Modular Protections Against Non-control Data Attacks

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Abstract. This paper introduces YARRA, a conservative extension to C to protect applications from non-control data attacks. YARRA programmers specify their data integrity requirements by declaring critical data types and ascribing these critical types to important data structures. YARRA guarantees that such critical data is only written through pointers with the given static type. Any attempt to write to critical data through a pointer with an invalid type (perhaps because of a buffer overrun) is detected dynamically. We formalize YARRA’s semantics and prove the soundness of a program logic designed for use with the language. A key contribution is to show that YARRA’s semantics are strong enough to support sound local reasoning and the use of a frame rule, even across calls to unknown, unverified code. We evaluate a prototype implementation of a compiler and runtime system for YARRA by using it to harden four common server applications against known non-control data vulnerabilities. We show that YARRA successfully defends the applications against these attacks. In our initial experiments, we find that the performance impact of YARRA is small, provided the amount of critical data is small and the application is not compute intensive.

Keywords. language-based security; non-control data attack; data integrity; control-flow integrity; Hoare logic; frame rule; data isolation

1. Introduction

Most important applications contain components written in unsafe languages such as C and C++. These components are vulnerable to a variety of memory corruption attacks. To develop comprehensive protections for these unsafe components, it is essential to identify wide, prominent classes of attacks, to analyze such classes mathematically, and to implement and evaluate effective solutions against them.

One broad class of attack on unsafe programs is the control-based attack, in which an attacker uses a memory corruption error, such as a buffer overflow or use-after-free, to overwrite control-data such as a return address or function pointer and thereby modifies the control-flow of the program. Through the early to mid 2000s, both industry and academia developed mitigation techniques against control-data attacks. One particularly noteworthy piece of work in this line of inquiry, due to Abadi et al. [1], developed a formal model of control-flow integrity and used this model to prove the correctness of defenses against a formal attacker.
In this paper, we analyze a separate class of attacks: non-control data attacks. These attacks do not modify the control-flow of programs, but instead corrupt user identity data, configuration data, user input data or decision-making data to achieve the attacker’s ends. In 2005, Chen et al. [11] demonstrated that such non-control data attacks are a serious threat against many real applications, including widely-used server programs. Since then, due to the mitigations that have been developed against control-based attacks, the appeal of non-control data attacks has increased [34].

In this paper, we set aside the problem of control-based attacks to focus squarely on non-control data attacks. We formally define our attacker model in a core language in which the adversary has no ability to subvert the control flow of the program and can only mount attacks by corrupting non-control data. Mapping our formal model to practice requires that our techniques be used in conjunction with defenses against control-flow attacks. The following paragraphs summarize our key contributions.

A modular solution to non-control data attacks. Our solution takes the form of a language extension to C, which we call YARRA. YARRA programmers introduce special type declarations and ascribe the special types to their critical data structures—those data structures upon which system reliability or security most depends. We call the special types critical data types, and YARRA ensures that data with such types are impervious to non-control data attacks.

Critical data types help programmers specify an intended data integrity policy. Programmers further specify their data integrity intentions by choosing, in any given program expression, to use a pointer with a static critical type or not to use a pointer with a static critical type. When accessing data through a pointer with a static critical type, a programmer declares that she expects the underlying memory to have that same critical type dynamically. When reading or writing through a pointer that, statically, does not have a critical type, the programmer declares that she does not expect to be accessing memory with dynamic critical type.

This design has a number of advantages. First, it is simple to understand and easy to use. Every programmer is familiar with the concept that the underlying dynamic type of a data structure should match the static type of the pointer. YARRA merely puts an enforcement mechanism for this concept in place. Violation of this property, and the subsequent unintended modification of a critical data type, is at the heart of all non-control data attacks.

Second, our design supports adaptation of legacy code with minimal effort: type declarations may be added to an existing code base, literally one at a time, incrementally hardening a program against non-control data attacks.

Third, the design is highly modular in the sense that once a module is proved secure, it may be linked with arbitrary, unverified library code, and that library will be unable to wage a non-control data attack against it. In contrast, systems such as Cyclone [15], CCured [26], Softbound [24] and others that rely upon conventional array-bounds checking generally do not provide any guarantees whatsoever when there are buffer overruns in unchecked libraries (Despite this limitation, array-bounds checking, like control-flow integrity, remains a very useful technique).

Formal safety and modularity properties for YARRA. We provide an operational semantics and a sound program logic for a core model of YARRA. The program logic defines the formal or informal reasoning principles that programmers may use when analyzing their YARRA programs. A key element of our logic is a new kind of type-based frame
rule. This frame rule allows components responsible for implementing security infrastructure to be verified independently of the unverified, possibly buggy and vulnerable libraries that they are linked with. Despite such bugs and vulnerabilities, these libraries cannot wage non-control data attacks against the verified security components. Consequently, the frame rule codifies the modularity properties that YARRA programmers may rely upon. The proof of soundness of our program logic, including this novel frame rule, is the deep theoretical result of our work.

A formal definition of non-control data attacks. Inherent in our safety proof, and our analysis of the frame rule, is a formal, language-based definition of non-control data attacks. To be specific, a non-control data attack is any attack driven by a sequential, imperative program with fixed, static control-flow and the license to attempt unlimited reads and writes (including writes outside the normal bounds of data structures such programs allocate). The attacks are waged against YARRA programs, which are also defined to have fixed, static control flow. We limit the control constructs in our formal model because that is the simplest, clearest way to define the essence of a non-control data attack (as opposed to a control-based attack) and thereby to characterize the problem and our solution. We leave an analysis of multi-threaded programs to future work.

Implementation of YARRA. The semantics of YARRA may be implemented in more than one way. Different implementations have different performance trade-offs in terms of time and space and different requirements in terms of access to source code for transformation. We have implemented a compiler and run-time system for YARRA that provides two different runtime enforcement mechanisms. The first mechanism, called source protections, is inspired by previous work on Write Integrity Testing (WIT) [2], instruments source code with dynamic checks that cannot be proven unnecessary at compile time. The second mechanism, called targeted protections, inspired by previous work on Samurai [29], makes copies of critical objects on separate pages. Prior to invoking untrusted library code, the implementation turns off hardware write permissions on the designated pages, thereby preventing unsafe libraries from corrupting critical data.

Experimental evaluation. We demonstrate the effectiveness of YARRA on a collection of important server applications including SSH, telnet, HTTP and FTP with security-sensitive data that may be vulnerable to non-control data attacks. These applications typically contain, amongst thousands of lines of code, a relatively small, clearly defined module, or set of modules that implement important security considerations and require careful auditing—applications with this structure are best suited to the protections that YARRA can provide. For these applications, we observe that our implementation has negligible overhead relative to the end-to-end performance of the application as a whole. This is because most of these applications are network intensive, and the amount of critical data chosen is small. In addition, the programmer integration effort was on the order of a few hundred modified lines of code or less in applications tens of thousands of lines long.

For a more thorough, but artificial, measurement of the performance impact of YARRA, we adapt BGET [37], a widely used memory manager, to use YARRA to protect the allocator’s internal data structures from corruptions by the application. When used in such a scenario, where a large number of data accesses involve critical data types, we find that the performance overhead can be very substantial.

One conclusion we draw from these experiments is that our current prototype, though completely unoptimized, is still capable of providing relatively low-overhead pro-
tection against non-control data attacks in typical server applications where the amount of critical data that needs to be protected is relatively small.

**Advancement over previous work.** This work first appeared in the Computer Security Foundations Symposium in June of 2011 [33]. We expand on that previous work in the following ways:

- **Semantics.** Section 3 presents the full operational and static semantics of YARRA, as well as supporting judgments and auxiliary functions. The conference version of the paper was incomplete, presenting only selected rules and judgements.
- **Proof sketch.** Section 3.6 provides a more complete sketch of the soundness proof for YARRA’s semantics. We have also provided a technical report \(^1\) with the complete proofs.
- **Implementation.** Section 4 offers a more detailed description of the YARRA compiler, as well as a consideration of design trade-offs.
- **Evaluation.** Section 5 adds more evaluation results, supporting the discussion of design considerations in Section 4.

2. **YARRA by Example**

**Background.** A non-control data attack occurs when security-critical data allocated on the heap is unexpectedly modified. The display below shows code vulnerable to such an attack. This example is drawn from Akritidis et al. [2] and was inspired by a true null httpd attack.

**Code vulnerable to a non-control data attack**

```c
1 static char cgiCmd[1024];
2 static char cgiDir[1024];
3 void ProcessCGIRequest(char* msg, int sz) {
4    int flag = 0;
5    while (i < sz) {
6        cgiCmd[i] = msg[i]; // buffer overrun here could overwrite cgiDir
7        i++;
8    } flag = CheckRequest(cgiCmd); // input sanitization
9    if (flag) {
10       Log("... "); // buggy library could invalidate sanitization
11       ExecuteRequest(cgiDir, cgiCmd);
12   }
13 }
```

In this example, a request (`msg`) is copied into a new buffer called `cgiCmd`. Next, a routine called `CheckRequest` checks that the command does not contain "..", which would allow an attacker to navigate out of the designated directory and execute any program, anywhere in the system. Finally, `Log` logs the request for future audits and `ExecuteRequest` concatenates the command to the designated directory path and executes it. Unfortunately, the routine is vulnerable when `sz` is larger than 1024. In this case, the copying operation overflows from `cgiCmd` into `cgiDir`, allowing an attacker to effectively execute any command in any directory on the user system. An additional concern is a potential

\(^1\)\url{http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/141972/yarraTR.pdf}
time-of-check to time-of-use discrepancy in the code, that can be exploited, if, for example, the call to Log has a buffer overflow that allows cgiCmd to be overwritten after CheckRequest has been executed. Both of these vulnerabilities lead to non-control data attacks because they do not change the control flow of the C program. Hence, they will not be detected by mechanisms that check solely for control flow integrity.

There are two perspectives on this kind of attack:

- **The conventional array-bounds perspective**: The fault lies with the write operations at line 7 and within the implementation of Log, since they misimplement indexing operations.
- **The data integrity perspective**: The fault lies in the definition and implementation of the cgiDir and cgiCmd data structures, since they fail to protect themselves from external agents.

These two different perspectives lead to different solutions with different engineering considerations. The conventional perspective, taken by systems such as SoftBound [24], leads one to maintain bounds on all data structures and to rewrite the code for every data access. Consequently, it cannot be applied when library source code is unavailable, e.g., if a function like Log were to make library calls. In such a situation, all bets are off—a single missed bounds check may corrupt any data structure, anywhere in the program. In contrast, the data integrity perspective leads one to maintain bounds only for the high integrity (critical) data structures and indexing operations must be proven not within the bounds of these structures. This alternative perspective leads to a different set of implementation possibilities. For example, one may use conventional hardware protections to prevent writes to critical data, while still allowing safe linking with unmodified, possibly buggy libraries. We adopt the latter perspective in YARRA and show how it can be used to harden code against non-control data attacks.

2.1. **Hardening nullhttpd with YARRA**

The main new abstraction that YARRA provides is the critical data type. Critical data types have the rather unremarkable property that access to such data may only occur through a pointer with a corresponding (static) type. Working with critical data types demands a certain discipline. First, programmers must declare a critical type X. Having done so, programmers can designate (or bless) portions of memory as containing X objects and, as a result, they obtain X-typed references. X-typed memory should only be accessed using X-typed references. In return, YARRA ensures that the portions of memory that hold X-typed objects will never be corrupted by writes via untyped pointers, or by the effects of library code. When finished with an X object, a programmer can unbless a reference, undoing the protections on the referenced memory.

**Programming with critical data types.** The listing below shows how our example from nullhttpd may be rewritten using YARRA’s critical data types to foil both non-control data attacks. On line 1, we introduce a new critical data type, cchar, using a declaration much like C’s typical declaration for structures. The type cchar is a new YARRA structure containing a single character field named cc. The type dchar (line 2) is another critical type, also with a single character field dc. At line 3, we declare that every element of cgiCmd is a cchar, meaning it can only be written by cchar pointers. Likewise, with cgiDir and dchar, at line 4. Finally, we modify line 8, to access the cc field of the YARRA structure, thereby indicating our clear intention to write to protected data.
YARRA’s promise to programmers is that writes via non-critical pointers to memory locations holding critical objects will always be detected. Because the types \texttt{cchar} and \texttt{dchar} are unknown to \texttt{Log} and any library it may call, the functions use only non-critical pointers, and hence \texttt{YARRA} guarantees that both \texttt{cgiDir} and \texttt{cgiCmd} are uncorrupted at the call to \texttt{ExecuteRequest}. Further, at line 8, if there is a buffer overrun from \texttt{cgiCmd} into \texttt{cgiDir}, \texttt{YARRA} detects the error because a pointer with static type \texttt{cchar*} attempts to write to memory with (dynamic) \texttt{YARRA} type \texttt{dchar}. This illustrates the importance of using different \texttt{YARRA} types for logically distinct data structures. If one were to use the same type (say, \texttt{cdchar}) for both \texttt{cgiCmd} and \texttt{cgiDir} then \texttt{YARRA} would not prevent a buffer overrun at line 8. In other words, structures that share the same type are not protected from each other; they are only protected from structures with other types.

Using critical data types in \texttt{nullhttpd}

```c
1 yarra struct {char cc;} cchar;
2 yarra struct {char dc;} dchar;
3 static cchar cgiCmd[1024];
4 static dchar cgiDir[1024];
5 void ProcessCGIRequest(char* msg, int sz) {
6    int flag, i=0;
7    while (i < sz) {
8       cgiCmd[i].cc = msg[i]; //Yarra: cgiDir cannot be modified
9       i++;
10    }
11    flag = CheckRequest(cgiCmd);
12    if (flag) {
13       Log("..."); //Yarra: corruption of cgiDir, cgiCmd detected
14       ExecuteRequest(cgiDir, cgiCmd);
15    }
```

Implementing \texttt{YARRA} protections. There are many ways to implement the protections \texttt{YARRA} offers—our current implementation relies on two mechanisms. Using \texttt{source protections} mode (inspired by WIT), our compiler uses the statically declared type of pointers to instrument memory accesses with suitable checks. For example, the write to \texttt{cgiCmd} on line 8 is checked at run time to ensure that the location to be modified is indeed of type \texttt{cchar}. Should such a check fail, the program will abort. \texttt{Targeted protections} (inspired by Samurai) are suitable for situations in which code cannot be instrumented with checks (e.g., when linking with third-party binaries) and rely on maintaining secure copies of critical objects on separate memory pages. Prior to invoking potentially buggy library code, such as the call to \texttt{Log("...")} on line 13, the \texttt{YARRA} runtime turns off hardware write permissions on these pages to preserve their integrity. Writes from untyped pointers to critical objects proceed without failure, but these writes only modify one copy of the object, leaving the secure copy unchanged. In contrast, writes to critical objects using well-typed references update both copies of the object. When a critical object is read using a well-typed pointer, checks inserted by our compiler ensure that the two versions of the object are identical, thus detecting potential corruptions.

Reasoning about \texttt{YARRA} programs. Regardless of the implementation chosen, with both \texttt{cgiCmd} and \texttt{cgiDir} protected by \texttt{YARRA}, our semantics provides the programmer with powerful, sound, local reasoning principles. Any invariant over the objects \texttt{cgiCmd} and \texttt{cgiDir} is preserved across the call to the \texttt{Log} function, since \texttt{Log} is unable to modify criti-
cal memory locations. Additionally, an invariant on \texttt{cgiDir} (e.g., that \texttt{cgiDir} does not start with ‘..’) is preserved across line 8, since \textsc{Yarra} ensures that the write to \texttt{cgiCmd} never modifies a \texttt{dchar} object. We formalize this principle in Section 3 in terms of a type-based \textit{frame rule} and prove it sound.

### 2.2. Critical Data and Dynamic Allocation

Our first example illustrated a simple use case for \textsc{Yarra} in which a set of memory locations have a single \textsc{Yarra} type for their entire lifetime. However, in order to handle dynamically allocated data structures, or memory that is reused for different purposes, we need a way to cast memory from one critical type to another.

In \textsc{Yarra}, memory pointed to by \( p \) is dynamically cast to a critical type \( T \) using the operation \texttt{bless}(\( T \))(\( p \)) and cast back using \texttt{unbless}(\( T \))(\( p \)). It is an error to attempt to bless memory protected at type \( T' \) to another type \( T \), unless \( T' \) is a declared substructure of \( T \). Likewise, it is an error to attempt to unbless memory from type \( T \) when that memory location had not previously been blessed at \( T \). These sorts of errors are detected at runtime by the instrumentation inserted by our compiler. \textsc{Yarra} also provides the operation \texttt{isln}(\( T \))(\( p \)), which returns true if \( p \) dynamically has type \( T \) and false if it does not. If \( p \) points to memory which has been blessed at type \( T \) but which has been corrupted by a write via an untyped pointer, \textsc{Yarra} causes the program to abort—this situation can be detected, if, for example, the two copies of the \( T \)-object in question are not synchronized. Finally, \textsc{Yarra} provides the command \texttt{vacant}(\( T \))(\( p \)), which returns true if \( p \) points to completely unprotected memory of size \texttt{sizeof}(\( T \)) and false otherwise.

Figure 1 shows a simple memory allocator that uses \texttt{bless} and \texttt{unbless} to protect its metadata, hence increasing its reliability, even when linked against buggy clients. While the allocator shown is extremely simple, we have used the same principles to protect \texttt{BGET} [37], a standard, publicly available allocator for C.

The allocator relies on a few simple invariants (where \( i \) ranges from 0 to \texttt{SIZE}−1): (1) the elements \( i \) of the \texttt{meta} array have critical type \texttt{metaT}, preventing a buggy client program from modifying allocator meta data; (2) the \texttt{meta} array contains integers that are either 0 or 1; (3) if \texttt{meta[i]} is 0 then \texttt{data[i]} is not allocated and dynamically has critical type \texttt{unusedT}, preventing a client from using it; and (4) if \texttt{meta[i]} is 1 then \texttt{data[i]} is allocated and dynamically does not have critical type \texttt{unusedT}, allowing a client to use it as needed.

Given these invariants, consider the effects of the \texttt{alloc} and \texttt{free} routines. In \texttt{alloc}, the code searches for a free cell (one with \texttt{meta[i].tag} == 0), assigns the \texttt{meta[i]} tag to 1 (allocated state), and unblesses the cell, returning a pointer that the client may freely use. In \texttt{free} the code first checks that its argument is in range. If it is, it checks that the cell has previously been allocated by the allocator and not yet freed (\texttt{meta[i].tag} == 1). Next, it checks that the data is not still (erroneously) in use by another module at a protected type by testing if \texttt{data[i]} is \texttt{vacant} (line 23). Finally, if all these checks succeed, the metadata is set to unallocated and the data is blessed, protecting it from use by any other module.

When thinking about the correctness of \texttt{alloc} and \texttt{free}, the first thing to notice is that if the informal invariants mentioned above are true at entry to either routine then they are also true upon completion of the routine. More interesting still, the invariants (though loosely stated) are phrased entirely in terms of protected state — \textit{i.e.}, in terms of static global arrays, whose addresses may not be changed, in terms of protected memory, such

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{2}An illegal cast of this sort might invalidate protections supplied by \( T' \).}
as the contents of meta, and in terms of a locally quantified variable i — as opposed to in terms of normal, vulnerable, heap-allocated data structures. Because these invariants depend exclusively on protected state, no client module may corrupt them and hence, according to the traditional hypothetical frame rule [28], if initialization (not shown) makes them valid at the outset, it is sound for each routine to depend upon their continued validity throughout the program. We do not, however, formalize this rule in the program logic of Section 3.

3. Semantics of YARRA

This section defines YCORE, a sequential, imperative language intended to serve as a core model for YARRA. This formal development serves two purposes. First, YCORE’s semantics makes precise our attacker model: the attacker is represented by calls to unverified library code that may have arbitrary effects on the heap, but cannot alter the control flow of the program. Second, we define robustness in the presence of non-control data attacks to be the ability to reason locally about critical data structures, even in the presence of arbitrary heap effects caused by library code.
We formulate robustness, or modular local reasoning, in the context of a program logic for YCORE programs and we show that this logic admits a frame rule. Unlike recent presentations of the frame rule that require the use of separation logic [31], ours is in the context of a classical Hoare logic and relies on the type structure of the program for modular reasoning. In addition to its technical novelty, we argue that our type-based approach provides a more familiar model for programmers already used to working with types. Furthermore, unlike in other logics, YARRA’s dynamic protections make our frame rule sound even in the presence of heap effects caused by unverified libraries. As such, this frame rule captures the essence of YARRA’s modular protections against non-control data attacks.

3.1. Syntax

Broadly speaking, YCORE is a simple while-language, augmented with critical type declarations, and memory operations to manipulate critical memory. Figure 2 shows the syntax of YCORE, starting with our meta variable conventions. Integer constants are $i, j, \ell$, where, we generally use $\ell$ for memory locations. Local variables are $x, y, z$, and critical data types (and their representations as maps) are $X, Y, Z$ with $H$ and $U$ being two distinguished map names.

**Expressions** $e$ are purely arithmetic terms, built from integer constants, integer variables and primitive operators $op$. Values $v$ are either integer constants $i$, or are structured tuples $(v_1, v_2)$ corresponding to the values of protected object types. Note, expressions do not include tuples, ensuring that well-scoped expressions always evaluate to integers.

**Basic statements** include the usual forms for branching, looping, sequencing, assertions, and scoped, local variable declarations, (local $x$ in $s$). Local variables always hold integer values, so no type is needed on the declaration of $x$. The statement form $s$ also serves as a multi-hole context, where the holes $\bullet_1, \ldots, \bullet_n$ represent points at which control transfers to an attacker program. We write $s[s_i| i$ to replace hole $i$ in $s$ with $s_i$. We write $s[s_1, \ldots, s_n]$ for the hole-free statement obtained by replacing each hole $\bullet_i$ in $s$ with $s_i$. We place specific conditions on the attacker code that can be used to fill a hole in Section 3.5.

**Critical type commands.** The statement form (newtype $X = \tau$ in $s$) allows us to define a name $X$ for a new critical type, where the representation of $X$ is $\tau$, and $X$ can be used in $s$. The statements for blessing and unblessing are slightly more general than what was used in Section 2. Here, the command $(y := \text{bless}_X[e] e_{\text{base}})$ operates on an array of locations $e_{\text{base}}$ starting at the location $e_{\text{base}}$ and including $e$ objects each to be protected at the type $X$ (where $e$ is expected to evaluate to a non-negative integer). The returned value $y$ is a reference to the start of the array of newly blessed objects. Analogously, the command $(y := \text{unbless}_X[e] e_{\text{base}})$ removes protections on an array of critical objects. The dynamic typecase (if $e$ is in $X$ then $s_1$ else $s_2$) statement is useful for modeling the vacant command of Section 2.2, as well as other constructs—it can be used to check whether a location $e$ holds a critical object of type $X$.

**Reading and writing memory.** YCORE includes two forms each of read and write instructions. A checked read $(y := X(e).p)$ attempts to read a structured value $v$ of type $X$ at the location $e$ and projects a field from $v$ using the path $p$, storing the result in the local variable $y$. In contrast, an un-checked read instruction (lib $y := e$) reads the contents of an arbitrary memory location $e$ from the heap $H$ into a local variable $y$.
Figure 2. Syntax of YCORE

larly, a checked write \((X(e_1).p := e_2)\) attempts to write to a structured type using a field assignment; un-checked writes (lib \(e_1 := e_2\)) modify a single location \(e_1\) in the heap, overwriting its contents with \(e_2\). We use the un-checked forms to model the actions of arbitrary, untrusted code, e.g., third party libraries.

**Failure modes.** We model two failure modes in YCORE. Certain dynamic failures are permitted by the logic, e.g., failures caused by the effects of untrusted libraries which are detected by the runtime system. These failures cause a program to loop indefinitely issuing the abort command—we expressly choose to allow such “safe” failures to occur at run time since they are unavoidably triggered by the behavior of unverified library code. Other failures, e.g., trying to bless a piece of memory that has already been blessed at another type, or an assertion failure, cause the program to get stuck. YCORE’s logic is designed to prevent stuck programs.

**Types and the assertion language.** The type language of YCORE includes \(int\), pairs,
and type names \( X \). We model both C’s integers as well as pointers using the \( int \) type. Structures in C, which contain an arbitrary number of named fields, are modeled using nested pairs. We omit unions. The assertion logic of \( \text{Y}^{\scriptsize \text{CORE}} \) makes use of first-order formulas \( \Phi \) over a term language including arithmetic expressions, tuples, maps and sets, together with (extensional) equality, set membership, and integer inequality. Maps are lambda-terms \( (\lambda \ell. \hat{e}) \), with types described using the map types \( \hat{\tau} \). The body \( (\hat{e}) \) of a map value is built from values \( v \), an application form, a conditional form, and a distinguished value \( \bot \) used to model partial maps.

Figure 3 illustrates how the concrete syntax of \( \text{YARRA} \) maps to \( \text{Y}^{\scriptsize \text{CORE}} \). Struct declarations correspond to declarations of tuple types. We do not include procedures in \( \text{Y}^{\scriptsize \text{CORE}} \)—the statement \( s \) can be thought of as the body of \textit{main}. We also do not provide primitive operations for dynamic memory allocation in \( \text{Y}^{\scriptsize \text{CORE}} \)—so the \textit{malloc} call at line 4 has no direct analog in \( \text{Y}^{\scriptsize \text{CORE}} \). However, we model the heap as a total map over integer locations and we can program \textit{malloc} in \( \text{Y}^{\scriptsize \text{CORE}} \).(This is not an unusual choice in systems governed by classical logics. See, for example, work on Havoc [18].) In this example, which will be reused later to illustrate the static semantics, we replace the call to \textit{malloc} with an abstract address \( \ell \). Calls to \textit{bless} and \textit{unbless} in \( \text{YARRA} \) map directly to \( \text{Y}^{\scriptsize \text{CORE}} \). In cases (\textit{e.g.}, lines 6 and 9) where we omit the first argument to \textit{bless} or \textit{unbless}, the argument defaults to 1.

Writes and field projections via object references in \( \text{YARRA} \) also map directly, as shown on line 7. \( \text{Y}^{\scriptsize \text{CORE}} \) uses binary paths to the fields of tuples, instead of field names. More importantly, while writes to objects via typed references in \( \text{YARRA} \) are evident from the declared types (for example, the type \( Y* \) of \( y \)), in \( \text{Y}^{\scriptsize \text{CORE}} \), the write instruction itself is tagged with the type of the object that is the destination of the write. Typed read instructions are similar. For convenience, our example hoists the local variable declarations.

### 3.2. Auxiliary Judgements

Before we present the dynamic (§ 3.3) and static (§ 3.4) semantics of \( \text{YARRA} \), we first introduce and briefly discuss the auxiliary judgements on which the semantics—and the soundness proof—rely.

We write \( \vdash \Gamma; \Delta \text{ ok} \) for the well-formedness of an environment—this judgment is defined in Figure 5. Informally, well-formedness requires that all the names in \( \Delta \) appear in \( \Gamma \); that every name in \( \Gamma \) be unique, and that every map type \( \tau \) in \( \Gamma \) be well-formed. Well-formedness of types is a simple structural relation, \( \Gamma \vdash \tau \text{ ok} \), essentially requiring that every map name in \( \tau \) appear in \( \Gamma \).
**Figure 4.** Well-typed terms and well-formed formulas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Γ ⊢ a : t</th>
<th>well-typed terms, where t ::= τ</th>
<th>ℓ</th>
<th>int set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Γ ⊢ i : int</td>
<td>x ∈ dom Γ</td>
<td>Γ ⊢ a₁ : int</td>
<td>Γ ⊢ a₂ : int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Γ ⊢ a₁ : τ₁</td>
<td>Γ ⊢ a₂ : τ₂</td>
<td>Γ ⊢ (a₁, a₂) : (τ₁, τ₂)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Γ ⊢ a : (τ₁, τ₂)</td>
<td>Γ ⊢ a.i : τᵢ</td>
<td>Γ ⊢ X : τ</td>
<td>Γ ⊢ ⊥ : τ</td>
</tr>
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<td>Γ ⊢ if a ∈ a' then e₁ else e₂ : τ</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Γ ⊢ { x</td>
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<td>Γ ⊢ dom a : int set</td>
<td>Γ ⊢ { \hat{x} } : \hat{φ} \ ok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Γ ⊢ \hat{x} : \hat{φ} \ ok</td>
<td>Γ ⊢ \hat{a} : \hat{φ} \ ok</td>
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<td>Γ ⊢ τ₂ \ ok</td>
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<td>Γ ; Δ \ ok</td>
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<td>Γ \ ok</td>
<td>Γ ; Δ \ ok</td>
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</table>

**Figure 5.** Well-formed types, bindings, and environments

Next, we define a notion of well-formed formulas, Γ ⊢ φ \ ok, analogous to the well-formed relation on types. A related notion is a typing judgment for terms a, written Γ ⊢ a : t—both of these judgments are defined in Figure 4. The types t given to terms are either basic types τ, map types \hat{τ}, or a type of sets of locations int set. The latter type is only used within the metatheory and is never explicitly manipulated by source
YCORE programs. Typing of terms is quite straightforward, and given this relation, well-formedness of formulas is also easy—note, the two relations are mutually recursive to handle the set-comprehension term construct \( \{ x \mid \Phi \} \).

\[
\vdash E : \Gamma \quad \text{store typing}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\vdash \hat{v} : \text{int} \rightarrow \text{int} & \quad \models \forall l, l \in \text{dom} \hat{v} \\
\vdash (H \mapsto (v : \text{int} \rightarrow \text{int})) : (H : \text{int} \rightarrow \text{int}) & \\
\vdash E : (\Gamma_2, \Gamma_1) & \\
\vdash v : \text{int} & \quad \vdash E : \Gamma \\
\vdash E, (x \mapsto v) : \Gamma, x & \\
\vdash \hat{v} : \text{int} \rightarrow \text{int} & \quad \vdash E : \Gamma \\
\vdash E, (X \mapsto (\hat{v} : \text{int} \rightarrow \text{int})) : \Gamma, X : \hat{\tau} & \\
\vdash E, (Un \mapsto (\hat{v} : \text{int} \rightarrow \text{int})) : \Gamma, Un : \text{int} \rightarrow \text{int} & \end{align*}
\]

Figure 6. Store typing

Another auxiliary notion is the typing of stores \( E \). We write this judgment \( \vdash E : \Gamma \), and define it in Figure 6. Note that every store \( E \) includes a heap \( H \). The first rule checks that the heap value is indeed a well-typed total map, i.e., its second premise, \( \models \forall l, l \in \text{dom} \hat{v} \), relies on the interpretation of formulas to require that every location is indeed in the domain of the heap. Every store also contains the \( Un \) partial map—its typing rule is the last one. The other rules are straightforward.

Finally, we turn to the interpretation of formulas \( \Phi \) in the context of a store \( E \), written \( E \models \Phi \). This judgment relies on the interpretation of terms \( a \) in the same context, given by the function \( [a]_E \). Both of these are defined in Figure 7. As is usual, we lift the interpretation of formulas \( E \models \Phi \) into a static notion of formula derivability, \( \Gamma \models \Phi \), by requiring that \( \Phi \) be derivable in all stores \( E \) that are typeable by \( \Gamma \).

3.3. Dynamic Semantics

Figure 8 shows the key dynamic semantics of YCORE. The semantics is a small-step reduction relation of the form \( (E; s) \rightarrow (E'; s') \), where \( (E, s) \) is called a run-time configuration. Such configurations contain run-time environments \( E \) and hole-free statements \( s \).

Runtime environments \( E \) contain integer assignments for local variables \( (x \mapsto i) \); a typed map value \( (\hat{v} : \hat{\tau}) \) for each critical type \( X \) defined in the program \( (X \mapsto \hat{v} : \hat{\tau}) \); a map value for the conventional heap \( (H \mapsto \hat{v} : \hat{\tau}) \); and, finally, a map value for \( Un \), the collection of unblessed locations \( (Un \mapsto \hat{v} : \hat{\tau}) \). We call each map value \( \hat{v} \) in \( E \) a heaplet. The heaplet for a critical type \( X \) corresponds roughly to the backing store for \( X \)-typed objects. Note, we overload the use of type names \( X \) also for the heaplets that contain \( X \)-typed values. This is a technical convenience which helps keep our notation light. We model the critical heaplets formally as partial maps from memory addresses to \( X \)-typed objects, i.e., in a well-formed environment containing \( X \mapsto (\hat{v} : \hat{\tau}) \), \( \hat{v} \) is a partial map of type \( \hat{\tau} \), where \( \hat{\tau} = \text{int} \rightarrow X \). The heap \( H \) is a total map from memory addresses to integers (i.e., it has type \( \text{int} \rightarrow \text{int} \)), while \( Un \) is a partial map of type \( \text{int} \rightarrow \text{int} \). The totality of the \( H \)-map is simply a technical convenience—we could, with a little additional book-keeping, allow \( H \) to be a partial map.

Auxiliary functions. Figure 10 defines auxiliary functions used in the dynamic semantics, and Figure 11 defines auxiliary functions used throughout both the static and dynamic semantics. Auxiliary functions used solely in the static semantics (presented in
Figure 7. Interpretation of terms and formulas

Figure 13) are discussed in Section 3.4. These functions are straightforward, although a few comments are worthwhile. First, note that most of our auxiliary functions carry indexes (subscripted) that represent environment arguments. For example, \( [e]_E \) is a standard denotational semantics for expressions, defined relative to the assignments of local variables in \( E \). Some function symbols are indexed either by runtime environments \( E \) or static environments \( \Gamma \). This allows us to overload function symbols for use in both the static and dynamic semantics. For example, \( \text{dom}_E X \), used in the dynamic semantics, concretely represents the domain of a map \( X \) as the set of locations on which \( X \) does not evaluate to \( \perp \). Statically, \( \text{dom}_\Gamma (X) \) is simply a term \( \text{dom} \ X \) in the logic. Many of the functions in Figure 11 are parametric in their environment index—these functions carry the index \( E \), where \( E \) may be either \( E \) or \( \Gamma \).

A brief description of each of the auxiliary functions in Figure 10 follows: \( E[X \leftarrow \bar{v}] \) updates the map named \( X \) in \( E \) to contain \( \bar{v} \); \( \text{blessed}_E \ L \ X \) asserts that every location \( \ell \) in \( L \) resides in the domain of the map \( X \) in \( E \); \( \text{inSync}_E \ \ell \ X \) asserts that values in the
\[
\hat{\tau} = \text{int} \rightarrow \tau \\
(E; \text{newtype } X = \tau \text{ in } s) \Rightarrow (E, X \mapsto (\lambda \ell. \hat{\tau}); s) \quad \text{E-NewX}
\]

\[
(E; \text{local } x \text{ in } s) \Rightarrow (E, x \mapsto i; s) \quad \text{E-NewLoc}
\]

\[
[e_1]_E = n \quad [e_2]_E = \ell \quad L = \bigcup_{0 \leq i < n} \{\ell + |X|_E \ast i\} \quad \tau = \text{range}_E X \\
E_1 = \text{chkAndRem}_E \tau L \quad E_2 = \text{copy}_{E_1} L \text{ from } H \text{ to } X \quad E' = \text{updUn}_{E_2} L \tau \perp
\]

\[
(E; y := \text{bless}_X[e_1] e_2) \Rightarrow (E'[y \mapsto \ell]; \text{skip}) \quad \text{E-Bless}
\]

\[
[e_1]_E = n \quad [e_2]_E = \ell \quad L = \bigcup_{0 \leq i < n} \{\ell + |X|_E \ast i\} \quad \tau = \text{range}_E X \\
E_1 = \text{chkAndRem}_E X L \quad E_2 = \text{copy}_{E_1} L \text{ from } H \text{ to } \tau \quad E' = \text{updUn}_{E_2} \tau L \perp 1
\]

\[
(E; y := \text{unbless}_X[e_1] e_2) \Rightarrow (E; \text{abort}) \quad \text{E-UnBless}
\]

\[
[e_1]_E = \ell \quad [e_2]_E = v \quad E(H) = \hat{\nu}:\hat{\tau} \quad E' = E[H \mapsto (\hat{\nu}[\ell \leftarrow \hat{\tau}])]
\]

\[
(E; \text{lib } e_1 := e_2) \Rightarrow (E'; \text{skip}) \quad \text{E-LibWr}
\]

\[
[e_1]_E = \ell \quad E' = E[y \mapsto H_E(\ell)]
\]

\[
(E; \text{lib } y := e_1) \Rightarrow (E'; \text{skip}) \quad \text{E-LibD}
\]

\[
[e_1]_E = \ell \quad \ell \notin \text{dom}_E X \quad X_E(\ell) = \text{readFrom}_E H (\ell; X)
\]

\[
(E; y := X(e).p) \Rightarrow (E; \text{abort}) \quad \text{E-RdAbort}
\]

\[
[e_1]_E = \ell \quad \ell \in \text{dom}_E X \quad X_E(\ell) = X_E(\ell; p + \text{offset}_E X p)
\]

\[
(E; X(e_1).p := e_2) \Rightarrow (E; \text{abort}) \quad \text{E-WrAbort}
\]

\[
p \neq \cdot \quad [e_1]_E = \ell \quad \ell \in \text{dom}_E X
\]

\[
E_1 = E[H \mapsto (\hat{\nu}[\ell \leftarrow \hat{\tau}])]
\]

\[
(E; \text{if } e \text{ is in } X \text{ then } s_1 \text{ else } s_2) \Rightarrow (E; s_1) \quad \text{E-IsX-Then}
\]

\[
[e_1]_E = \ell \quad \ell \notin \text{dom}_E X
\]

\[
(E; \text{if } e \text{ is in } X \text{ then } s_1 \text{ else } s_2) \Rightarrow (E; s_2) \quad \text{E-IsX-Else}
\]

\[
[e_1]_E = \ell \quad \ell \in \text{dom}_E X
\]

\[
E(E)[\ell \leftarrow \hat{\tau}]
\]

\[
(E; \text{if } e \text{ is in } X \text{ then } s_1 \text{ else } s_2) \Rightarrow (E; \text{abort}) \quad \text{E-IsX-Aabort}
\]

Figure 8. \((E, s) \Rightarrow (E', s')\): Dynamic semantics of YCORE (Selected rules)
map $X$ in $E$ match the heap at location $\ell$ (or all locations in a set $L$); copy-from-to copies values between maps; chkAndRem removes locations from a critical map, provided every location is blessed and in sync with the heap; updUn adds locations to Un. The latter functions make use of the correspondence between type and map names, where $E$ contains maps with the same names as new types $X, Y, Z$; thus, these functions structurally recurse on the $T$ype parameter to effect changes in the corresponding maps.

From Figure 11, $X_E(\ell)$ is the value of the map $X$ at the location $\ell$; $a_m[a \leftarrow a']$ updates the map $a_m$ at location $a$ to contain $a'$; range$_E X$ is the range type of a map; $|\tau|_E$ represents the size (in machine words) of a value $v$ of type $\tau$; offset$_E \tau p$ is the offset of a field accessed via the path $p$ in the type $\tau$; readFrom$_E X (\ell; \tau)$ reads a structured value at location $\ell$ of type $\tau$ from the map $X$. Note that offset$_{\tau} (\text{int}, \text{int}, \text{int}) 0$ is undefined. This ensures that only word-length int-valued fields in a nested tuple type can be directly addressed. Second, readFrom$_E Y (\ell; \tau)$ is used to read a structured value of type $\tau$ from the location $\ell$ in the map $Y$. While this function is well-defined for arbitrary maps $Y$, we use it primarily to read structured values out of the flat heap map $H$.

We turn now to a discussion of the key rules in Figure 8.

**Heaplets for new critical types.** The rule (E-NewX) shows the initialization of an empty heaplet (everywhere $\bot$) for a new critical type $X$. Structured values corresponding to the objects of the critical type $X$ are added to the $X$ heaplet whenever the program issues a bless command; values are removed from the heaplet when unblessed. As such, the heaplet $X$ serves as a backing store for $X$ values.

**Bless statements.** The rule (E-Bless) shows the reduction of a bless operation for a critical type $X$. We evaluate the pure expression $e_1$ to an integer $n$ and $e_2$ to a location $\ell$, specifying that an array of $n$ objects should be blessed with type $X$, starting at $\ell$. Values in the heap at the locations in this range are copied into the heaplet $X$. The type $X$ may contain fields that themselves have critical types, and so to preserve the invariant that locations belong to at most one critical heaplet, we employ chkAndRem to check that corresponding locations in the critical heaplets of any such fields are in sync with the heap and, if so, remove those locations. (E-Bless-Abort) shows the failure of chkAndRem, which may occur if the heap and one of the heaplets are out of sync. Finally, the Un map is updated to reflect the transfer of locations into the critical map $X$. 

![Figure 9. (E; s) \rightsquigarrow (E'; s'): Dynamic semantics of YCORE (Standard rules)](image-url)
Unbless statements. The (E-Unbless) and (E-Unbless-Abort) rules are dual to (E-Bless) and (E-Bless-Abort), causing values to be removed from the heap X and failing if those values are not in sync with the heap. If X contains critically-typed fields, then fresh values are copied from the heap into the corresponding heaplets. This propagates any changes effected to those locations while they were blessed as part of the X-typed object. Finally, fields without critical types are added to the Un map.

Un-checked reads and writes. The rule (E-LibRd) shows the reduction of a read operation performed by untrusted code. We evaluate the pure expression e to a location ℓ, and update the local variable y in the environment to hold the value in the heap H at location ℓ. (E-LibWr) is also unsurprising—we simply update the heap H at the location ℓ to the value v. The important aspect of these rules is that library reads and writes only have
effect on the heap \( H \) and on local variables in scope, but never update the heaplets for any critical type \( X \). It is possible to implement this semantics for un-checked writes in multiple ways. For example, in its targeted protection mode, our compiler uses hardware page protections to maintain the integrity of critical heaplets.

**Checked reads.** Although library instructions cannot modify the critical heaplets, errant writes by a library can corrupt a critical object stored in the heap. We use the backing store provided by the critical heaplets to detect such corruptions and abort the program, if necessary. The rules (E-RdAbort) and (E-Rd) show this behavior. When reducing \( y := X(e).p \) we evaluate \( e \) to a location \( \ell \) and check that \( \ell \) is a reference to a blessed object. A failure of this first check causes the configuration to get stuck, a situation prevented by the static semantics. Next, we check that the value in the backing store \( X \) at location \( \ell \) matches the value stored in the heap at the same location. If this check fails, the program aborts. Otherwise, we compute the offset of the field being read, and update the local \( y \) with the contents of the field.

Note that as shown here, since the critical heaplet for \( X \) always holds an uncorrupted value, we might recover from a corruption instead of aborting. However, we aim to provide an abstract semantics for YCORE that is independent of the specific choice of implementing critical heaplets. In particular, rather than storing copies of objects in the critical heaplets, we may wish to use our compiler’s source protection mode, or to resort to other forms of protections that, say, only maintain checksums or cryptographic digests rather than full shadow copies. Such implementation strategies allow memory corruption to be detected, but may not support recovery. By allowing (E-RdAbort) to fail when a corruption is detected, we provide YARRA with the flexibility to choose among various implementation strategies.

**Checked writes.** (E-Wr) shows the reduction of an instruction that writes via an \( X \)-typed reference. As for checked reads, we ensure that the location being written to is in the domain of the \( X \) heaplet (otherwise the configuration is stuck) and check, using the backing
store, that the critical object being modified is uncorrupted (and abort otherwise, using (E-WrtAbort) a rule analogous to (E-RdAbort)). We then update \( H \) at the appropriate location and offset, and, importantly, in the last premise, we copy the updated object from the heap into the critical heaplet \( X \). Thus, abstractly, writes through typed references correspond to a pair of writes, both to the heap and to the critical object’s shadow copy. However, the \textsc{Yarra} implementation may or may not actually manifest the update to the shadow copy, e.g., when using our source protection mode.

Intuitively, one can imagine that \textsc{Ycore} programs enjoy a measure of data integrity, since copies of critical objects are maintained in uncorruptible backing stores. The next section makes this notion of data integrity precise. Specifically, we show that despite the presence of arbitrary heap modification by untrusted code, programmers can reason about the invariants of critical objects using modular, local reasoning principles. The crux of this idea is embodied by the frame rule in a program logic for \textsc{Ycore}, presented next.

3.4. Static Semantics

The static semantics of \textsc{Ycore} is given by the relation \( \Gamma; \Delta \vdash \{ \Phi \} \; s \; \{ \Psi \} \), a classical Floyd-Hoare logic judgment. The judgment states, informally, that when executed in an environment \( E \) modeled by the context \( \Gamma \), and when \( E \) satisfies the pre-condition \( \Phi \), the program \( s \), if it terminates, produces some environment \( E' \) that satisfies the post-condition \( \Psi \), while modifying at most the variables in the set \( \Delta \). The context \( \Gamma \) contains a mapping of type names \( X \) to their map types \( \hat{\tau} \) and the set of local variables \( x \) that are in scope. Well-formedness conditions on \( \Gamma \) ensure that (like runtime environments \( E \)) it always contains bindings for two distinguished map variables: \( H \), a total map from integer locations to integer values, which represents the conventional heap; and \( Un \), a partial map whose domain is the set of unprotected locations.

Figures 12 and 14 present the main semantic rules for \textsc{Ycore}. The following paragraphs explain the key rules.

**The frame rule.** The key feature of our logic is that it admits the frame rule, (T-Frame), which states that a formula \( \Phi' \), whose free variables do not overlap with the set of free variables modified by a statement \( s \), is preserved across execution of \( s \). Crucially, because the state of critical data with type \( X \) is represented with a variable \( X \) that is distinct from variable \( H \), the frame rule can soundly be used to preserve invariants of that critical data, when \( X \) is unmodified, despite arbitrary modifications to \( H \) in \( s \).

**Checking attacker code.** (T-Hole) shows the rule for checking holes in statements. These holes are to be filled by attacker code that can have arbitrary effects on the heap. (T-Hole) states that any property \( \Phi \) that does not involve the heap is preserved across calls to the attacker code. As such, (T-Hole) is an instance of (T-Frame), which we prove sound under certain syntactic restrictions on the attacker code that fills a hole—roughly, that it be a closed term without any instructions that involve critical types.

**Declaring new types.** (T-NewX) shows how new types are introduced. The premises of the rule check that the type \( \tau \) is well-formed (e.g., does not mention names that are not in scope) and that \( X \) is a fresh name. The body \( s \) is checked in a context where \( X \) is bound to the type of a map, and \( X \) is recorded as one of the variables that may be modified by \( s \). Since all heaplets are initially empty, the pre-condition of \( s \) may be proven under the assumption that \( X = \lambda \ell. \bot \).
The command \( y \) := \text{bless}_{X[e_1]} e_2\), it casts \( e_2 \) to the base of an \( e_1 \)-numbered array of \( X \) objects and stores a reference to the base location in the local variable \( y \). The unbless command does the opposite, removing the protection on an array of objects. We illustrate the behavior of these operations using the YCORE program in Figure 3.

This program declares two object types \( X \) and \( Y \), where the type \( Y \) has the type \( X \) nested within its first component. When blessing an object \( Y \), YARRA requires all sub-objects of \( Y \) to already be blessed—this is important since we want our frame rule.
to say that writes that modify non-Y locations have no effect on the contents of Y-typed objects. If the contents of a Y-object are not first blessed, then a write to a sub-object X can modify the contents of some Y-object, which is inconsistent with the frame rule. To comply with this restriction, the program above first blesses the memory location \( \ell \) as containing a single Y-object, and then blesses the location \( \ell \) again as a Y object.

Abstractly, we model this behavior by allocating two maps corresponding to the types X and Y. At the first bless command, (T-Bless) computes the set \( L \) of locations in the array to be blessed. In our example, this is just the singleton set \( \{ \ell \} \). Using the function \( \text{copy}_Y^L \), we read X-typed tuple values from the heap \( H \) at each location in \( L \) into the heaplet for X. At the first bless command in our example, this corresponds to reading \( v_x = (H \, \ell, H \, (\ell + 1)) \) and adding it to the X map at location \( \ell \). At the second bless command, we copy the value \( v_y = (v_x, H \, (\ell + 2)) \) (a Y-typed value) into the map Y at location \( \ell \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \text{copy}_Y^L )</td>
<td>( L \text{ from } H \text{ to } X ) ( = \cdot )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{chkAndRem}^\circ )</td>
<td>( \text{chkAndRem}^\circ ) ( \circ \text{updUn} ) ( \circ \text{copy}_Y^L ) ( (\tau_1, \tau_2) ) ( = \cdot )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{updUn}^\circ )</td>
<td>( \text{updUn}^\circ ) ( (\tau_1, \tau_2) ) ( \cdot )</td>
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Figure 13. Auxiliary functions used in static semantics only.
Additionally, when blessing locations we enforce two other invariants key to the soundness of our frame rule. First, when blessing a location \( \ell \) to be a type \( \tau \), we must check that the fields of the type \( \tau \) are appropriately blessed or unblessed—we call this the field consistency condition. For this purpose, in addition to the maps for each type, our semantics also keeps track of a map \( Un : int \rightarrow int \) for locations that are not blessed at any protected type. Second, we ensure that in addition to the heap \( H \), every memory location is in at most one map—we call this the disjoint domains condition.

We use two auxiliary functions to enforce these invariants. At the first bless command of our example, \( \text{chkAndRem}_\tau \ (\text{int}, \text{int}) \{ \ell \} \) checks that the locations \( \{ \ell, (\ell + 1) \} \) are currently unblessed, i.e., they are in the \( Un \) map. At the second bless command, we use \( \text{chkAndRem}_Y \ (X, \text{int}) \{ \ell \} \) to check that location \( \ell \) is in the domain of \( X \) and location \( (\ell + 2) \) is unblessed. In both cases, the check manifests itself as a pre-condition \( \Phi \) for verifying the bless command. For the second bless, to ensure the maps for \( X \) and \( Y \) do not overlap, we additionally compute a substitution \( \sigma_2 \) which updates the map \( X \) by removing the location \( \ell \) from its domain. The function \( \text{updUn}_\tau, L \tau \) updates the substitution that removes locations that are newly blessed from the \( Un \) map—at the first bless these locations are \( \{ \ell, \ell + 1 \} \) and, at the second, \( \{ \ell + 2 \} \).

Finally, we require \( Y, X, \) and \( Un \) to be in the set of modified locations \( \Delta \). Additionally, since the maps of nested types are also modified (e.g., the map \( X \) when blessing a location as \( Y \)), we overload notation and require \( \tau \) to also be in \( \Delta \). The pre-condition in the conclusion is a propagation of the post-condition under the composition of all the computed substitutions. We also include the formula \( \Phi \) in the pre-condition to enforce field consistency.

The rules for unbless are entirely symmetric to those for bless, swapping the role of a type name \( X \) for its representation \( \tau \), and adding elements to the \( Un \) map instead of removing them. In our example, the first unbless removes a value \( v_y = (v'_x, i) \) from the
Y-map at location \( \ell \); adds \( v_x \) to \( X \) at location \( \ell \), and adds the location \( \ell + 2 \) back to the Un map. The second unbless removes \( v'_x \) from \( X \) at location \( \ell \) and adds \( \{ \ell, \ell + 1 \} \) back to the Un map.

**Typecase.** The typecase construct allows a programmer to test whether a location is either the head of an \( X \)-typed object, or not blessed at all. To test the latter condition, a programmer can write (if \( e \) is in Un then \( s_1 \) else \( s_2 \)), which causes \( s_1 \) to be executed only if \( e \) is an unblessed location—this is a primitive form of the vacant function used in the memory manager of Section 2.2, which can be expanded to a sequence of typecase commands. (T-IsX) formalizes the semantics of typecase. The then-branch \( s_1 \) can assume that the scrutinee \( e \) is in the backing store of \( X \) and, when \( X \) is not Un, can additionally assume that the value of \( X \) in the backing store matches the contents of the heap \( H \). A mismatch between the backing store and heap signals a potential corruption of memory by library code—this situation is detected dynamically by the YARRA runtime and causes the program to abort. The else-branch, in contrast, can assume that \( e \) is not in \( X \).

**Reads and writes.** The static semantics of checked reads (T-Rd) and writes (T-Wr) closely mirrors the reduction rules for these constructs in the dynamic semantics. Dynamically, both instructions require the reference being used to be blessed—this manifests itself as a pre-condition in the static semantics that \( e \in \text{dom}_\Gamma X \). Since the dynamic semantics includes a check to make sure that the value being read or written to is uncorrupted (aborting otherwise), (T-Rd) and (T-Wr) allows us to assume that \( v_h = v_x \), i.e., protections in YARRA operate at a level of granularity corresponding to the object, allowing programmers to reason about and preserve internal invariants among the fields of an object, rather than each field in isolation. The rules (T-LRd) and (T-LWr) provide no special semantics for un-checked reads and writes in the static semantics—libraries are free to read from or write to arbitrary portions of the heap, but leave all critical heaplets unchanged.

### 3.5. Robustness with respect to Non-control Data Attacks

Our first metatheoretic result makes precise our definition of an attacker that can mount only non-control data attacks. We show that verification of a YCORE program is independent of the code of a non-control data attacker.

**Definition 1 (Valid attacker program).** A hole-free statement \( s \) is a valid attacker program if both of the following conditions are true:

1. \( \text{FV}(s) = \emptyset \), where \( \text{FV}(s) \) are the free local variables and critical type names in \( s \).
2. \( s \) does not contain statements of the form \( \text{newtype } X = \tau \text{ in } s \) or \( \text{assert } \Phi \).

The next lemma establishes that valid attackers are always verifiable in our logic. A corollary of this property is that programs that are verified in our logic remain verifiable even when composed with valid attackers.

**Lemma 1 (Valid attackers are trivially verifiable).** For any valid attacker program \( s \), the triple \( \Gamma; H \vdash \{ \text{True} \} s \{ \text{True} \} \) is derivable, where \( \Gamma = H:\text{int} \rightarrow \text{int}, \text{Un:} \text{int} \rightarrow \text{int} \).

**Proof:** (Sketch) Since \( s \) has no free type names and creates no new types, \( s \) is free of instructions like \( X(e_1).p := e_2 \) that involve manipulation of critical data types. So, for any
X \neq H, X is not in the modifies set. Likewise, s has no free local variables, and hence modifies no local variables. Finally, s is also free of assertions. The remaining statements involve arbitrary reads and write to the heap H, the usual control constructs, and operations on new local variables. Arbitrary combinations of these remaining constructs satisfy the trivial Hoare triple \{True\} s \{True\}.

**Corollary 2** (Robustness under composition with valid attackers). For any \(\Gamma, \Delta, \Phi, \Psi\), program s with hole \(\bullet\), and valid attacker program \(s_i\); If \(\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \{\Psi\} s \{\Phi\}\) then \(\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \{\Psi\} s[s_i] \{\Phi\}\).

Note that YCORE provides no first-class control constructs (e.g., computed jumps) thereby preventing attackers from subverting the control flow of the program. Furthermore, although technically feasible in YCORE, we also forbid valid attackers from modifying local variables used by the program since this corresponds conceptually to allowing attackers to modify locations on the stack. As such, valid attackers in YCORE are capable of mounting only non-control data attacks.

### 3.6. Soundness of the Logic

The main formal result of our work is a soundness result, namely Theorem 3, which guarantees that verified YCORE programs never get stuck (although they may abort). Intuitively, the theorem states that the reduction of verified YCORE statement s does not get stuck and that if the reduction terminates, it ends in a state satisfying the post-condition. Clause (1) of part (A) in the statement below states that the configuration \((E; s)\) is not stuck. Clause (2) states that the new state \(E'\) is well-typed in an extension of the environment \(\Gamma\). Clauses (3) and (4) state that the program \(s'\) is verifiable but with the same post-condition, \(\Psi\) and a new pre-condition \(\Phi'\), and with a modifies set that includes at most the variables modifiable by \(s\) and possibly any new locals or heaplets allocated in the single step of reduction. Clause (5) ensures that the new pre-conditions \(\Phi'\) is valid in the new state \(E'\). Finally, part (B) states that when the computation has terminated, the post-condition is valid.

**Theorem 3** (Soundness). For all environments \(\Gamma, \Delta\) (such that \(\vdash \Gamma; \Delta \text{ ok}\)); formulas \(\Phi, \Psi\) (such that \(\Gamma \vdash \Psi\) ok); well-formed stores \(E\) (such that \(\vdash E : \Gamma\) that satisfy the pre-condition \((E \models \Phi)\); and hole-free programs \(s\) such that \(\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \{\Phi\} s \{\Psi\}\):

(A) If \(s \neq \text{skip}\), then there exists \(E', s', \Gamma', \Phi', \Delta'\) such that all of the following are true:

1. \((E; s) \rightsquigarrow (E'; s')\);
2. \(\vdash E' : \Gamma, \Gamma'\);
3. \(\Delta' \subseteq \Delta \cup \text{dom } \Gamma'\);
4. \(\Gamma, \Gamma'; \Delta' \vdash \{\Phi'\} s' \{\Psi\}\); and
5. \(E' \models \Phi'\).

(B) If \(s = \text{skip}\), then \(E \models \Psi\).

**Proof.** (Sketch) By an induction over the structure of the verification judgment, \(\Gamma; \Delta \vdash \{\Phi\} s \{\Psi\}\). The key technical lemma that we rely on is a framing property, which establishes that for all stores \(E_1\) and \(E_2\) and typing context \(\Gamma_1\) and \(\Gamma_2\), such that \(\vdash E_1 : \Gamma_1\) and \(\vdash E_2 : \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2\) (i.e., \(E_2\) is an extension of \(E_1\)); and for all for-
1. \( \Gamma; \text{flag}, H \vdash \{ \text{cgiCmd, cgiCmd + |cchar| \times 1024} \in \text{cchar} \} \)
\hspace{1cm} \text{flag} = \text{CheckRequest} (\text{cgiCmd})
\hspace{1cm} \{ \text{flag} \neq 0 \Rightarrow \text{validCmd}(\text{cchar}, \text{cgiCmd}) \} 

2. \( \Gamma; H \vdash \{ \text{True} \} \text{Log}("...") \{ \text{True} \} \)

3. \( \Gamma; H \vdash \{ \text{validCmd}(\text{cchar}, \text{cgiCmd}) \land \text{validDir}(\text{dchar}, \text{cgiDir}) \} \)
\hspace{1cm} \text{ExecuteRequest}(\text{cgiDir}, \text{cgiCmd})
\hspace{1cm} \{ \text{True} \} 

Figure 15. Three triples to illustrate the power of the frame rule

3.7. The Power of the Frame Rule

This section revisits the nullhttpd example of Section 2.1 and shows how, using our logic, we can reason about the safety of the program. Recall that the example defines two types \text{cchar} and \text{dchar}, where the static variables \text{cgiCmd} and \text{cgiDir} hold arrays of these types respectively. The program contains a call to the function \text{ExecuteRequest(cgiDir, cgiCmd)}, and our goal is to ensure that both arguments to this function are not corrupted, either by buffer overruns within nullhttpd, or by the effects of libraries it uses. We can capture this specification by assuming that the three triples in Figure 15 hold for some binary predicates \text{validCmd} and \text{validDir}.

These triples are given in a context \( \Gamma \) that includes bindings for the local variable \text{flag} and the type names \text{cchar} and \text{dchar}. The static variables \text{cgiCmd} and \text{cgiDir} are arbitrary address constants. Additionally, in order to fit in YCORE, we model \text{CheckRequest} and \text{ExecuteRequest} as inlined sequences of instructions that are free to use arbitrary YCORE instructions. In contrast, \text{Log("...")} represents a sequence of instructions from a library function, whose only effects are via un-checked reads and writes.

The first triple states that the call to \text{CheckRequest} modifies the heap and \text{flag}, and decides if \text{cgiCmd} is a \text{validCmd} when it can be shown to be an array of protected \text{cchars}. The second triple states that \text{Log} can have arbitrary effects on the heap \( H \), since it contains library calls. However, it has no effects on the heaplets corresponding to \text{cchar} and \text{dchar}. The third triple says that \text{ExecuteRequest} demands a pre-condition to ensure that both its arguments are valid.

Our semantics (via Lemma 1) ensures that any sequence \( s \) of well-scoped library commands (e.g., the call to \text{Log}) satisfies the trivial Hoare triple \( \{ \text{True} \} s \{ \text{True} \} \) and modifies no type maps \( X \) aside from \( H \). In such a case, according to the frame rule, a formula \( \Phi \) that only references types \( X \) and local variables \( x \) inaccessible to the library \( s \) is preserved across calls to \( s \). Most importantly, we can come to the conclusion that \( \Phi \) is preserved \textit{without having to analyze or modify the memory access patterns of} \( s \). Therein lies the power of YARRA.

To illustrate this power, consider our example in a context where \text{validDir}(\text{dchar}, \text{cgiDir}) initially holds true. We can guard the call to \text{ExecuteRequest} with a test to make sure that \text{flag} is non-zero, and verify that the sequence of commands are valid. In particular, using the frame rule, we preserve the predicate \text{validDir}(\text{dchar}, \text{cgiDir}) across the first triple, since it only modifies \text{flag} and the heap, whereas the free variables of the pred-
icate include only the map for \texttt{dchar} (\texttt{cgiDir} is a constant). Likewise, we preserve both \texttt{validDir} \((\texttt{dchar}, \texttt{cgiDir})\) and the post-condition of the first triple above across the call to \texttt{Log}, without examining the code of \texttt{Log}, even though it has arbitrary effects on the heap.

4. Implementation

The YARRA compiler is implemented as a plug-in to the CIL compiler infrastructure [25]. It implements YARRA’s protection mechanisms using two sets of techniques. YARRA \textit{source protections} are applied to code compiled with the YARRA compiler to ensure that the program neither misuses critical data nor modifies the YARRA runtime’s internal data structures. YARRA \textit{targeted protections} instrument points where control flow enters or leaves YARRA-compiled code. On exit, critical data (and runtime data structures) are locked using hardware page protections, which are unlocked on entry. As we will see in the evaluation section, these two techniques have different performance characteristics: source protections incur an additional cost on each modification to the heap, whereas targeted protections incur a cost when control transfers between instrumented and uninstrumented code. Hence, the programmer can choose which files are compiled under YARRA, incurring the cost of source protections, or compiled normally, incurring a cost as control transfers between protected and unprotected functions.

Source and targeted protections are both implemented via a source-to-source translation that inserts calls to a runtime system. Section 4.1 introduces the YARRA runtime system and describes how the YARRA language extensions are implemented. Section 4.2 describes how critical data and YARRA internal data structures are protected as control transfers to uninstrumented code, and Section 4.3 discusses trade-offs in designing the runtime data structures. We conclude this section by revisiting the performance trade-offs between protection mechanisms. First, however, we clarify the relationship between the formal development of the previous section and our implementation.

\textit{Relating YCORE to YARRA.} YCORE is clearly a much smaller language than C, the language addressed by the YARRA implementation. Nevertheless, YCORE provides the guiding principles behind the design of YARRA. The gap between the formal model and the implementation is, however, important to consider—we list the main distinctions.

- We restrict our attention to single-threaded C programs.
- Whereas the attacker in YCORE is restricted, by construction, to mounting only non-control data attacks, the C-attacker is not limited in this way. As such, the guarantees provided by YARRA are formally justified only by combining its protections with control-flow integrity (CFI) checking. YCORE does not model the C stack, either. However, typical CFI implementations also protect the stack, since its contents determine control. We have yet to integrate YARRA with CFI, although the protections provided by YARRA and CFI are complementary and should, in principle, compose naturally.
- In YCORE, we model interactions between trusted and untrusted code by a program with multiple holes (which can be filled with untrusted code). In our implementation, we work at the granularity of object files composed by the linker. An object file compiled using YARRA is considered trusted (since it is instrumented to respect YARRA’s invariants); all other object files are untrusted. As in
YCORE, the flow of information between trusted and untrusted code is bidirectional. Unlike in YCORE (which lacks procedural abstraction), control transfer between trusted and untrusted code in YARRA is primarily via procedure calls and returns—semantically, this is superficial.

- YCORE ensures the integrity of the shadow heaplets by construction—untrusted code simply does not have access to these maps. As mentioned previously, YARRA enforces the integrity of its internal data structures through a combination of source-code instrumentation and hardware page protections. In all cases, we assume that the YARRA runtime “starts first”, i.e., the application begins with control in the YARRA runtime so that all internal data structures are suitably protected before untrusted code executes.

4.1. YARRA Source Protections

YARRA source protections are applied to modules compiled with the YARRA compiler. In order to avoid syntax extensions to C (and thus requiring extensions to the front end), our compiler accepts as input C source files and additional configuration files that mark certain types in the program as being critical. These extra files can be generated by extracting type definitions containing the `yarra` keyword and using a macro to replace `yarra` with `typedef` during the preprocessing phase. Calls to the YARRA functions `bless`, `unbless`, `isin`, and `vacant` are inserted into the C source files as standard function calls, which are implemented by the runtime system. Our intention is for (assertion-free) instrumented programs to be verifiable according to the rules of our logic. The resulting program is compiled with gcc, and, when used in conjunction with defences against control-flow attacks, may be safely linked against unmodified components.

On execution, the YARRA runtime assigns each memory location a YARRA type identifier (a `ytype`) corresponding to the type of data it holds. The `bless` and `unbless` instructions change the `ytype` associated with a set of locations, and the compiler instruments read and write instructions with checks to ensure that the static types of pointers match the `ytype` of memory accessed at runtime. Because the YARRA compiler sees every read and write, the runtime system is able to abort the program if blessed memory is written to through an untyped pointer.

The runtime system maintains type information and implements the checks. The key data structure is a map that associates each memory address with the critical object to which it belongs (if it does belong to one).

\[
\text{map : address} \rightarrow \{\text{head:bit; tid:ytype}\}
\]

The map implements a function from addresses \(a\) to pairs consisting of a bit and a `ytype`. The bit marks whether \(a\) is the head (first byte) of a critical object, and the `ytype` identifies the type of the enclosing critical object. If the location is not part of an object, its `ytype` is `Un`. The runtime system exposes the following functions that manipulate the map.

---

3 We do not attempt to prove any assertions statically.
• **Bless:** `void bless<`ytype` t>(`void` *p)`. The `bless` function updates the map to reflect that addresses `[p, p + sizeof(t)]` are part of a critical object of type `t`. It sets the head bit at location `p`, assigns `t` to each location in `[p, p + sizeof(t)]`, and requires fields of `p` with critical types to be blessed in advance; the type identifiers of the nested objects are replaced by `t` and their head bits are reset.

• **Typecase:** `int isIn<`ytype` t>(`void` *p)`. Typecase is implemented as a boolean function, which returns a non-zero integer if `p` has been blessed with type `t`—i.e., the head bit is set and locations `[p, p + sizeof(t)]` have `ytype t`.

• **Unbless:** `void unbless<`ytype` t>(`void` *p)`. The `unbless` function undoes the effects of `bless`. First, it calls `isIn(t, p)` to ensure that `p` has been previously blessed. Second, it clears the addresses `[p, p + sizeof(t)]` in the map of association with `t`.

• **Vacant:** `int vacant<`ytype` t>(`void` *p)`. The `vacant` function returns a non-zero integer if `[p, p + sizeof(t)]` has `ytype Un`.

Types in C are strictly static, but YARRA functions take critical types as arguments. The YARRA compiler resolves this conflict by mapping each critical type to a unique integer (the `ytype`) and replacing each `ytype` argument with the appropriate integer.

The YARRA compiler does the following:

- Builds run-time type representations for each critical type. Each representation includes the `ytype`, its size, and offsets of fields.
- Prefaces each critical read and write of pointer `p` with a call to `isIn(typeOf(p), p)`. Execution aborts if the call fails.
- Prefaces each untyped write with a call to `vacant` and aborts if it returns 0.

The compiler must instrument critically-typed reads as well as writes, because dynamic unblessing can change the protection on the underlying memory. Consider two critically-typed pointers that alias a blessed memory location. Unblessing one pointer invalidates future reads through the other; reading from unblessed memory through a critically-typed pointer is illegal. YARRA offers no guarantees about untyped reads, and hence they are not instrumented.

**Protecting the map.** To protect the map data structure from heap modifications in compiled code, the runtime system assigns a unique YARRA type to the heap locations containing the map. Hence, the same checks that guarantee the integrity of critical data also guarantee the integrity of the backing store.

### 4.2. YARRA Targeted Protections

YARRA targeted protections rely on (1) maintaining a **backing store** that stores copies of critical data, and (2) protecting that backing store from library access.

**Maintaining the Backing Store.**

The backing store is realized by adding a field to the map described in Section 4.1; that is, when targeted protections are enabled, the range of the map is a triple of a bit, a `ytype`, and a shadow byte. The shadow byte stores a copy of the value at the address in question.

```
map : address → {head:bit; color:ytype; shadow:byte}
```
Critical writes update this field as well as the value at their target address. The runtime functions are similar to those in Section 4.1, with the following changes.

- **Typecase.** The implementation of `isin` is augmented to compare the value of `shadow` with the value at `address` in the heap. If the address has been blessed and the comparison detects a difference, indicating a potential corruption, `isin` aborts the program. Notice that since the implementation of critical reads and writes use `isin`, they only succeed when the shadow copy is in sync with the ordinary copy.

- **Bless.** `bless` is augmented to copy values of newly blessed addresses to the backing store.

As mentioned earlier, critically-typed writes are also instrumented at runtime with a call to a new runtime function, `yShadowWrite(void *p, size_t size)`, which copies the values in the heap starting at `p` into the backing store.

**Protecting the Backing Store.** We use hardware page protections to protect the integrity of the backing store. The backing store uses a special critical memory manager (CMM), implemented using the BGET memory manager [37], for memory allocations. The memory pool given to the CMM is tracked, and the YARRA runtime system exposes `yUnlock(void)` and `yLock(void)` functions for setting and unsetting write permissions on those pages respectively. Boundary crossings from protected to unprotected functions are instrumented with calls to `yLock()`, and each function in the runtime API calls `yUnlock` if the backing store has been locked, effectively unlocking on demand.

### 4.3. Implementing the Address Map

We implement two versions of the address map: a standard hash table and a two-level lookup table—the latter is similar to that used by Valgrind [27]. Although the space overhead of both implementations grows linearly with the number of blessed locations, the space overhead of the hash table is much smaller. However, the number of reads required by each hash table lookup is proportional to the number of hash collisions, and hence its efficiency degrades as the number of blessed locations increase. The hash table implementation is thus well suited for YARRA-protected programs with few blessed locations and many boundary crossings (this was the case in our experiments).

The lookup table uses a primary table with 64K entries, each of which points to a secondary table with 64K tuples. This associates a tuple with each byte in memory; the higher order 16 bits determine the offset in the primary table, and the lower order bits identify a tuple in the secondary table. Secondary tables are only allocated when a byte within their range is blessed, making unblessed lookups very fast and blessed lookups slightly slower. However, the primary and all secondary tables must be protected on every boundary crossing, which can be expensive, given that the primary table alone requires $2^{18}$ bytes. Thus, the two-level page table implementation is better suited to programs with many blessed locations and fewer boundary crossings.

### 4.4. Performance Trade-offs

Targeted protection eliminates the cost of instrumenting every read and write throughout the program in exchange for maintaining copies of critical data and protecting the store at boundary crossings. However, in cases where the number of blessed locations
in the address map is large, it may be more efficient to protect the program by instrumenting more of its modules. This adds more read/write instrumentation but reduces the number of boundary crossings. Section 5.3 presents measurements comparing protection mechanisms and address map implementations.

5. Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate our prototype implementation of YARRA. The important take-away is that despite the lack of optimizations, YARRA’s performance is adequate to protect small sets of high-value data structures in server applications, and that YARRA can defend against important vulnerabilities with low impact on end-to-end application performance. Alternative approaches based on array-bounds checking cannot (soundly) implement such targeted, negligible-overhead performance protections.

We begin by using YARRA to harden four open source programs with known vulnerabilities to non-control data attacks (Section 5.1) and explore the cost of adding targeted protections to IO-bound applications. Next, we evaluate performance of the YARRA runtime in CPU-bound applications that make heavy use of protected functions (Section 5.2), including a comparison between the two protection mechanisms. Finally, we compare two implementations of the internal runtime data structures (Section 5.3).

5.1. Hardening Server Applications with YARRA

Chen et. al identify non-control data attacks on real-world applications, including FTP, SSH, Telnet and HTTP servers. These applications share a common characteristic: they each have a well-defined module that handles a small amount of security-sensitive data i.e., critical data structures. The applications are well-suited to YARRA protections precisely because they share this characteristic.

We show how these applications can be hardened with minimal effort, often with only a new critical type, a few calls to `bless` and `unbless`, and minor changes to statements using critical variables. We chose the data-structures to protect in each application based on the attacks described in Chen et. al.’s paper. Figure 16 shows the server applications we harden, the nature of critical data protected, and the amount of code changed. As the table indicates, YARRA protections require very few modifications to these applications. Few locations required blessing and unblessing, and the vast majority of modified lines were changed by automated search and replace of variable names. Further, each application required less than a day’s effort, showing the ease of applying YARRA protections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>YARRA Protections</th>
<th>Orig. LOC / Mod. LOC</th>
<th>Bless / Unbless</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sshd</td>
<td>Password structure and validation bit.</td>
<td>60148 / 497</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ftpd</td>
<td>Path/command buffers.</td>
<td>17993 / 262</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ghttpd</td>
<td>Pointer to command buffer.</td>
<td>514 / 69</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>telnetd</td>
<td>Login command string.</td>
<td>3962 / 63</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 16. YARRA-protected Applications
We measure end-to-end performance to gauge the impact of applying YARRA protections. For each server, we define a client/server interaction wherein the client connects, performs a small task, and disconnects. By design, each interaction exercises vulnerable code in the server. We compare the run times of a client connecting to vulnerable (unmodified) and hardened servers, normalizing the results against the run time connecting to the vulnerable server. Figure 17 shows our results (“End to End”).

We found no measurable overhead between connecting to hardened and vulnerable servers, irrespective of the total lines of code in the program or number of memory accesses throughout the code. YARRA was effective in protecting the security-critical modules identified by Chen et al. as vulnerable to non-control data attacks.

In order to investigate further, we instrumented each server to isolate and collect run-time data from within the protected module, allowing us to measure function slowdown for hardened server functions. Our findings are shown in Figure 17 (“Server”), reflecting a modest performance impact (at most 1.6x) on the hardened module.

5.2. Stress-testing the Performance of YARRA

We employ a second, atypical use case to evaluate the performance of the YARRA run time under heavy load, wherein we use YARRA to protect module data structures so that clients may not corrupt it. For this study, we experiment with the BGET memory allocator [37], using YARRA to protect BGET’s metadata from clients that use the allocator in a way reminiscent of the idealized allocator example presented in Section 2.2. The BGET clients we measure are three SPECINT2000 programs also used in the WIT paper [2]. Unlike the server applications of the previous case study, these clients frequently call

---

4 Average of five timed executions on a virtual machine running Ubuntu 9.10 on a 2.13Ghz Intel Core 2 Duo; 722Mb RAM.
Figure 18. CPU overhead for securing allocator metadata using YARRA’s targeted protections (“Targeted”) compared to instrumenting the whole source program with source protections (“Whole”). A value of 1x indicates no measurable overhead.

Figure 18 illustrates our results, comparing both protection mechanisms discussed in Section 4. To evaluate targeted protections (“Targeted”), we compile BGET using source protections, leaving the client application untouched—hence, the critical data is locked and unlocked each time a BGET function is invoked. Next, we compile both the client and BGET using source protections (“Whole”), leaving only calls to the standard library protected with targeted protections.

We found that targeted protection is much more efficient with these applications, indicating that the cost of boundary crossings from protected to unprotected code is less than the cost of instrumenting every read and write in the application. Even with targeted protection, however, we incur a 2x overhead these benchmarks (the corresponding overhead for whole program protection is 4 to 6x).

There are two bottlenecks in our current implementation, namely read/write instrumentations and boundary crossings. Because our implementation is not as highly optimized as other, similar bounds-checking implementations (e.g. [24,32]), we believe that this overhead can be lowered significantly. Further, we can use cheaper alternatives to page protection for protecting the address map data-structure. For example, heap randomization techniques can be used to hide data structure copies as opposed to paying the cost of turning on hard protections at boundary crossings [6]. Alternatively, the address map structure may be hidden in a separate process, using a technique similar to the one proposed by Berger et al. [5]. These techniques would make boundary crossings take constant time (instead of being linear with the size of the map), albeit at the cost of a small increase in look-up speed.

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5Average of five timed executions on a machine running CentOS 5.4 on four dual-core 2.8 GHz AMD Opteron 8220s; 8Gb RAM.
The changes to BGET were minimal, requiring only 16 calls to `bless/unbless` and modifying 43 out of 241 lines in total. The SPEC applications did not need to be changed at all.

5.3. Comparing Address Map Implementations

Figure 19 and Figure 20 compare the performance impact of using the hash table and lookup table implementations of the address map (Figures 17 and 18 both report over-
head measured using the hash table implementation). The hash table implementation proved to be much more efficient on the security-related benchmarks, bearing out our earlier observation that the high space overhead of the lookup table is costly to protect across boundary crossings, compared to the smaller hash table. The ghttpd benchmark especially highlights this behavior, because there are frequent boundary crossings and very few critical objects.

The distinction is less clear for the SPEC benchmarks using the instrumented BGET allocator. The lookup table implementation clearly wins out when the whole program—both SPEC benchmark and BGET library—is instrumented with YARRA; there are no boundary transitions, and thus the space overhead of the lookup table does not have a significant impact on performance. With targeted protection, however, there is no clear winner. These programs allocate many more critical objects than the security benchmarks, and more efficient manipulation of the shadow map via the lookup table balances the cost of protecting more data at boundary crossings. Also, as the number of protected objects grows, the relative size of the space overhead incurred by the lookup table decreases.

Of course, these distinctions largely hinge on our decision to protect the shadow map using hardware page protections; the trade-offs may shift, were we to develop an alternative protection mechanism—perhaps based on heap randomization techniques or process isolation, as we speculated in the previous section. For example, hiding critical data in a separate process may well obviate the size of the shadow map data structure as an impact on performance, and instead incur a larger cost for each invocation of interprocess communication. We hope to explore these trade-offs in future work.

6. Related work

There is a large body of related work focused on protecting the integrity of data in a program, often by providing increased memory safety in unsafe languages such as C through various mechanisms, including array bounds checking, software fault isolation, etc. Here we survey this work on indicate how it differs from YARRA.

**Preventing non-control data attacks.** As non-control data attacks have become more prominent, mitigations targeted specifically to avoid them have been proposed in recent years. Kong et al. [17] propose ensuring data integrity as a special case of taint checking. They separate data and instructions into tainted and taintless, and ensure that each instruction operates on the appropriately type of data. Mondrian Memory Protection (MMP) [38] is a technique to separate memory into fine-grained regions, and allow arbitrary access control for individual regions. MMP allows each data type to be in its own region and to be accessed only by selected instructions. Both these techniques can protect data from attacks; however they require hardware support, and are not feasible on commodity processors.

Data-flow integrity (DFI) [9] computes data dependencies between instructions using static analysis and ensures that the flow of data at runtime obeys these dependencies. Data Space Randomization (DSR) [7] XORs the contents of memory with a random key, making it difficult for an attacker to correctly subvert the contents. Both DFI and DSR differ from Yarra in that they (1) apply protections to all data (and not just critical data), (2) do not provide language support for partial protection, and (3) do not formalize the semantics of their solutions. SIDAN [12] detects non-control data attacks using tech-
niques from the intrusion detection literature. However, it does not provide any formal guarantees about the protection.

**Array bounds checking.** Mechanisms for array bounds checking seek to eliminate buffer overflows, a major source of memory corruption in real programs. Conceptually, this approach is very simple—instrument every read and write to guarantee that references do not fall outside the bounds of the object being referenced. Early array bounds-checking techniques (e.g., Jones and Lin [16]) had substantial performance overheads, and more recent work [3,4,13,24,32] attempts to reduce that overhead. Methods of reducing overhead include eliminating the check when it can be determined statically that the check is unnecessary, reducing the overhead of storing and retrieving the bounds, only checking the integrity of writes, and allocating objects in pools of fixed size. Approaches to memory safety through array bounds checking fail to provide complete safety unless every memory reference is checked, including references from modules that have not been compiled with checking enabled. **YARRA** differs from this prior work in its emphasis on protecting the contents of arrays from all references made to other objects, including references made in arbitrary external libraries.

As mentioned, **YARRA**’s explicit declaration of types has similarities to ideas in WIT [2]. To reduce checking overhead, WIT maps all objects that are reachable from a store in the program to an equivalence class and gives all the objects in that class the same color. Mapping objects to a small number of distinct colors allows WIT to implement bounds checks efficiently. Unlike WIT, **YARRA** allows the user to specify object equivalence classes explicitly and precisely, and guarantees that all program references, including those performed in external components, do not violate the integrity of such objects. Further, WIT requires that the entire application be analyzed by it, including libraries, in order to provide protection.

None of the prior work on array bounds checking attempts to define the semantics of programs in which only some array bounds are checked. Dhurjati et al. [14] show that using a pool-allocation transformation, they are able to eliminate bounds checks altogether and ensure semantic correctness of array references even in the presence of incorrect frees. Similar to **YARRA**, they transform the program to explicitly include the pool as a parameter to functions that operate on dynamic data. However, like other array bounds checking research, they assume that all code in an application has been transformed to ensure safety.

**Separating and isolating memory.** Software fault isolation [36] attempts to isolate the potential negative effects of external components by preventing memory operations and other unwanted interactions, such as system calls, that might be harmful. Castro et al. describe BGI (Byte-Granularity Isolation) [10], which provides software enforced protection domains between kernel extensions. Like **YARRA**, they provide an API that allows users to explicitly identify what extensions can access what memory. Unlike **YARRA**, BGI assumes that all untrusted extensions are compiled with BGI and will fail in the presence of untrusted extensions. In addition, unlike **YARRA**, BGI has no formal semantics.

SafeDrive [39] uses type annotations and source-to-source transformations to provide fine-grained protection for extensions written in unsafe languages. Like **YARRA**, SafeDrive is able to guarantee the preservation of invariants associated with the extension’s data, provided the data has been annotated by the programmer. Unlike **YARRA**,
SafeDrive requires that either the entire code base has been analyzed by it or that external types have been annotated by the programmer with their allowed bounds.

Samurai [29] also takes the approach of explicitly protecting part of the entire memory state from memory errors. Like Samurai, YARRA also focuses on protecting critical data from memory corruption errors. Unlike Samurai, YARRA provides a precise definition of what critical memory means, incorporates those semantics in language features, and demonstrates that such features are useful to ensure correctness and security. Further, YARRA supports a richer set of possible implementations compared to Samurai, which is confined to replication and error correction. Finally, Samurai provides only limited protection from security attacks, as its focus is on reliability and fault-tolerance.

**Formal reasoning.** The most closely related theories emanate from a line of research started in the 1970’s with the Euclid programming language [20]. Euclid was built in order to facilitate verification and one of the techniques for doing so involved logically, as opposed to physically, splitting the heap into a set of different heaplets called collections. These collections resemble the typed heaplets in this paper except that there was no means for moving an object from one heap to another as we do with bless and unbless operations. In the mid-nineties, Utting [35] reexamined Euclid’s model and added a transfer coercion that, logically speaking, moved objects between heaplets, though physically, no action was taken. Recently, similar ideas have been rediscovered by Lahiri et al. [19]. They modernized and extended Euclid’s Hoare Logic and illustrated the interaction between collections, now called linear maps, and the frame rule. The key difference between YARRA and this previous work is that YARRA’s separate heaplets are designed to be used in the context of an unsafe language with unverified libraries. Consequently, the bless and unbless operations (i.e., transfers) have operational significance: they put up and tear down physical protections.

7. Conclusion

This paper presents YARRA, a lightweight extension to C that allows programmers to protect the integrity of critical data structures in their programs, even in the presence of untrusted third-party libraries. We formalize the key semantic properties of YARRA by developing a sound program logic for it. The logic includes a novel type-based frame rule that gives programmers access to powerful modular reasoning techniques. We show YARRA is effective in practice by protecting important server applications, tens of thousands of lines long, from known vulnerabilities—in each case, we modify at most a few hundred lines of code. Moreover, the end-to-end performance overhead is negligible in the security-centric examples we studied.

We conclude this paper by discussing how YARRA can complement existing protection mechanisms for C programs. One effective protection against control-based attacks is to ensure control-flow integrity (CFI) [1]. Combining CFI with YARRA would give stronger guarantees against both control-based and non-control data attacks than CFI alone. Further, it would require less overhead than combining CFI with complete array bounds checking. While many approaches to array bounds checking have been proposed, none are in widespread use. We believe that this is because of the performance overheads imposed and issues related to whole-program compilation and third-party code. YARRA provides an alternative approach that addresses these issues.
We also consider the value of using YARRA in cases where other techniques such as CFI and array bounds checking are impractical. Specifically, modern systems, such as recent incarnations of Microsoft Windows, rely on a collection of techniques to defend against attacks, implemented in the compiler [22], heap [23], and the hardware [21]. While these mechanisms prevent a number of common attack vectors, they do not prevent arbitrary buffer overruns from corrupting either control data (such as vtable pointers) or non-control data (such as passwords). As a result, many publicly available documents demonstrate how to corrupt structures such as the Windows heap metadata to mount a successful attack [30].

In this context, YARRA provides a novel and systematic way to harden applications from attacks. Consider the following scenario: an attacker exploits a buffer overrun in a heap object to overwrite a function pointer in another object or in the heap metadata. Without YARRA, the standard mitigation of this exploit would be to patch the buffer overflow. However, this leaves the program vulnerable to other attacks that overwrite the data, through a different buffer overflow, for example. With YARRA, the mitigation would be to make the function pointer critical, thus protecting the system not just from the one exploit, but from every exploit that would attempt to overwrite that function pointer. Note that one does not need to know what vulnerabilities are present or where they are present, in order to deploy YARRA protection.

YARRA would also be effective when used in conjunction with hardware protection such as Data Execution Prevention (DEP), which prevents attackers from injecting code into the heap and jumping to it. Attackers can bypass DEP using return-to-libc attacks and return-oriented programming [8]. However, to do so they still need to overwrite a vulnerable function pointer somewhere in the heap. In such cases, YARRA can be deployed to selectively protect vulnerable function pointers. This may be an interesting avenue for future work.

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