we measured comprised about half of the Internet AS's by weight.

Thus, while we do not claim that our measurements give us a fully representative view of Internet routing behavior, we do argue that they reflect a significant cross-section of the behavior.

### 4.4 Shortcomings of the experimental design

A legitimate criticism of our study is that it does not provide enough analysis of the routing difficulties uncovered, including whether these difficulties are fundamental to routing a large packet-switched internetwork, or whether they could be fixed. There are several reasons for this shortcoming worth noting for those who would undertake similar studies in the future.

The first difficulty is somewhat inherent to end-to-end measurement: while an end-to-end measurement has the great benefit of measuring a quantity of direct interest to network end users, it also has the difficulty of compounding effects at different hops at the network into a single net effect. For example, when a routing loop is observed, a natural question is: what router is responsible for having created this loop? A measurement study made internal to the network, such as [LMJ97], can attempt to answer this question because the network's internal state is more visible. But for an end-to-end measurement study such as ours, all that is actually visible is the *fact* that a loop occurs, with little possibility of determining *why*.

One way to determine *why* a problem exists is to ask those running the network. We attempted a great deal of this (see § 10), but this approach does not scale effectively for large numbers of problems.

In retrospect, there are two ways in which our experiment could be considerably improved. The first is that if NPD's could be given a whole batch of measurement requests (rather than just a single request), along with times at which to perform them, then the underestimation of network problems due to our centralized design (§ 4.2) could be eliminated. The second is the use of a tool more sophisticated than `traceroute`: one that could analyze the route measurement in real-time and repeat portions (or all) of the measurement as necessary in order to resolve ambiguities.

## 5 The Raw Routing Data

The first routing experiment was conducted from November 8 through December 24, 1994. During this time, we attempted 6,991 `traceroutes` between 27 sites. We refer to this collection of measurements as $\mathcal{D}_1$. The second experiment, $\mathcal{D}_2$, went from November 3 through December 21, 1995. It included 37,097 attempted `traceroutes` between 33 sites. Both datasets are available from the Internet Traffic Archive, `http://www.acm.org/sigcomm/ITA/`. Table 1 lists the sites participating in our study, giving the abbreviation we will use to refer to the site, a brief description of the site, and its location.

| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| adv | Advanced Network & Services, Armonk, NY |
| austr | University of Melbourne, Australia |
| austr2 | University of Newcastle, Australia |
| batman | National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, CO |
| bnl | Brookhaven National Lab, NY |
| bsdi | Berkeley Software Design, Colorado Springs, CO |
| connix | Caravela Software, Middlefield, CT |
| harv | Harvard University, Cambridge, MA |
| inria | INRIA, Sophia, France |
| korea | Pohang Institute of Science and Technology, South Korea |
| lbl | Lawrence Berkeley Lab, CA |
| lbli | LBL computer connected via ISDN, CA |
| mid | MIDnet, Lincoln, NE |
| mit | Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA |
| ncar | National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, CO |
| near | NEARnet, Cambridge, Massachusetts |
| nrao | National Radio Astronomy Observatory, Charlottesville, VA |
| oce | Oce-van der Grinten, Venlo, The Netherlands |
| panix | Public Access Networks Corporation, New York, NY |
| pubnix | Pix Technologies Corp., Fairfax, VA |
| rain | RAINet, Portland, Oregon |
| sandia | Sandia National Lab, Livermore, CA |
| sdsc | San Diego Supercomputer Center, CA |
| sintef1 | University of Trondheim, Norway |
| sintef2 | University of Trondheim, Norway |
| sri | SRI International, Menlo Park, CA |
| ucl | University College, London, U.K. |
| ucla | University of California, Los Angeles |
| ucol | University of Colorado, Boulder |
| ukc | University of Kent, Canterbury, U.K. |
| umann | University of Mannheim, Germany |
| umont | University of Montreal, Canada |
| unij | University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands |
| usc | University of Southern California, Los Angeles |
| ustutt | University of Stuttgart, Germany |
| wustl | Washington University, St. Louis, MO |
| xor | XOR Network Engineering, East Boulder, CO |

Table 1: Sites participating in the study

Figure 1 shows the locations of the North American, while figure 2 shows the different links traversed by the routes in our study. The $N^2$ scaling effect is readily apparent—a few dozen sites allow us to study hundreds of paths through the network.

In the two experiments, between 5–8% of the `traceroutes` failed outright (i.e., we were unable to contact the remote NPD, execute `traceroute` and retrieve its output). Almost all of the failures were due to an inability of npd_control to contact the remote NPD. For our analysis, the effect of these contact failures will lead to a bias towards *underestimating* Internet connectivity failures, because sometimes the failure to contact the remote daemon will result in losing an opportunity to observe a lack of connectivity between that site and another remote site (§ 4.2).

When conducting the $\mathcal{D}_2$ measurements, however, we somewhat corrected for this underestimation by *pairing* each measurement of the virtual path $A \Rightarrow B$ with a measurement




Figure 1: Sites participating in routing study, North America and Asia


Figure 2: Links traversed during $\mathcal{D}_1$ and $\mathcal{D}_2$, North American perspective

of the virtual path $B \Rightarrow A$, increasing the likelihood of observing such failures. In only 5% of the $\mathcal{D}_2$ measurement failures was npd_control unable to contact either host of the measurement pair.

# 6 Routing pathologies

We begin our analysis by classifying occurrences of routing pathologies—those routes that exhibited either clear, sub-standard performance, or out-and-out broken behavior. These include routing loops (§ 6.1), erroneous routing (§ 6.2), rapidly changing routing (§ 6.3, § 6.4), infrastructure failures (§ 6.5), excessive hops (§ 6.6), and temporary outages (§ 6.7).

## 6.1 Routing loops

In this section we discuss the pathology of a routing *loop*. For our discussion we distinguish between three types of loops: a *forwarding* loop, in which packets forwarded by a router eventually return to the router; an *information* loop, in which a router acts on connectivity information derived from information it itself provided earlier; and a `traceroute` loop, in which a `traceroute` measurement reports the same sequence of routers multiple times. For our study, all we can observe directly are `traceroute` loops, and it is possible for a `traceroute` loop to reflect *not* a forwarding loop but instead an upstream routing change that happens to add enough upstream hops that the `traceroute` observes the same sequence of routers as previously. Because of this potential ambiguity, we require a `traceroute` measurement to show the same sequence of routers at least *three* times in order to be assured that the observation is of a forwarding loop.

In general, routing algorithms are designed to avoid forwarding loops, provided all of the routers in the network share a consistent view of the present connectivity. Thus, loops are apt to form when the network experiences a change in connectivity and that change is not immediately propagated to all of the routers [Hu95]. One hopes that forwarding loops resolve themselves quickly, as they represent complete connectivity failures.

While some researchers have downplayed the significance of temporary forwarding loops [MRR80], others have noted that loops can rapidly lead to congestion as a router is flooded with multiple copies of each packet it forwards [ZG-LA92], and minimizing loops is a major Internet design goal [Li89]. To this end, BGP is designed to never allow the creation of inter-AS forwarding loops, which it accomplishes by tagging all routing information with the AS path over which it has traversed.[1]

For our analysis, we considered any `traceroute` showing a loop unresolved by end of the `traceroute` as a "persistent loop." 10 `traceroutes` in $\mathcal{D}_1$ (0.13%) exhibited persistent routing loops, and 50 `traceroutes` in $\mathcal{D}_2$ (0.16%). Due to $\mathcal{D}_2$'s higher sampling frequency, for some of these loops we can place upper bounds on how long they persisted, by looking for surrounding measurements between the same hosts that do not show the loop. In addition, sometimes the surrounding measurements *do* show the loop, allowing us to assign lower bounds, too.

We find that the loop durations fall into two modes, those definitely under 3 hours (and possibly quite shorter), observed by only one `traceroute` measurement; and those of more than half a day, observed by multiple `traceroute` measurements. Some loops were observed by only one measurement, but the surrounding measurements were many hours earlier and later, which does not allow us to determine whether they were relatively short-lived or long-lived. We observed two definite, long-lived loops, one spanning 14–17 hr (observed in 12 `traceroute` measurements) and one spanning 16–32 hr (16 measurements), and one likely long-lived loop, spanning at least 10 hr (2 measurements). The presence of persistent loops of durations on the order of hours is surprising: it suggests a lack of good tools for diagnosing network problems, and of adequate feedback mechanisms for informing end users of connectivity problems.

We also note a tendency for persistent loops to come in clusters. Geographically, loops occurred much more often between routers located in the Washington D.C. area, probably because the very high degree of interchange between different network service providers in that area offers ample opportunity for introducing inconsistencies.

Loops involving separate pairs of routers also are clustered in time. For example, we observed a loop involving two AlterNet routers sited in Washington, D.C., at the same time as two separate observations of a SprintLink loop, at nearby MAE-East. Thus, it appears that the inconsistencies that lead to long-lived routing loops are not confined to a single pair of routers, but also affect nearby routers, tending to introduce loops into their tables too. This clustering makes sense because topologically close routers will often quickly share routing information, and hence if one router's view is inconsistent, the view of the nearby ones is likely to be so, too. The clustering suggests that an observation of a persistent forwarding loop likely reflects an outage of larger scope than just the observed set of looping routers.

We also analyzed the looping routers to see if any of the loops involved more than one AS. As mentioned above, the design of BGP in theory prevents any inter-AS forwarding loops, by preventing any looping of routing information. We found that three of the ten $\mathcal{D}_1$ loops spanned more than one AS, and two of the fifty in $\mathcal{D}_2$. We also learned that at least one of the inter-AS loops in $\mathcal{D}_2$ occurred due to the presence of a static route, and thus clearly was not the fault of BGP. It may be that the others have similar explanations. In any event, it appears clear from our data that BGP loop suppression virtually eliminates inter-AS looping.

[1] This technique is based on the observation that forwarding loops occur only in the wake of a routing information loop.




Figure 3: Routes taken by alternating packets from `wustl` (St. Louis, Missouri) to `umann` (Mannheim, Germany), due to fluttering

## 6.2 Erroneous routing

In $\mathcal{D}_1$ we found one example of *erroneous* routing, where the packets clearly took the wrong path. This involved a `connix` ⇒ `ucl` route in which the trans-Atlantic hop was not to London but instead to Rehovot, Israel! While we did not observe any erroneous routing in $\mathcal{D}_2$, there remains a security lesson to be considered: one really cannot make any safe assumptions about where one's packets might travel on the Internet.

## 6.3 Connectivity altered mid-stream

In 10 of the $\mathcal{D}_1$ traces (0.16%) and 155 of the $\mathcal{D}_2$ traces (0.44%) we observed routing connectivity reported earlier in the `traceroute` later lost or altered, indicating we were catching a routing failure as it happened. Some of these changes were accompanied by outages, in which presumably the intermediary routers were rearranging their views of the current topology, and dropping many packets in the interim because they did not know how to forward them. We found that the distribution of recovery times from routing problems is at least bimodal—some recoveries occur quite quickly, on the time scale of congestion delays (100's of msec to seconds), while others take on the order of a minute to resolve. We suspect the different modes depend on whether the change is due to a new route becoming available, in which case the outage spans only the amount of time required to process the new routing information and update the forwarding table; versus an existing route being lost, and the outage reflecting having to wait for the change to propagate through the network and an alternative route to be found. The latter type of recovery presents significant difficulties for time-sensitive applications that assume outages are short-lived.

## 6.4 Fluttering

We use the term "fluttering" to refer to rapidly-oscillating routing. Figure 3 dramatically illustrates the possible effects of fluttering. Here, the `wustl` border router splits it load between two STARnet routers in St. Louis, one of which sends all of its packets to Washington, D.C. (solid; 17 hops to `umann`), and the other to Anaheim (dotted line; 29 hops). Thus, every other packet bound for `umann` travels via a different coast! While load splitting is explicitly allowed in [Ba95, p.79], that document also cautions that there are situations for which it is inappropriate. We argue below that this is one of those situations.

In addition to the `wustl` fluttering, we also found fluttering at a `ucol` border router. Here, though, the two split paths immediately rejoined, so the split's effects were completely localized. In $\mathcal{D}_2$, however, we observed very little fluttering.

While fluttering can provide benefits as a way to balance load in a network, it also creates a number of problems for different networking applications. First, a fluttering network path presents the difficulties that arise from *unstable* network paths (§ 7). Second, if the fluttering only occurs in one direction (true for `wustl`, but not for `ucol`), then the path suffers from the problems of *asymmetry* (§ 8). Third, estimating the path characteristics, such as round-trip time and available bandwidth, becomes potentially very difficult, since in fact there may be *two* different sets of values to estimate. Finally, when the two routes have different propagation times, then TCP packets arriving at the destination out of order can lead to spurious "fast retransmissions" [St94] by generating duplicate acknowledgements, wasting bandwidth.

These problems all argue for eliminating large-scale fluttering when possible. On the other hand, when the effects of the flutter are confined, as for `ucol`, or invisible at the network layer (such as split-routing used at the link layer, which would not show up at all in our study), then these problems are all ameliorated. Furthermore, if fluttering is done on a coarser granularity than per packet (say, per TCP connection), then the effects are also lessened.

Finally, we note that "deflection" and "dispersion" routing schemes that forward packets along varying or multiple paths have many of the characteristics of fluttering paths [BDG95, GK97]. While these schemes can offer benefits in terms of simplified routing decisions, enhanced throughput, and resilience, they bring with them the difficulties discussed above. From the discussion of dispersion routing in [GK97], it appears that the literature in that area to date has only considered the problem of out-of-order delivery, which is addressed simply by noting that the schemes require a resequencing buffer.

## 6.5 Infrastructure failures

We classify a `traceroute` measurement as an "infrastructure failure" if the measurement terminates due to receiving a "host unreachable" message from a router well inside the network. Such a message from a stub network router, or a router near a stub network, might indeed indicate that just the given host or its local network is unreachable. But for routers more removed from an individual host, routing information for reaching the host becomes increasingly aggregated with routing information for reaching other hosts

and local networks. Consequently, if we receive a "host unreachable" message from a router remote from the destination host, then most likely the message indicates that the underlying infrastructure has lost connectivity to appreciably more destinations than just the host or its local network.

We observed a total of 13 infrastructure failures out of 6,459 $\mathcal{D}_1$ observations (0.21%). From these, we can estimate an overall availability rate for the Internet infrastructure of 99.8%, with the caveat that doing so assumes that the paths measured in our study are plausibly representative. In $\mathcal{D}_2$, this dropped to 99.5%. We must also bear in mind, however, that these numbers will be somewhat skewed by times when the infrastructure failure also prevented us from making any measurement (§ 5). Consequently, these availability figures are overestimates.

## 6.6 Unreachable due to too many hops

By default, `traceroute` probes up to 30 hops of the route between two hosts. This length sufficed for all of the $\mathcal{D}_1$ measurements, and all but 6 of the $\mathcal{D}_2$ measurements. The fact that it failed occasionally in $\mathcal{D}_2$ (there was no indication of a problem with these long routes, just a few more hops than usual), however, indicates that the operational diameter of the Internet has grown beyond 30 hops. This in turn argues for using large initial TTL values when a host originates an IP datagram.[2]

In $\mathcal{D}_1$, the mean path length was 15.6 hops, which increased slightly in $\mathcal{D}_2$ to 16.2 hops. The median for both datasets was 16 hops, and the standard deviation was 4.5 hops. We also note that for both datasets, the overall distribution of hop counts is well described as (discrete) Gaussian with the above parameters, which may prove beneficial for synthesizing Internet topologies for simulation studies.

Finally, it is sometimes assumed that the hop count of a route equates to its geographical distance. While this is roughly the case, we noticed some remarkable exceptions. For example, we observed a 1,500 km end-to-end route of only 3 hops, and a 2,000 km route of 5 hops. We also found that the route between `mit` and `harv` (about 3 km apart) was consistently 11 hops in both directions.

## 6.7 Temporary outages

The final pathology we discuss here is temporary network outages. When a sequence of consecutive `traceroute` packets are lost, the most likely cause is either a temporary loss of network connectivity, or very heavy congestion lasting 10's of seconds. For each `traceroute`, we examined its longest period of consecutive packet losses (other than consecutive losses at the end of a `traceroute` when, for example, the endpoint was unreachable). We partitioned the

[2] When examining link traces at our site, we have found that a non-negligible proportion of the datagrams (10% in one trace) appear to have been sent with TTL's of 32.




Figure 4: Distribution of long $\mathcal{D}_1$ outages




Figure 5: Distribution of long $\mathcal{D}_2$ outages

outages into three modes: no losses observed; 1–5 losses observed, corresponding to perhaps a period of congestive loss rather than a true connectivity outage; and 6 or more losses observed, reflecting an outage spanning 30 seconds or more, probably due to a true connectivity outage. In $\mathcal{D}_1$ ($\mathcal{D}_2$), about 55% (43%) of the `traceroutes` had no losses, 44% (55%) had between 1 and 5 losses, and 0.96% (2.2%) had 6 or more losses.

Of these latter (six or more losses, $\geq$ 30 sec outage), the distribution of the number of packets lost in the $\mathcal{D}_1$ data is quite close to geometric. Figure 4 plots the outage duration on the $x$-axis vs. the probability of observing that duration or larger on the $y$-axis (log-scaled). The outage duration is determined by the number of packet losses multiplied by 5 seconds per lost packet. The line added to the plot corresponds to a geometric distribution with $p = 0.92$ that a packet beyond the 6th is dropped. As can be seen, the fit is good.

This evidence argues that long outages are well-modeled

as persisting for 30 seconds plus an exponentially distributed random variable with mean equal to about 40 seconds.

Figure 5 shows the same plot for the $\mathcal{D}_2$ data. Here we find, however, that the geometric tail with $p = 0.92$ is present only for outages more than 75 seconds long. For outages between 30 and 70 seconds, the duration still exhibits a strong geometric distribution, but with $p = 0.62$, suggesting two different recovery mechanisms. We do not have a plausible explanation for the difference, nor for why the distribution is geometric.

## 6.8 Time-of-day patterns

We analyzed the two most prevalent pathologies in $\mathcal{D}_2$ (temporary outages and infrastructure failures) for time-of-day patterns, to determine whether they are correlated with the known patterns of heavy traffic levels during daytime hours and lower levels during the evening and early morning off-hours. To do so, we associate with each measurement the mean of the time-of-day at its source and destination hosts. For example, the time zone of Berkeley, California is three hours behind that of Cambridge, Massachusetts. For a `traceroute` from `mit` to `lbl`, initiated at 09:00 local time in Cambridge, we would assign a local time of 07:30, since the `traceroute` occurred at 06:00 local time in California.

The most prevalent pathology was a temporary outage lasting at least 30 seconds (§ 6.7). We would expect these outages to be correlated with the time-of-day congestion patterns, since Labovitz et al. found that route flutter is correlated with network load [LMJ97]. Indeed, this is the case. In $\mathcal{D}_2$, the fewest temporary outages (0.4%) occurred during the 01:00-02:00 hour, while the most (8.0%) occurred during the 15:00-16:00 hour, with the pattern closely following the daily load pattern. From our data, however, we cannot rule out that some of these temporary outages were in fact simply periods of very heavy congestion, and did not reflect a true loss of connectivity.

The other pathology we analyzed was that of an infrastructure failure (§ 6.5). These definitely reflect connectivity outages, and not simply congestion periods. Here, we again have the peak occurring the 15:00-16:00 hour (9.3%), but the minimum actually occurred during the 09:00-10:00 hour (1.2%). Furthermore, the second highest peak (7.6%) occurred during the 06:00-07:00 hour. We speculate that this pattern might reflect the network operators favoring early morning (before peak hours) for making configuration changes and repairs. Once finished, these then hold the network stable until the late afternoon hours, when congestion hits its peak.

## 6.9 Representative pathologies

In § 4.3 we argued that our measurements are fairly plausibly representative of Internet routing behavior in general. An important question, though, is whether the *pathologies* we observed are likewise representative. It often proves difficult to assign responsibility for a pathology to a particular AS, in part due to the "serial" nature of `traceroute`: a pathology observed in a `traceroute` measurement as occurring at hop $h$ might in fact be due to a router upstream to hop $h$ that has changed the route, or a router downstream from $h$ that has propagated inconsistent routing information upstream to $h$. Nevertheless, we attempted to assess the representativeness of the pathologies as follows. For the most common pathology, a temporary outage of 30 or more seconds (§ 6.7), we assigned responsibility for the outage to the router in the `traceroute` measurement directly upstream from the first completely missing hop, as the link between this router and the missing hop is the most likely candidate for subsequent missing packets. We then tallied for each AS the number of its routers held culpable for outages.

The top three AS's accounted for nearly half of all of the temporary outages. They were AS-3561 (MCI-RESTON), 25%; AS-1800 (ICM-Atlantic; the transcontinental link between North America and Europe, operated by Sprint), 16%; and AS-1239 (Sprintlink), 6%. These three also correspond to the top three AS's by "weight," when we weight each AS by how often it appears in a BGP AS path (§ 4.3), indicating that our observations of the pathology are not suffering from skew due to an atypical AS.

| Pathology | Probability | Trend | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Persistent loops | 0.13–0.16% | | Some lasted hours. |
| Erroneous routing | 0.004–0.004% | | No instances in $\mathcal{D}_2$. |
| Mid-stream change | 0.16% $\perp$ 0.44% | worse | Suggests rapidly varying routes. |
| Infrastructure failure | 0.21% $\perp$ 0.48% | worse | No dominant link. |
| Outage $\geq$ 30 secs | 0.96% $\perp$ 2.2% | worse | Duration exponent. distributed. |
| Total pathologies | 1.5% $\perp$ 3.3% | worse | |

Table 2: Summary of representative routing pathologies

## 6.10 Summary of pathologies

Table 2 summarizes the routing pathologies. The second column gives the probability of observing the pathology, in two forms. A range indicates that the proportion of observations in $\mathcal{D}_1$ was consistent with the proportion in $\mathcal{D}_2$, using Fisher's exact test at the 95% confidence level [Ri95]. The range reflects the values spanned by the two datasets. Two probabilities separated by "$\perp$" indicates that the proportion of $\mathcal{D}_1$ observations was *inconsistent*, with 95% confidence, with the proportion of $\mathcal{D}_2$ observations. The first probability applies to $\mathcal{D}_1$, and can be interpreted as reflecting the state of the Internet at the end of 1994, and the second to $\mathcal{D}_2$, reflecting the state at the end of 1995.

For those pathologies with inconsistent probabilities, the third column assesses the apparent trend during the year separating the $\mathcal{D}_1$ and $\mathcal{D}_2$ measurements. We see that *none of the pathologies improved*, and *a number became significantly worse*.

The final row summarizes the total probability of observing a pathology. If we accept our measurements as representative, then we see that during 1995, the likelihood of a user encountering a serious end-to-end routing problem more than doubled, to 1 in 30. The most prevalent of these problems was an outage lasting more than 30 seconds.

Even if we accept our measurements as representative, it is difficult to assess the significance of the trend, in terms of routing problems continuing to increase with time. In particular, we might argue that 1995 was an atypical year for Internet stability, due to the transition from the NSFNET backbone to the commercially-operated backbone. This effect does not dominate our measurements, though—only about one third of the $\mathcal{D}_1$ routes traversed the NSFNET. Clearly, resolving the significance of the trend in solid terms will require gathering more measurements over time.

# 7 End-to-end routing stability

One key property we would like to know about an end-to-end Internet route is its *stability*: do routes change often, or are they stable over time? In this section we analyze the routing measurements to address this question. We begin by discussing the impact of routing stability on different aspects of networking. We then present two different notions of routing stability, "prevalence" and "persistence," and show that they can be independent. It turns out that "prevalence" is quite easy to assess from our measurements, and "persistence" quite difficult. In § 7.3 we characterize the prevalence of Internet routes, and then in § 7.4 we tackle the problem of assessing persistence.

One of the goals of the Internet architecture is that large-scale routing changes (i.e., those involving different autonomous systems) rarely occur [Li89], because the load on Internet routers increases directly with the rate of such changes. In addition, there are a number of aspects of networking affected by end-to-end routing stability, including the degree to which: *(i)* the properties of network paths are *predictable*; *(ii)* a connection can *learn* about network conditions from past observations; *(iii)* real-time protocols must be prepared to recreate or migrate state stored in the routers [DB95, FBZ94, ZDESZ93, BCS94]; *(iv)* and whether network studies based on repeated measurements of network paths [CPB93, Bo93, SAGJ93, Mu94] can assume that the measurements are indeed observing the same path.

## 7.1 Two definitions of stability

There are two distinct views of routing stability. The first is: "Given that we observed route $r$ at the present, how likely are we to observe $r$ again in the future?" We refer to this notion as *prevalence*, and equate it with the unconditional probability of observing a given route. Prevalence has implications for overall network predictability, and the ability to learn from past observations.

A second view of stability is: "Given that we observed route $r$ at time $t$, how long before that route is likely to have changed?" We refer to this notion as *persistence*. It has implications for how to effectively manage router state, and for network studies based on repeated path measurements.

Intuitively, we might expect these two notions to be coupled. Consider, for example, a sequence of routing observations made every $T$ units of time. If the routes we observe are:

$$R_1, R_1, R_1, R_1, R_1, R_1, R_1, R_1, R_1, R_1, R_1, R_2, R_1, R_1, R_1 \ldots$$

then clearly route $R_1$ is much more prevalent than route $R_2$. We might also conclude that route $R_1$ is persistent, because we observe it so frequently; but this is not at all necessarily the case. For example, suppose $T$ is one day. If the mean duration of $R_1$ is 10 days, and that of $R_2$ is one day, then this sequence of observations is quite plausible, and we would be correct in concluding that $R_1$ is *persistent and prevalent*. Furthermore, if, for a particular context, we consider a route lifetime of one day as sufficiently long-lived, then we would also deem that $R_2$ is persistent, since on average it lasts for a full day. In that case, $R_2$ is *persistent but not prevalent.*

But suppose instead that the mean duration of $R_1$ is 10 seconds and the mean duration of $R_2$ is 1 second. If, for example, the alternations between them occur as a semi-Markov process, then the proportion of time spent in state $R_1$ is $\frac{10}{11}$ [Ro83], again reflecting that $R_1$ is prevalent. Similarly, the proportion of time spent in state $R_2$ is $\frac{1}{11}$. Given these proportions, the sequence of observations is *still plausible*, even though each observation of $R_1$ is actually of a separate instance of the route. In this case, $R_1$ is *prevalent but not persistent*, and $R_2$ is *neither prevalent nor persistent*.

## 7.2 Reducing the data

We confine our analysis to the $\mathcal{D}_2$ measurements, as these were made at a wide range of intervals (60% with mean 2 hrs and 40% with mean 2.75 days), which allows us to assess stability over many time scales, and to tackle the "persistence ambiguity" outlined above. Of the 35,109 $\mathcal{D}_2$ measurements, we omitted those exhibiting pathologies (because they reflect difficulties distinct from routing instabilities), and those for which one or more of the `traceroute` hops was completely missing, as these measurements are inherently ambiguous. This left us with 31,709 measurements.

We next made a preliminary assessment of the patterns of route changes by seeing which occurred most frequently. We found the pattern of changes dominated by a number of single-hop differences, at which consecutive measurements showed exactly the same path except for an alternation at a single router. Furthermore, the names of these routers often suggested that the pair were administratively interchangeable. It seems likely that frequent route changes differing at just a single hop are due to shifting traffic between two tightly coupled machines. For the stability concerns given at the beginning of this section, such a change will have




Figure 6: Fraction of observations finding the dominant route, for all virtual paths, at all granularities

little consequence, provided the two routers are co-located. We identified 5 such pairs of "tightly coupled" routers and merged each pair into a single router for purposes of assessing stability.

Finally, we reduced the routes to three different levels of *granularity*: considering each route as a sequence of Internet hostnames (*host* granularity), as a sequence of cities (*city* granularity), and as a sequence of AS's (*AS* granularity). The use of city and AS granularities introduces a notion of "major change" as opposed to "any change." Overall, 57% of the route changes at host granularity were also changes at city granularity, and 36% of the changes at host granularity were also changes at AS granularity.

## 7.3 Routing Prevalence

In this section we look at routing stability from the standpoint of *prevalence*: how likely we are, overall, to observe a particular route (per § 7.1). We associate with prevalence a parameter $\pi_r$, the steady-state probability that a virtual path at an arbitrary point in time uses a particular route $r$; and, because of PASTA, our sampling gives us an unbiased estimator of $\pi_r$ computed as: $\hat{\pi}_r = k_r/n$.

For a particular virtual path $p$, let $n_p$ be the total number of `traceroutes` measuring that virtual path, and $k_p$ be the number of times we observed the *dominant* route, meaning the route that appeared most often. We focus our analysis on $\hat{\pi}_{\text{dom p}} = k_p/n_p$, the prevalence of the dominant route.

Figure 6 shows the cumulative distribution of the prevalence of the dominant routes over all 1,054 virtual paths measured in $\mathcal{D}_2$, for the three different granularities. For example, when viewed at host granularity (i.e., as a series of Internet routers), about 30% of the paths had a dominant route with a prevalence of 60% or less. For the other 70% of the paths, the same series of routers was observed for those paths more than 60% of the time.

Similarly, if we view paths in terms of the series of cities visited along the path (city granularity), then from the figure we find that for only about 10% of the paths was the prevalence 60% or less. This means that for 10% of the Internet paths in our study, the most common series of cities taken by a route along those paths showed up in 60% or fewer of the observations of the path. For the remaining 90% of the paths, the most common series of cities was observed more than 60% of the time.

There is clearly a wide range in prevalence, particularly for host granularity. For example, for the virtual path between `pubnix` and `austr`, in 46 measurements we observed 9 distinct routes at host granularity, and the dominant route was observed only 10 times, leading to $\hat{\pi}_{\text{dom}} = 0.217$. On the other hand, at host granularity more than 25% of the virtual paths exhibited only a single route ($\hat{\pi}_{\text{dom}} = 1$). For city and AS granularities, the spread in $\hat{\pi}_{\text{dom}}$ is more narrow, as we would expect.

A key figure to keep in mind from this plot, however, is that while there is a wide range in the distribution of $\hat{\pi}_{\text{dom}}$ over different virtual paths, its *median* value at host granularity is 82%. That is, for half of the virtual paths measured, the same route was observed 82% or more of the time. From this, we argue that *in general, Internet paths are strongly dominated by a single route,* where "dominated" means that we are likely to repeatedly observe that same route when measuring at random points in time.

Furthermore, if we are interested in routing at coarser granularities than individual routers, then the statement holds more strongly. The median value of $\hat{\pi}_{\text{dom}}$ is 97% at city granularity, and 100% at AS granularity. The corresponding findings are *in general, Internet paths are very strongly dominated by the same set of cities, and also the same AS's.*

Previous traffic studies, however, have shown that many characteristics of network traffic exhibit considerable site-to-site variation [Pa94], so it behooves us to assess the differences in $\hat{\pi}_{\text{dom}}$ between the sites in our study. To do so, for each site $s$ we compute $\hat{\pi}_{\text{src s}}$ and $\hat{\pi}_{\text{dst s}}$, the estimated conditional probabilities of observing a dominant route aggregated over all virtual paths with source or destination $s$, respectively.

Studying $\hat{\pi}_{\text{src s}}$ and $\hat{\pi}_{\text{dst s}}$ for different sites and at different granularities reveals considerable site-to-site variation. For example, at host granularity, the prevalence of the dominant routes originating at the `ucl` source is under 50% (we will see why in § 7.4.1), and for `bnl`, `sintef1`, `sintef2`, and `pubnix` is around 60%, while for `ncar`, `ucol`, and `unij` it is just under 90%.

We can summarize routing prevalence as follows: *In general, Internet paths are strongly dominated by a single route, but, as with many aspects of Internet behavior, we also find significant site-to-site variation.*

## 7.4 Routing Persistence

We now turn to the more difficult task of assessing the *persistence* of routes: How long they are likely to endure before changing. As illustrated in § 7.1, routing persistence

can be difficult to evaluate because a series of measurements at particular points in time do not necessarily indicate a lack of change *and then change back* in between the measurement points. Thus, to accurately assess persistence requires first determining if routing alternates on short time scales. If not, then we can trust shortly spaced measurements observing the same route as indicating that the route did indeed persist during the interval between the measurements. The shortly spaced measurements can then be used to assess whether routing alternates on medium time scales, etc. In this fashion, we aim to "bootstrap" ourselves into a position to be able to make sound characterizations of routing persistence across a number of time scales.

### 7.4.1 Rapid route alternation

We have already identified two types of rapidly alternating routes, those due to "flutter" and those due to "tightly coupled" routers. We have separately characterized fluttering (§ 6.4) and consequently have not included paths experiencing flutter in this analysis. As mentioned in § 7.2, we merged tightly coupled routers into a single entity, so their presence also does not further affect our analysis.

We first looked at those `traceroute` measurements that were made less than 60 seconds apart. There were only 54 of these, but all of them were of the form "$R_1, R_1$"—i.e., both of the measurements observed the same route. This provides credible, though not definitive, evidence that there are no additional widespread, high-frequency routing oscillations, other than those we have already characterized. Consequently, we can plausibly trust measurements made at somewhat longer intervals apart as not missing high-frequency changes, which allows us to bootstrap our analysis so we can now assess how often network paths exhibit medium-frequency routing oscillations.

We next looked at measurements made less than 10 minutes apart. There were 1,302 of these (including the 54 less than 60 seconds apart), and 40 *triple* observations (three observations all within a ten minute interval). The triple observations allow us to double check for the presence of high-frequency oscillations: if we observe the pattern $R_1, R_2, R_1$ or $R_1, R_2, R_3$, then we are likely to miss some route changes when using only two measurements 10 minutes apart. If we only observe $R_1, R_1, R_1$; $R_1, R_2, R_2$; or $R_1, R_1, R_2$, then measurements made 10 minutes apart are not missing short-lived routes. Of the 40 triple observations, all were of one of the latter forms.

The 1,302 ten-minute observations included 25 instances of a route change ($R_1, R_2$). This suggests that the likelihood of observing a route change over a ten minute interval is not negligible, and requires further investigation before we can look at more widely spaced measurements.

A natural question to ask concerning 10-minute changes is whether just a few sites are responsible for most of them. For each site $s$, let $N^{10}_{\text{src s}}$ be the number of 10-minute pairs of measurements originating at $s$, and $X^{10}_{\text{src s}}$ be the number of pairs reflecting a routing change. Similarly, define $N^{10}_{\text{dst s}}$ and $X^{10}_{\text{dst s}}$ for those pairs of measurements with destination $s$. We can then define: $P^{10}_{\text{src s}} = X^{10}_{\text{src s}}/N^{10}_{\text{src s}}$, and similarly for $P^{10}_{\text{dst s}}$. $P^{10}_{\text{src s}}$ ($P^{10}_{\text{dst s}}$) gives the estimated probability that a pair of ten-minute observations of virtual paths with source (destination) $s$ will show a routing change. By sorting sites based on $P^{10}_{\text{src s}}$ and $P^{10}_{\text{dst s}}$, we then identify those that appear particularly prone to be associated with a rapid routing change. These outliers then merit further investigation, to see whether we can identify an underlying cause for the rapid changes.

For example, one clear outlier identified by inspecting $P^{10}_{\text{dst s}}$ is `austr`. For it, we find that all of the routing changes (which involve a number of different source sites) take place at the point-of-entry into Australia. The changes are either the first Australian hop of `vic.gw.au`, in Melbourne, or `act.gw.au`, in Canberra, or `serial4-6.pad-core2.sydney.telstra.net` in Sydney followed by an additional hop to `nsw.gw.au` (also in Sydney). These are the only points of change: before and after, the routes are unchanged. Thus, the destination `austr` exhibits rapid (time scale of tens of minutes) changes in its incoming routing. As such, the routing *to* `austr` is not at all persistent.

However, for another $P^{10}_{\text{dst s}}$ outlier, `sandia`, the story is different. Its changes occurred only along the virtual path originating at `sri`, and reflected a change localized to MCINET in San Francisco. Had this change been more often observed, we might have decided that the two pairs of routers in question were "tightly coupled" (§ 7.2), but they were responsible for changes only between `sri` and `sandia`. Thus, we can deal with this outlier by eliminating the virtual path `sri` ⇒ `sandia` from further analysis of lower-frequency routing changes, but we can keep all the other virtual paths with destination `sandia`.

In addition to the destination `austr`, a similar analysis of $P^{10}_{\text{src s}}$ points up `ucl`, `ukc`, `mid`, and `umann` as outliers. Both `ucl` and `ukc` had frequent oscillations between two sets of routers for the path between London and Washington, D.C. (One set of routers also included an AS not present in the other set.) For `mid` and `umann`, however, the changes did not have a clear pattern, and their prevalence could be due simply to chance.

On the basis of this analysis, we conclude that the sources `ucl` and `ukc`, and the destination `austr`, suffer from significant, high-frequency oscillation, and exclude them from further analysis. After removing any measurements originating from the first two or destined to `austr`, we then looked at the range of values for $P^{10}_{\text{src s}}$ and $P^{10}_{\text{dst s}}$. Both of these had a median of 0 observed changes, and a maximum corresponding to about 1 change per 60 minutes of observation. On this basis (at most 1 change per hour), we believe we are on firm ground treating pairs of measurements between these sites, made less than an hour apart, and both observing the same route, as consistent with that route having persisted unchanged between the measurements. Consequently, we can now bootstrap our analysis to the next larger time scale, on

the assumption that two observations of a virtual path made less than an hour apart will not completely miss a routing change.

### 7.4.2 Medium-scale route alternation

Given the findings that, except for a few sites, route changes do not occur on time scales less than an hour, we now turn to analyzing those measurements made an hour or less apart to determine what they tell us about medium-scale routing persistence. We proceed much as in § 7.4.1. Let $P^{\text{hr}}_{\text{src s}}$ and $P^{\text{hr}}_{\text{dst s}}$ be the analogs of $P^{10}_{\text{src s}}$ and $P^{10}_{\text{dst s}}$, but now for measurements made an hour or less apart. After eliminating the rapidly oscillating virtual paths previously identified, we have 7,453 pairs of measurements to assess, encompassing 904 source/destination pairs.

The data also included 1,517 triple observations spanning an hour or less. Of these, only 10 observed the pattern $R_1, R_2, R_1$ or $R_1, R_2, R_3$, indicating that, in general, two observations of these virtual paths spaced an hour apart are not likely to miss a routing change.

An analysis similar to that above quickly identified virtual paths originating from `bnl` as exhibiting rapid changes. These changes are almost all due to oscillation between `llnl-satm.es.net` and `pppl-satm.es.net`. (The first is in California, the second in New Jersey). ESNET oscillations also occurred on one-hour time scales in traffic between `lbl` (and `lbli`) and the Cambridge sites, `near`, `harv`, and `mit`.

The other prevalent oscillation we found was between the source `umann` and the destinations `ucl` and `ukc`. Here the alternation was between a British Telecom router in Switzerland and another in the Netherlands.

Eliminating these oscillating virtual paths leaves us with 6,919 measurement pairs (and 82% of the initial source/destination pairs). These virtual paths all have low rates of routing changes, with the median $P^{\text{hr}}_{\text{src s}}$ and $P^{\text{hr}}_{\text{dst s}}$ correspond to one routing change per 1.5 days, and the maximum to one change per 12 hours.

### 7.4.3 Large-scale route alternation

Given that, after removing the oscillating paths discussed above, we expect at most on the order of one route change per 12 hours, we now can further bootstrap our analysis to include measurements less than 6 hours apart of the remaining virtual paths, in order to assess longer-term route changes. There were 15,171 such pairs of measurements, encompassing 860 source/destination pairs. As 6 hours is significantly larger than the mean 2 hour sampling interval, not surprisingly we find many triple measurements spanning less than 6 hours. But of the 10,660 triple measurements, only 75 included a route change of the form $R_1, R_2, R_1$ or $R_1, R_2, R_3$, indicating that, for the virtual paths to which we have now narrowed our focus, we are still not missing many routing changes using measurements spaced up to 6 hours apart.




Figure 7: Estimated distribution of long-lived route durations

Employing the same analysis, we first identify `sintef1` and `sintef2` as outliers, both as source and as destination sites. The majority of their route changes turn out to be oscillations between two sets of routers, each alternating between visiting or not visiting Oslo. Two other outliers at this level are traffic to or from `sdsc`, which alternates between two different pairs of CERFNET routers in San Diego, and traffic originating from `mid`, which alternates between two MIDNET routers in St. Louis.

Eliminating these paths leaves 11,174 measurements of the 712 remaining virtual paths. The paths between the sites in these remaining measurements are quite stable, with a maximum transition rate for any site of about one change every two days, and a median rate of one per four days.

### 7.4.4 Duration of long-lived routes

We term the remaining measurements as corresponding to "long-lived" routes. For these, we might hazard to estimate the durations of the different routes as follows. We suppose that we are not completely missing any routing transitions, an assumption based on the overall low rate of routing changes. Then for a sequence of measurements all observing the same route, we assume that the route's duration was at least the span of the measurements. Furthermore, if at time $t_1$ we observe route $R_1$ and then the next measurement at time $t_2$ observes route $R_2$, we make a "best guess" that route $R_1$ terminated and route $R_2$ began half way between these measurements, i.e., at time $\frac{t_1+t_2}{2}$.

Figure 7 shows the distribution of the estimated durations of the "long-lived" routes. Even keeping in mind that our estimates are rough, it is clear that the distribution of long-lived route durations has two distinct regions, with many of the routes persisting for 1-7 days, and another group persisting for several weeks. About half the routes persisted for under a week, but the half of the routes lasting more than a week accounted for 90% of total persistence. This means that if we observe a virtual path at an arbitrary point in time, *and we are not observing one of the numerous, more rapidly*

| Time scale | % | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| seconds | N/A | "Flutter" for purposes of load balancing. Treated separately, as a pathology, and not included in the analysis of persistence. |
| minutes | N/A | "Tightly-coupled routers." We identified five instances, which we merged into single routers for the remainder of the analysis. |
| 10's of minutes | 9% | Frequent route changes inside the network. In some cases involved routing through different cities or AS's. |
| hours | 4% | Usually intra-network changes. |
| 6+ hours | 19% | Also intra-network changes. |
| days | 68% | Two regions. 50% of routes persist for under 7 days. The remaining 50% account for 90% of the total route lifetimes. |

Table 3: Summary of persistence at different time scales

*oscillating paths outlined in the previous sections*, then we have about a 90% chance of observing a route with a duration of at least a week.

#### 7.4.5 Summary of routing persistence

We summarize routing persistence as follows. First, *routing changes occur over a wide range of time scales, ranging from seconds to days.* Table 3 lists different time scales over which routes change. The second column gives the percentage of all of our measured virtual paths (source/destination pairs) that were affected by changes at the given time scale. (The first two rows show "N/A" in this field because the changes were due to a very small, and hence not representative, set of routers.) The final column gives associated notes.

One important point apparent from the table is that routing changes on shorter time scales (fewer than days) happen *inside the network* and not at the stub networks. Thus, *those changes observed in our measurements are likely to be similar to those observed by most Internet sites*.

Finally, two thirds of the Internet paths we studied had quite stable routes, persisting for days or weeks. This finding accords with [Ch93] and [LMJ97], both of whom found that most networks are nearly quiescent (in terms of routing changes) while a few exhibit frequent routing fluctuations.

# 8 Routing symmetry

We now analyze the measurements to assess the degree to which routes are *symmetric* or *asymmetric*. We confine ourselves to studying "major" asymmetries, in which the sequence of cities or AS's visited by the routes for the two directions of a virtual path differ.

Routing symmetry affects a number of aspects of network behavior. When attempting to assess the one-way propagation time between two Internet hosts, the common practice is to assume it is well approximated as half of the round-trip time (RTT) between the hosts [CPB93]. The Network Time Protocol (NTP) needs to make such an assumption when synchronizing clocks between widely separated hosts [Mi92].[3]

Claffy and colleagues studied variations in one-way latencies between the United States, Europe, and Japan [CPB93]. They discuss the difficulties of measuring *absolute* differences in propagation times in the absence of separately-synchronized clocks, but for their study they focussed on *variations*, which does not require synchronization of the clocks. They found that the two opposing directions of a path do indeed exhibit considerably different latency variations, in part due to different congestion levels, and in part due to unidirectional routing changes.

Routing asymmetry also potentially complicates network measurement, trouble-shooting, accounting, and the utility of routers establishing *anticipatory flow state* when they observe a new flow from $A$ to $B$ that is likely to generate a return flow from $B$ to $A$ [CBP95].

Finally, routing asymmetry complicates network trouble-shooting, because it increases the likelihood that a network problem apparent in one direction along a virtual path cannot be detected in the other direction.

We note that because of the use of "reverse path forwarding" in Internet multicast routing protocols [DC90], it is sometimes assumed that routing asymmetry has a deleterious effect on multicast routing. However, this is not the case: a routing asymmetry merely leads to the construction of asymmetric multicast routing trees for different senders in a multicast group. In particular, it does not lead to any loss of connectivity within a multicast group.

## 8.1 Sources of routing asymmetry

Routing asymmetries can arise whenever the link "cost" metrics used to choose between different routing paths themselves contain an asymmetry along the two directions of a link. This can occur due to the link itself having a genuine asymmetric cost (e.g., differing bandwidth or payment scheme along the two directions), or due to configuration errors or inconsistencies.

Another mechanism introducing asymmetry—one rooted in the economics of a commercial Internet and hence of possibly growing importance—concerns "hot potato" and "cold potato" routing. Suppose host $A$ in California uses Internet Service Provider (ISP) $I_A$, and host $B$ in New York uses $I_B$. Assume that both $I_A$ and $I_B$ provide Internet connectivity across the entire United States, and compete with one another commercially. When $A$ sends a packet to $B$, the routers belonging to $I_A$ must at some point transfer the packet to routers belonging to $I_B$. Since cross-country links are a scarce resource, both $I_A$ and $I_B$ would prefer that the other convey the packet across the country. If the inter-ISP routing scheme allows the upstream ISP ($I_A$, in our example) to determine when to transfer the packet to $I_B$, then,

[3] However, NTP features robust algorithms that will only lead to inconsistencies if the paths between two NTP communities are *predominantly* asymmetric, with similar differences in one-way times.

due to the preference of avoiding the cross-country haul, $I_A$ will elect to route the packet via $I_B$ as soon as possible. This form of routing is known as "hot potato." In our example, it leads to $I_A$ transferring the packet to $I_B$ in California. But when $B$ sends traffic to $A$, $I_B$ gets to make the decision as to when to forward the traffic to $I_A$, and with hot potato it will choose to do so in New York. Since the paths between California and New York used by $I_A$ and $I_B$ will in general be quite different, hot potato routing thus leads to a major routing asymmetry between $A$ and $B$.

Conversely, if the *downstream* ISP can control where the upstream ISP transfers packets to it, then the result is "cold potato" routing, in which $I_B$ instructs $I_A$ that, to reach $B$, $I_A$ should forward packets to $I_B$'s New York network access point. The paths are the opposite of those resulting from hot potato routing, but the degree of asymmetry remains the same, and potentially large.

### 8.2 Analysis of routing symmetry

In $\mathcal{D}_1$ we did not make simultaneous measurements of the virtual paths $A \Rightarrow B$ and $B \Rightarrow A$, which introduces ambiguity into an analysis of routing symmetry: if a measurement of $A \Rightarrow B$ is asymmetric to a later measurement of $B \Rightarrow A$, is that because the route is the same but asymmetric, or because the route changed?

In $\mathcal{D}_2$, however, the bulk of the measurements were *paired* (§ 4.1), allowing us to unambiguously determine whether the route between $A$ and $B$ is symmetric. The $\mathcal{D}_2$ measurements contain 11,339 successful pairs of measurements. Of these, we find that *49% of the measurements observed an asymmetric path that visited at least one different city*.

There is a large range, however, in the prevalence of asymmetric routes among virtual paths to and from the different sites. For example, 86% of the paths involving `umann` were asymmetric, because nearly all outbound traffic from `umann` traveled via Heidelberg, but none of the inbound traffic did. At the other end of the spectrum, only 25% of the paths involving `umont` were asymmetric (but this is still a significant amount).

If we consider autonomous systems rather than cities, then we still find asymmetry quite common: about 30% of the paired measurements observed different autonomous systems in the virtual path's two directions. The most common asymmetry was the addition of a single AS in one direction. This can reflect a major change, however, such as the presence or absence of SprintLink routers (the most common AS change).

Again, we find wide variation in the prevalence of asymmetry among the different sites. Fully 84% of the paths involving `ucl` were asymmetric, mostly due to some paths including JANET routers in London and others not (§ 7.4.1), while only 7.5% of `adv`'s paths were asymmetric at AS granularity.

### 8.3 Size of asymmetries

We finish with a look at the size of the asymmetries. We find that the majority of asymmetries are confined to a single "hop" (just one city or AS different). For city asymmetries, though, about one third differed at two or more "hops." This corresponds to almost 20% of all the paired measurements in our study, and can indicate a very large asymmetry. For example, a magnitude 2 asymmetry between `ucl` and `umann` differs at the central city hops of Amsterdam and Heidelberg in one direction, and Princeton and College Park in the other!

## 9 Summary

We have reported on an analysis of 40,000 end-to-end Internet route measurements, conducted between a diverse collection of Internet sites. The study characterizes pathological routing conditions, routing stability, and routing symmetry. For pathologies, we found a number of examples of routing loops, some persisting for hours; one instance of erroneous routing; a number of instances of "infrastructure failures," meaning that routing failed deep inside the network; and numerous outages lasting 30 seconds or more. Overall, we find that *the likelihood of encountering a major routing pathology more than doubled between the end of 1994 and the end of 1995, rising from 1.5% to 3.3%.*

For routing stability, we defined two types of stability, "prevalence," meaning the overall likelihood that a particular route is encountered, and "persistence," the likelihood that a route remains unchanged over a long period of time. We find that *Internet paths are heavily dominated by a single prevalent route, but that the time periods over which routes persist show wide variation*, ranging from seconds up to days. About 2/3's of the Internet paths had routes persisting for either days or weeks.

For routing symmetry, we looked at the likelihood that a virtual path through the Internet visits at least one different city in the two directions. At the end of 1995, this was the case half the time, and at least one different autonomous system was visited 30% of the time.

The presence of pathologies, short-lived routes, and major asymmetries highlights the difficulties of providing a consistent topological view in an environment as large and diverse as the Internet.

A constant theme running through our study is that of widespread variation. We repeatedly find that different sites or pairs of sites encounter very different routing characteristics. This finding matches that of [Pa94], which emphasizes that the variations in Internet traffic characteristics between sites are significant to the point that there is no "typical" Internet site. Similarly, there is no "typical" Internet path. But we believe the scope of the measurements provided by the $N^2$ scaling property of the NPD framework gives us a solid understanding of the breadth of behavior we might expect to encounter—and how, from an end-point's view, routing in the Internet actually works.

# 10 Acknowledgements

This work would not have been possible without the efforts of the many volunteers who installed the Network Probe Daemon at their sites. I am indebted to:

G. Almes and B. Camm (adv); J. Alsters (unij); J-C. Bolot (inria); H-W. Braun, K. Claffy, and B. Chinoy (sdsc); R. Bush (rain); J. Crowcroft and A. Ghosh (ucl); P. Danzig and K. Obraczka (usc); M. Eliot (sri); R. Elz (austr); T. Hagen (oce); S. Haug and H. Eidnes (sintef1, sintef2); J. Hawkinson (near and panix); TR Hein (xor); T. Helbig and W. Sinze (ustutt); P. Hyder (ncar); A. Jackson (sandia); K. Lance (austr2); C. Leres (lbl); K. Lidl (pubnix); P. Linington, A. Ibbetson, P. Collinson, and I. Penny (ukc); S. McCanne (lbli); J. Milburn (korea); W. Mueller (umann); E. Nemeth, M. Schwartz, D. Grunwald, L. McGinley (ucol, batman); F. Pinard (umont); J. Polk and K. Bostic (bsdi); T. Satogata (bnl); D. Schmidt and M. Flory (wustl); S. Slaymaker and A. Hannan (mid); D. Wells and D. Brown (nrao); G. Wright (connix); J. Wroclawski (mit); C. Young and B. Karp (harv); and L. Zhang, M. Gerla, and S. Walton (ucla).

I am likewise indebted to K. Bostic, E. Nemeth, R. Stevens, G. Varghese, A. Albanese, W. Holfelder, and B. Lamparter for their invaluable help in recruiting NPD sites. Thanks too to P. Danzig, J. Mogul, and M. Schwartz for feedback on the NPD design.

This work greatly benefited from the efforts and insights of D. Ferrari, S. Floyd, J. Hawkinson, V. Jacobson, K. Lidl, M. Luby, S. McCanne, G. Minshall, C. Partridge, and J. Rice, all of whom gave detailed comments on earlier versions; from discussions with G. Almes, R. Elz, T. Hagen, J. Krawczyk, K. Lance, D. Liu, P. Love, J. Mahdavi, M. Mathis, D. Mills, and C. Villamizar; and from the comments of the anonymous reviewers.

Often to understand the behavior of particular routers or to determine their location, I asked personnel from the organization responsible for the routers. I was delighted at how willing they were to help, and in this regard would like to acknowledge:

V. Antonov, T. Bates, M. Behringer, P.G. Bilse, B. Carlsson, P. Cheng, G. Davies, S. Doran, B. Eriksen, A. Gupta, T. Hain, S. Harris, I. Hershman, K. Hoadley, S. Huddle, J. Jokl, K. Keith, H. Koch, C. Labovitz, T. Li, M. Lindgreen, T. Lindgreen, D. Long, B. Manning, M. Medin, K. Mitchell, R. Muit, C. Myers, T. Nielsen, R. Nuttall, M. Oros, M. Ramsey, J. Rauschenbach, D. Ray, B. Renaud, J. Soini, N. Titley, P. Vixie, and R. Zickefoose.

A preliminary analysis of $\mathcal{D}_1$ was done by M. Stemm and K. Patel.

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