Concurrent NetCore: From Policies to Pipelines

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Abstract
In a Software-Defined Network (SDN), a central, computationally powerful controller manages a set of distributed, computationally simple switches. The controller computes a policy describing how each switch should route packets and populates packet-processing tables on each switch with rules to enact the routing policy. As network conditions change, the controller continues to add and remove rules from switches to adjust the policy as needed.

Recently, the SDN landscape has begun to change as several proposals for new, reconfigurable switching architectures, such as RMT [5] and FlexPipe [14] have emerged. These platforms provide switch programmers with many, flexible tables for storing packet-processing rules, and they offer programmers control over the packet fields that each table can analyze and act on. These reconfigurable switch architectures support a richer SDN model in which a switch configuration phase precedes the rule population phase [4]. In the configuration phase, the controller sends the switch a graph describing the layout and capabilities of the packet processing tables it will require during the population phase. Armed with this foreknowledge, the switch can allocate its hardware (or software) resources more efficiently.

We present a new, typed language, called Concurrent NetCore, for specifying routing policies and graphs of packet-processing tables. Concurrent NetCore includes features for specifying sequential, conditional and concurrent control-flow between packet-processing tables. We develop a fine-grained operational model for the language and prove this model coincides with a higher-level denotational model when programs are well-typed. We also prove several additional properties of well-typed programs, including strong normalization and determinism. To illustrate the utility of the language, we develop linguistic models of both the RMT and FlexPipe architectures and we give a multi-pass compilation algorithm that translates graphs and routing policies to the RMT model.

Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3.2 [Programming Languages]: Language Classifications—Specialized application languages

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1. Introduction
Over the past several years, a new networking technology known as Software-Defined Networking (SDN) has emerged as a viable competitor to traditional networking infrastructure. In a software-defined network, a logically centralized controller machine (or cluster of machines) manages a distributed collection of switches. The controller is a general-purpose server whose primary job is to decide how to route packets through the network while avoiding congestion, managing security, handling failures, monitoring load, and informing network operators of problems. The switches, on the other hand, are specialized hardware devices with limited computational facilities. In general, a switch implements a collection of simple rules that match bit patterns in the incoming packets, and based on those bit patterns, drop packets, modify their fields, forward the packets on to other switches, or send the packet to the controller for additional, more general analysis and processing. The switch itself does not decide what rules to implement—that job lies with the controller, which sends messages to the switches to install and uninstall the packet-forwarding rules needed to achieve its higher-level, network-wide objectives. SDN is distinguished from traditional networks by its centralized, programmatic control. In contrast, traditional networks rely on distributed algorithms implemented by the switches, and network administrators manually configure each switch in the hope of inducing behavior that conforms to a global (and often poorly specified) network policy.

SDN has had a tremendous impact in the networking community, both for industry and academia. Google has adopted SDN to manage its internal backbone, which transmits all its intra-datacenter traffic—making it one of the largest networks in the world [9], and many other major companies are following Google’s lead. Indeed, the board of the Open Networking Foundation (ONF)—the main body responsible for defining SDN standards, such as OpenFlow [10]—includes the owners of most of the largest networks in the world (Google, Facebook, Microsoft, etc) and its corporate membership numbers over a hundred. On the academic side, hundreds of participants have attended the newly-formed HotSDN workshop, and several tracks of top networking conferences, such as NSDI and SIGCOMM, are dedicated to research in SDN. But at its heart, management of Software-Defined Networks is an important new programming problem that calls for a variety of new, high-level, declarative, domain-specific programming languages, as well as innovation in compiler design and implementation.

OpenFlow 1.0: successes and failures. The OpenFlow protocol is a popular protocol for communication between the controller and switches. The first version, OpenFlow 1.0 [10], supported a simple
abstraction: Each switch is a single table of packet-forwarding rules. Each such rule can match on one or more of twelve standard packet fields (source MAC, destination MAC, source IP, destination IP, VLAN, etc.) and then execute a series of actions, such as dropping the packet, modifying a field, or forwarding it out a port. A controller can issue commands to install and uninstall rules in the table and to query statistics associated with each rule (e.g., the number of packets or bytes processed).

The single table abstraction was chosen for the first version of OpenFlow because it was a “least common denominator” interface that many existing switches could support with little change. It worked, and OpenFlow switches from several hardware vendors, including Broadcom and Intel, hit the market quickly. The simplicity of the OpenFlow 1.0 interface also made it a relatively easy compilation target for a wave of newly-designed, high-level SDN programming languages, such as Frenetic [7], Procera [15], Maple [16], FlowLog [13] and others.

Unfortunately, while the simplicity of the OpenFlow 1.0 interface is extremely appealing, hardware vendors have been unable to devise implementations that make efficient use of switch resources. Packet processing hardware in most modern ASICs is not, in fact, implemented as a single match-action table, but rather as a collection of tables. These tables are often aligned in sequence, so the effects of packet processing by one table can be observed by later tables, or in parallel, so non-conflicting actions may be executed concurrently to reduce packet-processing latency.

Each table within a switch will typically match on a fixed subset of a packet’s fields and will be responsible for implementing some subset of the chip’s overall packet-forwarding functionality. Moreover, different tables may be implemented using different kinds of memory with different properties. For example, some tables might be built with SRAM and only capable of exact matches on certain fields—that is, comparing fields against a single, concrete bit sequence (e.g., 1010001010). Other tables may use TCAM and be capable of ternary wildcard matches, where packets are compared to a string containing concrete bits and wildcards (e.g., 10?1??1001?) and the wildcards match either 0 or 1. TCAM is substantially more expensive and power-hungry than SRAM. Hence, TCAM tables tend to be smaller than SRAM. For instance, the Broadcom Trident has an L2 table with SRAM capable of holding ~100K entries and a forwarding table with TCAM capable of holding ~4K entries [6].

In addition to building fixed-pipeline ASICs, switch hardware vendors are also developing more programmable hardware pipelines. For example, the RMT design [5] offers a programmable parser to extract data from packets in arbitrary application-driven ways, and a pipeline of 32 physical match-action tables. Each physical table in this pipeline may be configured for use in different ways: (1) As a wide table, matching many bits at a time, but containing fewer rows, (2) as a narrow table, matching fewer bits in each packet but containing more rows, (3) as multiple parallel tables acting concurrently on a packet, or (4) combined with other physical tables in sequence to form a single, multi-step logical table. Intel’s FlexPipe architecture [14] also contains a programmable front end, but rather than organizing tables in a sequential pipeline, FlexPipe contains a collection of parallel tables to allow concurrent packet processing, a shorter pipeline and reduced packet-processing latency.

In theory, these multi-table hardware platforms could be programmed through the single-table OpenFlow 1.0 interface. However, doing so has several disadvantages:

- The single OpenFlow 1.0 interface serves as a bottleneck in the compilation process: Merging rules from separate tables into a single table can lead to an explosion in the number of rules required to represent the same function as one might represent via a set of tables.

Towards OpenFlow 2.0. As a result of the deficiencies of the first generation of OpenFlow protocols, a group of researchers have begun to define an architecture for the next generation of OpenFlow protocols [4] (See Figure 1). In this proposal, switch configuration is divided into two phases: table configuration and table population.

During the table configuration phase, the SDN controller describes the abstract set of tables it requires for its high-level routing policy. When describing these tables, it specifies the packet fields read and written by each table, and the sorts of patterns (either exact match or prefix match) that will be used. In addition, the table configuration describes the topology of the abstract tables—the order they appear in sequence (or in parallel) and the conditions necessary for executing the rules within a table.

We call the tables communicated from controller to switch abstract, because they do not necessarily correspond directly to the concrete physical tables implemented by the switch hardware. In order to bridge the gap between abstract and concrete tables, a compiler will attempt to find a mapping between what is requested by the controller and what is present in hardware. In the process of determining this mapping, the compiler will generate a function capable of translating sets of abstract rules (also called an abstract policy) supplied by the controller, and targeted at the abstract tables, into concrete rules/policy implementable directly on the concrete tables available in hardware. After the table configuration phase, and during the table population phase, the rule translator is used to transform abstract rules into concrete ones.

The configuration phase happens on a human time scale: a network administrator writes a policy and a controller program and runs the compiler to configure the switches and SDN controllers on her network appropriately. Rule population, on the other hand, happens on the time scale of network activity: a controller’s algorithm may install, e.g., new firewall or NAT rules after observing a single packet—concrete examples of these and other rule installations can be found in Section 2.

Contributions of this paper. The central contribution of this paper is the design of a new language for programming OpenFlow
2.0 switches. This compiler intermediate language is capable of specifying high-level switch policies as well as concrete, low-level switch architectures. We call the language Concurrent NetCore (or CNC, for short), as it is inspired by past work on NetCore [7, 11] and NetKAT [3].¹ Like NetCore and NetKAT, Concurrent NetCore consists of a small number of primitive operations for specifying packet processing, plus combinators for constructing more complex packet processors from simpler ones. Concurrent NetCore introduces the following new features.

- **Table specifications**: Table specifications act as “holes” in an otherwise fully-formed switch policy. These tables can be filled in (i.e., populated) later. Policies with tables serve as the phase-1 configurations in the OpenFlow 2.0 architecture. Ordinary, hole-free policies populate those holes later in the switch-configuration process.

- **Concurrent composition**: Whereas NetCore and NetKAT have a form of “parallel composition,” which copies a packet and performs different actions on different copies, CNC also provides a new concurrent composition operator that allows two policies to act simultaneously on the same packet. We use concurrent composition along with other features of CNC to model the RMT and Intel FlexPipe packet-processing pipelines.

- **Type System**: Unlike past network programming languages, CNC is equipped with a simple domain-specific type system. These types perform two functions: (1) they determine the kinds of policies that may populate a table (which fields may be read or written, for instance), and thereby guarantee that well-typed policies can be compiled to the target table, and (2) they prevent interference between concurrently executing policies, thereby ensuring that the overall semantics of a CNC program is deterministic.

The key technical results of the paper include the following:

- **Semantics for Concurrent NetCore**: We define a small-step operational semantics for CNC that captures the intricate interactions between (nested) concurrent and parallel policies. In order to properly describe interacting concurrent actions, this semantics is structured entirely differently from the denotational models previously defined for related languages.

- **Metatheory of Concurrent NetCore**: The metatheory includes a type system and its proof of soundness, as well as several auxiliary properties of the system, such as confluence and normalization of all well-typed policies. We derive reasoning principles relating the small-step CNC semantics to a NetKAT-like denotational model.

- **Multipass compilation algorithm**: We show how to compile high-level abstract configurations into the constrained lower-level concrete configuration of the RMT pipeline [5]. In doing so, we show how to produce policy transformation functions that will map abstract policy updates into concrete policy updates. We have proven many of our compilation passes correct using reasoning principles derived from our semantics. We offer this compilation as a proof of concept of “transformations within CNC” as a compilation strategy; we believe that many of our algorithms and transformations will be reusable when targeting other platforms.

A technical appendix includes a full presentation of the compilation algorithm, theorems, and proofs [1].

¹ Because we focus on programming individual switches in this paper, our language does not contain Kleene Star, which is more useful for specifying paths across a network than policies on a single switch. Hence, our language is a NetCore as opposed to a NetKAT.

The following section introduces CNC in greater detail through a series of examples, while Section 3 presents a formal semantics for CNC, and Section 4 describes its metatheory. The models of both the RMT and Intel FlexPipe architectures are described in Section 5, followed by our compilation algorithm in Section 6. Section 7 describes related work, and we conclude in Section 8.

2. **CNC by example**

In this section, we introduce CNC through a series of examples, starting with user policies that define high-level packet processing, and then showing how CNC can model low-level switching hardware. Because CNC can model both ends of the spectrum, it can serve as a common intermediate language within an OpenFlow 2.0 compilation system. Section 6 will illustrate this idea via algorithms that demonstrate how to transform our high-level user policies into components for placement in RMT tables.

2.1 **Simple switch policies**

Consider the picture in Figure 2. This picture presents several devices, a switch, a controller, a server and a DPI² box, as well as a link to “the internet.” The switch has four ports (labelled 1, 2, 3, 4 in the picture) that connect it to the other devices and to the internet. Our goal is to write a policy for the switch to specify how it forwards packets in and out of its ports.

In general, we model packets as records with a number of fields which map to values drawn from a finite set. Our examples typically use an idealized collection of fields such as src (the packet’s source IP address), dst (the packet’s destination IP address), and port (the port the packet arrives on), and out (the port a packet should leave on).³ Switch policies are functions that map packets to sets of packets. For example, a policy that drops all packets will map any packet to the empty set of packets. A policy that forwards packets from the internet (port 1) to the server (port 2) will map packets with in 1 to a packet with out 2. A policy that forwards packets from the internet to both the DPI box and the server will map packets with in 1 to a pair of packets with out 2 and out 3.

We build our policies out of a collection of primitive operations and policy combinators. The simplest primitive filters packets based on the contents of a single field. For example, when applied to a packet pk, the test src = 10.0.0.1 returns \{pk\} when pk’s src field is 10.0.0.1 and returns the empty set of packets otherwise.

Using such tests as well as standard boolean connectives and (\&\&), or (\|\|) and not (!), one can easily build up a function on packets that implements a firewall (either dropping each packet or returning it unchanged). For example, we might want to implement the following firewall w on the switch in Figure 2. It admits ssh or http traffic on port 1, but blocks all other traffic arriving on port 1. All

² DPI is deep packet inspection, a form of network security monitoring that inspects not just packet headers but their payloads as well.

³ Using in and out fields to designate ingress and egress ports rather than a single port field that indicates where the packet is “right now” deviates slightly from past presentations of NetCore and NetKAT, but more faithfully models our hardware targets.
traffic on ports other than 1 is allowed.

\[ w = \text{in} = 1; (\text{typ} = \text{ssh} + \text{typ} = \text{http}) + \neg (\text{in} = 1) \]

In order to make changes to packets, we use the assignment primitive \( f \leftarrow \text{value} \). Complex policies may perform the actions of a set of simpler policies in series using the sequential composition operator \((p_1; p_2)\). Alternatively, a policy may copy a packet and perform both \(p_1\) and \(p_2\) on the separate copies, taking the union of their results \((p_1 + p_2)\). We have reused the symbols “\&” and “\lor” (conjunction and disjunction) here as it turns out their semantics as logical predicates coincides with their semantics as policy combiners (the boolean algebra is a sub-algebra of the policy algebra).

As an example, to define a static routing policy \( r \) for our switch, we might write the following policy.

\[ r = \text{in} = 1; \text{out} \leftarrow 2 + \text{in} = 2; \text{out} \leftarrow 1 \]

The policy above has the effect of routing packets from port 1 to port 2 and from port 2 to port 1. In more detail, it first copies the incoming packet (+). Then, in the first branch, it tests whether the input port is 1; if not, the packet is dropped; if so, the out field is assigned 2. The second branch is dual, forwarding packets from port 2 to port 1. The guards on each branch guarantee that the ‘copying’ is purely notional; in general, one codes the conditional statement if \( a \) then \( p_1 \) else \( p_2 \) as \( a; p_1 + \neg a; p_2 \).

The above features are not new—they are present in NetCore [11, 12] and NetKAT [3]. However, in order to serve as a configuration language for OpenFlow 2.0, we require a couple of additional features, as well as the development of a simple type system for policies. First, the policies so far are completely static. They offer no room for populating new packet-processing rules at run time. To admit this kind of dynamic extension of static policies, we add typed table variables, which we write \( \langle x : \tau \rangle \). For example, we write \( \langle x : \{\text{typ}, \text{src}, \{\text{out}\}\} \rangle \) to indicate that the controller may later install new rules in place of \( x \), and any such rules will only read from the \( \text{typ} \) and \( \text{src} \) header fields and write to the \( \text{out} \) field. The controller could use this table to dynamically install rules that forward selected subsets of packets to the DPI box for additional scrutiny. The typing information informs the switch of the kind of memory it needs to reserve for the table \( x \) (in this case, memory wide enough to be able to hold patterns capable of matching on both the \( \text{typ} \) and \( \text{src} \) fields). We model rule population as a set of table bindings \( b \), i.e., a closing substitution.

A second key extension is concurrency, written \( p_1 \parallel p_2 \). In order to reduce packet-processing latency within a switch, one may which to execute \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \) concurrently on the same packet (rather than making copies). The latter is only legal provided there is no interference between subpolicies \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \). In CNC, interference is prevented through the use of a simple type system. This type system prevents concurrent writes and ensures determinism of the overall packet-processing policy language.

As an example, consider the following policy \( p \), which assembles each of the components described earlier. This policy checks for compliance with the firewall \( w \) while concurrently implementing a routing policy. The routing policy statically routes all packets to the server (this is the role of \( r \)) while dynamically selecting those packets to send to the DPI box (this is the role of \( m \)).

\[ m = \langle x : \{\text{typ}, \text{src}, \{\text{out}\}\} \rangle \]

\[ p = w || (r + m) \]

In essence, we have a form of speculative execution here. The policy \( r + m \) is speculatively copying the packet and modifying it’s out field while the firewall decides whether to drop it. If the firewall ultimately decides to drop the packet, then the results of routing and monitoring are thrown away. If the firewall allows the packet, then we have already computed how many copies of the packet are going out which ports. This kind of speculative execution is safe and deterministic when policies are well-typed.

### 2.2 Modeling programmable hardware architectures

In addition to providing network administrators with a language for defining policies, our language of network policies aptly describes the hardware layout of switches’ packet-processing pipelines. In this guise, table variables represent TCAM or SRAM tables, and combinators describe how these hardware tables are connected. The key benefit to devising a shared language for describing both user-level programs and hardware configurations is that we can define compilation as a semantics-preserving policy translation problem, and compiler correctness as a simple theorem about equivalence of input and output policies defined in a common language.

Below, we demonstrate how to model key elements of the RMT [5] and FlexPipe [14] architectures. Both chips offer differently architectured fixed pipelines connecting reconfigurable tables.

**RMT.** In RMT (as well as in FlexPipe), multicast is treated specially: the act of copying and buffering multiple packets during a multicast while processing packets as quickly as they come in (“at line rate”) is the most difficult element of chip design.

The RMT multicast stage consists of a set of queues, one per output port. Earlier tables in the pipeline indicate the ports on which a packet should be multicast by setting bits in a metavariable bitmap we call \( \text{out} \). The multicast stage consists of a sum, where each summand corresponds to a queue on a particular output port—when the \( i \)-th \( \text{out} \) bit is set, the summand tags the packet with a unique identifier and sets its output port out to \( i \) accordingly.

\[
\text{multicast} = (out_1 = 1; \text{flag} \leftarrow v_1; \text{out} \leftarrow 1) + (out_2 = 2; \text{flag} \leftarrow v_2; \text{out} \leftarrow 2) + \ldots
\]

In addition to the multicast processor, the RMT architecture provides thirty-two physical tables, which may be divided into sequences in the ingress and egress pipelines. Overall, the RMT pipeline consists of the ingress pipeline, followed by the multicast stage, followed by the egress pipeline.

\[
\text{pipeline} = (x_1 : \tau_1); \ldots; (x_k : \tau_k);
\text{multicast};
(x_{k+1} : \tau_{k+1}); \ldots; (x_{32} : \tau_{32})
\]

**FlexPipe.** The FlexPipe architecture makes use of concurrency by arranging its pipeline into a diamond shape. Each point of the diamond is built from two tables in sequence, with incoming packets first processed by the first pair, then concurrently by the next two pairs, and finally by the last pair. This built-in concurrency optimizes for common networking tasks, such as checking packets against an access control list while simultaneously calculating routing behavior.

\[
\text{pair}_1 = (x_{i, 1} : \tau_{i, 1}); (x_{i, 2} : \tau_{i, 2})
\text{diamond} = \text{pair}_1; (\text{pair}_2 || \text{pair}_3); \text{pair}_4
\]

The FlexPipe multicast stage occurs after the diamond pipeline and, like the RMT multicast stage, relies on metadata set in the ingress pipeline to determine multicast. FlexPipe can make up to five copies (“mirrors”) of the packet that can be independently modified, but each copy can be copied again to any output port, so long as no further modifications are required.

\[
\text{multicast} = \text{mirror}; \text{egress}; \text{flood}
\text{pipeline} = \text{diamond}; \text{multicast}
\]

We present models of both RMT and FlexPipe (including mirror, egress and flood) in greater detail in Section 5.
3. Concurrent NetCore

We define the syntax of Concurrent NetCore in Figure 3. The language is broken into two levels: predicates and policies. Predicates, written with the metavariables \(a\) and \(b\), simply filter packets without modifying or copying them. Polices, written with the metavariables \(p\) and \(q\), can modify and duplicate packets. Every predicate is a policy—a read-only one. Both policies and predicates are interpreted using a set semantics, much like NetKAT [3].

Policies are interpreted as functions from sets of packets to sets of packets, while predicates have two interpretations: as functions from sets of packets to sets of policies, but also as Boolean propositions selecting a subset of packets. A packet, written with the metavariable \(pk\), is finite partial function from fields to values. We fix a set of fields \(F\), from which we draw individual fields \(f\). We will occasionally refer to sets of fields using the metavariables \(R\) and \(W\) when they denote sets of readable or writable fields, respectively. We do not have a concrete treatment for values \(v\) in \(Val\), though \(Val\) will be finite and support a straightforward notion of equality. One could model both equality and TCAM-style wildcard matching, but for simplicity’s sake, we stick with equality only.

As explained in Section 2, the policies of Concurrent NetCore include the predicates as well as primitives for field modification, tables \((x : \tau)\), sequential composition \((\cdot)\), parallel composition \((\parallel)\), and concurrency \((\bowtie)\). One difference from our informal presentation earlier is that concurrent composition \(p W_q\parallel W_p\) formally requires a pair of write sets \(W_p\) and \(W_q\) where \(W_p\) denotes the set of fields that \(p\) may write and \(W_q\) denotes the set of fields that \(q\) may write. Our operational semantics in Section 3.1 will in fact get stuck if \(p\) and \(q\) have a race condition, e.g., have read/write dependencies.

Table variables \((x : \tau)\) are holes in a policy to be filled in by the controller with an initial policy, which the controller updates as the switch processes packets. The type \(\tau = (R, W)\) constrains the fields that the table may read from \(R\) and write to \(W\). For example, the rules that populate the table \((x : \{(src, typ) , (dst, typ)\})\) can only ever read from the src and typ fields and can only ever write to the dst fields. In practice, this means that the controller can substitute in for \(x\) any policy matching its type (or with a more restrictive type).

**A note on packet field dependences.** Packet formats often have complex dependencies, e.g., if the Ethertype field is 0x800, then the Ethernet header is followed by an IP protocol header. Switches handle attempts to match or modify a missing field at run time, although the specific behavior varies by target architecture. In the RMT chip, for instance, there is a valid bit indicating the presence (or absence) of each possible field. In OpenFlow 1.0 architectures, matching against a missing field always succeeds. In both cases, writing to a missing field is treated as a non-operation. Hence, we assume that each packet arriving at each switch contains fields \(f_1, \ldots, f_n\), although in practice the value associated with each field (which we treat abstractly) may be a distinguished “not present” value.

### 3.1 Small-step operational semantics

We give a small-step semantics for closed policies, i.e., policies where table variables have been instantiated with concrete policies.

Just like the switches we are modeling, our policies actually work on packets one at a time: switches take an input packet and produce a (possibly empty) set of (potentially modified) output packets. As a technical convenience, our operational semantics generalizes this, modeling policies as taking a set of packets to a set of packets. Making this theoretically expedient choice—as we will show in Lemma 3—doesn’t compromise our model’s adequacy.

While other variants of NetCore/NetKAT use a denotational semantics, we use a completely new small-step, operational semantics in order to capture the interleavings of concurrent reads and writes of various fields of a packet. The interaction between (nested) concurrent processing of shared fields and packet-copying parallelism is quite intricate and hence deserves a faithful, fine-grained operational model. In Section 4, we define a type system that guarantees the strong normalization of all concurrent executions, and show that despite the concurrency, we can in fact use a NetKAT-esque set-theoretic denotational semantics to reason about policies at a higher level of abstraction if we so choose.

Using PK to range over sets of packets, we define the states \(\sigma\) for the small-step operational semantics \(\sigma \rightarrow \sigma'\) in Figure 3. These states \(\sigma = (p, \delta)\) are pairs of a policy \(p\) and a packet tree \(\delta\). Packet trees represent the state of packet processing: which packets, or packet components, are the different branches of the parallel and concurrent compositions working on? When processing a negation, from what set of packets will we take the complement?

The leaves of packet trees are of the form \((PK, W)\), where \(PK\) is a set of packets and \(W\) is a set of fields indicating the current write permission. The write permission indicates which fields may be written; other fields present in the packets \(pk\in PK\) may be read but not written. Packet processing is done when we reach a terminal state, \((id, (PK, W))\).

There are three kinds of packet tree branches. The packet tree branch \((\pardelta, \delta_2)\) represents a parallel composition \(p + q\) where \(p\) is operating on \(\delta_1\) and \(q\) is operating on \(\delta_2\). The packet tree branch \((\notcndelta, \delta)\) represents a negation \(\neg a\) where \(a\) is running on \(\delta\)—when \(a\) terminates with some set of packets \(PK'\), we will compute \(PK'\land PK\), i.e., those packets not satisfying \(a\). The packet tree branch \((\concdelta, \delta_1)\) represents a concurrent composition \(p \parallel q\) where \(p\) works on \(\delta_1\) with write permission \(W_p\) and \(q\) works on \(\delta_2\) with write permission \(W_q\). We also store \(W\), the write permission before concurrent processing, so we can restore it when \(p\) and \(q\) are done processing.

We write \(\sigma \rightarrow \sigma'\) to mean that the state \(\sigma\) performs a step of packet processing and transitions to the state \(\sigma'\). Packet processing modifies the packets in a state and/or reduces the term. The step relation relies on several auxiliary operators on packets and packet sets. We read \(pk[f := e]\) as “update packet \(pk\)’s \(f\) field with the value \(e\);” and \(pk\setminus F\) as, “packet \(pk\) without the fields in \(F\);” and
PK \ F as, “those packets in PK without the fields in F,” which lifts pk \ F to sets of packets. Finally, we pronounce × as “cross product.” Notice that PK \ F only produces the empty set when PK is itself empty—if every packet pk ∈ PK has only fields in F, then PK \ F = ∅, the set containing the empty packet. Such a packet set is not entirely trivial, as there remains one policy decision to be made about such a set of packets: drop (using DROP) or forward (using ID)? On the other hand, ∅ × PK = PK × ∅ = ∅.

With these definitions to hand, we define the step relation in Figure 4. The following invariants of evaluation and well-typed policies may be of use while reading through Figure 4 the following.

- Policy evaluation begins with a leaf ⟨PK, W⟩ and ends with a leaf ⟨PK’, W⟩ with the same write permissions W.
- Policies may modify the values of existing fields within packets, but they cannot introduce new packets nor new fields—policies given the empty set of packets produce the empty set of packets.

The first few rules are straightforward. The DROP rule drops all its input packets, yielding ∅. In MATCH, a match (f = v, ⟨PK, W⟩) filters PK, producing those packets which have f set to v. In MODIFY, a modification (f ← v, ⟨PK, W⟩) updates packets with the new value v. Both MATCH and MODIFY can get stuck: the former if f is not defined for some packet, and the latter if the necessary write permission (f ∈ W) is missing.

Sequential processing for p; q is simpler: we run p to completion (SEQL), and then we run q on the resulting packets (SEQR). A special packet tree branch is not necessary, because q runs on any and all output that p produces. Intuitively, this is the correct behavior with regard to drop: if p drops all packets, then q will run on no packets, and will therefore produce no packets.

The parallel composition p + q is processed on ⟨PK, W⟩ in stages, like all of the remaining rules. First, (PAR ENTER) introduces a new packet tree branch, ⟨PAR ⟨PK, W⟩ (PK, W)⟩, duplicating the original packets: one copy for p and one for q. PAR.L and PAR.R step p and q in parallel, each modifying its local packet tree. When both p and q reach a terminal state, PAR.EXIT takes the union of their results. Note that PAR.EXIT produces the identity policy, id, in addition to combining the results of executing p and q, and we restore the initial write permissions W. As with NetKAT, p + q has a set semantics, rather than bag semantics. If p and q produce an identical packet pk, only one copy of pk will appear in the result.

Negation ¬a, like parallel composition, uses a special packet tree branch (not)—in this case, to keep a copy of the original packets. Running ¬a on PK, we first save a copy of PK in the packet tree (notpk ⟨PK, W⟩) (NOT ENTER), preserving the write permissions. We then run a on the copied packets (NOT INNER). When a finishes with some PKa, we look back at our original packets and return the saved packets not in PKa (NOT EXIT).

Concurrent composition is the most complicated of all our policies. To run the concurrent composition p \ Wq|⟨w⟩, q on packets PK with write permissions W, we first construct an appropriate packet tree (CON ENTER). We split the packets based on two sets of fields: those written by p, Wp, and those written by q, Wq. We also store the original write permissions W—a technicality necessary for the metatheory, since in well typed programs W = Wp ∪ Wq (see CON in the typing rules in Figure 5, Section 4). The sub-policies p and q run on restricted views of PK, where each side can (a) read and write its own fields, and (b) read fields not written by the other. To achieve (a), we split W between the two. To achieve (b), we remove certain fields from each side: the sub-policy p will process PK \ Wq under its own write permission WP (CONL), while the sub-policy q will process PK \ Wp under its own write permission Wq (CONR). Note that it is possible to write bad sets of fields for Wp and Wq in three ways: by overlapping, with Wp and Wq sharing fields (stuck in (CON ENTER)); by dishonesty, where p tries to write to a field not in Wp (stick later in (MODIFY)); and by mistake, with p reading from a field in Wq (stick later in (MATCH)). While evaluation derivations of such erroneous programs will get stuck, our type system rules out such programs (Lemma 1). When both sides have terminated, we have sets of packets PKp and PKq, the result of p and q processing fragments of packets and concurrently writing to separate fields. We must then reconstruct a set of complete packets from these fragments. In (CON EXIT), the cross product operator × merges the writes from PKp and PKq. We take every possible pair of packets pk and pk’ from PKp and PKq and construct a packet with fields derived from those two packets. (It is this behavior that leads us to call it the ‘cross product.’) In the merged packet pk”, there are three ways to include a field:

1. We set pk’f to be pk’f when f ∉ Dom(pk’).
2. We set pk’f to be pkf when f ∉ Dom(pk). Here, f ∈ Wq, and q may have written to it.
3. We set pk’f to pkf, which is equal to pkf. For a f to be found in both packets, it must be that f ∉ Wp ∪ Wq—that is, f was not written at all.

This accounts for each field in the new packet pk, but do we have the right number of packets? If p ran a parallel composition, it may have duplicated packets; if q ran drop, it may have no packets at all. One guiding intuition is that well typed concurrent compositions should be equivalent, but sequential composition already gives us a semantics for the ‘one side first’ strategy.) The metatheory in Section 4 is the ultimate argument, but we can give some intuition by example:

- Suppose that PK = {pk} and that p = f1 ← v1 and q = f2 ← v2 update separate fields. In this case PKp = {(pk \ f2)[f1 := v1]} and PKq = {(pk \ f1)[f2 := v2]}.

Taking PKp × PKq yields a set containing a single packet pk’, where pk’(f1) = v1 and pk’(f2) = v2, but pk’(f) = pk(f) for all other—just as if we ran p; q or q; p.

- Suppose that p = id and q = drop. We take PKp × PKq, there are no packets at all in PKq, and so there is no output. This is equivalent to running id; drop; drop; id.

- Suppose that p = f1 ← v1 + f2 ← v2. Running p (f1)[f1 := v1] q on PK will yield

\[
\begin{align*}
PK_p &= \{pk[f1 := v1] \mid pk \in PK \setminus f2\} \\
PK_q &= \{pk[f2 := v2] \mid pk \in PK \setminus f1\} \\
PK_p \times PK_q &= \{pk[f1 := v1][f2 := v2] \mid pk \in PK\} \\
&= \{f1 := v1, f2 := v2\} \cup (PK \setminus f1) \cup (PK \setminus f2)
\end{align*}
\]

Which is the same as running p; q or q; p.

We should note that p \ Wq(f) is not the same as p; q when WP and Wq are incorrect, e.g., when p tries to write a field f \ Wp, or when q tries to read a field f ∈ Wq. Sequential composition may succeed where concurrent composition gets stuck!

3.2 Modeling the SDN controller

The operational semantics is defined on closed—policies—that is, policies without table variables. At configuration time, the controller installs a (possibly open) policy on each switch, which tells the switch how to arrange its packet processing pipeline. Next, at population time, the controller will send messages to the switch instructing it to replace each abstract table variable with a concrete (closed) policy, after which packet processing proceeds as described by the operational semantics from Figure 4.
Packet operations

\[
pk[f := v] = \lambda f'. \begin{cases} v & f = f' \\ \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]

\[
pk \setminus F = \lambda f. \begin{cases} 1 & f \in F \\ \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]

\[
pk_1 \times \pk_2 = \lambda f. \begin{cases} \pk_1(f) & \text{when } f \not\in \text{Dom}(\pk_2) \\ \pk_2(f) & \text{when } f \not\in \text{Dom}(\pk_1) \\ \pk_1(f) \times \pk_2(f) & \text{when } f = \pk_1(\pk_2) \end{cases}
\]

\[
\PK \setminus \{\pk \in \PK \mid \pk \in \PK\} = \{\pk \setminus \{\pk \mid \pk \in \PK\} \mid \pk \in \PK\}
\]

Reduction relation

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{DROP} & : (f = v, (\pk, W)) \rightarrow (\text{id}, (\{\pk \in \PK \mid \pk(f) = v\}, W)) \\
\text{MODIFY} & : (p, \delta) \rightarrow (p', \delta') \\
\text{SEQL} & : (\langle p, q, \delta \rangle) \rightarrow (\langle p', q, \delta' \rangle) \\
\text{PARL} & : (p + q, (\pk, W)) \rightarrow (p + q, (\pk, W)) \\
\text{PAREXIT} & : (\text{id} + \text{id}, (\pk, W)) \rightarrow (\text{id}, (\pk_p \cup \pk_q, W)) \\
\text{NOTENTER} & : \langle a, (\not\text{true} (\pk, W)) \rightarrow \langle a, (\not\text{true} (\pk, W)) \rangle \\
\text{NOTINNER} & : (\langle a, (\not\text{true} (\pk, W)) \rightarrow (\langle a, (\not\text{true} (\pk, W)) \rangle \\
\text{CONENTER} & : \langle p, \delta_p \rangle \rightarrow (p', \delta'_p) \\
\text{CONL} & : (\langle p, \delta_p \rangle \rightarrow (p', \delta'_p) \\
\text{CONR} & : \langle q, \delta_q \rangle \rightarrow (q', \delta'_q) \\
\text{CONEXIT} & : \langle \text{id}, (\pk, \text{id}, (\text{true} (\pk_p, \pk_p) \rightarrow (\text{id}, (\pk_p \times \pk_q, W))
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 4. Concurrent NetCore operational semantics

Definition 1. Population-time updates and closing functions.

Population-time updates \( b \in \text{Var} \rightarrow \text{Policy} \)

Closing functions \( T_b \in \text{Policy} \rightarrow \text{Policy} \)

We model population-time updates as partial functions mapping table variables to closed policies. The function \( T_b(p) \) structurally recurses through a policy \( p \), replacing each table variable \( x \) with \( b(x) \). That is, the policy \( p \) is a configuration-time specification, and \( T_b(p) \) is an instance of that specification populated according to the update function \( b \). Population-time updates and closing functions will play a large role in Section 6, when we present a compilation algorithm for transforming a policy (and subsequent updates) to fit on a fixed target architecture.

4. Metatheory

The operational semantics of Section 3.1/Figure 4 defines the behavior of policies on packets. A number of things can cause the operational semantics to get stuck, which is how we model errors:

1. Unsubstituted variables—they have no corresponding rule.
2. Reads of non-existent fields—(MATCH) can’t apply if there are packets \( \pk \in \PK \) such that \( f \not\in \text{Dom}(\pk) \), as might happen if CONENTER were to split packets incorrectly.
3. Writes to fields without write permission—(MODIFY) only allows writes to a field \( f \) if \( f \in W \).
4. Race conditions—concurrency splits the packet tree based on the write permissions of its subpolicies, and incorrect annotations can lead to stuckness via being unable to apply (CONENTER), which requires that \( \wp \cap \wp_q = \emptyset \), or via getting stuck on (2) or (3) later in the evaluation due to the reduced fields and permissions each concurrent sub-policy runs with.

We define a type system in Figure 5, with the aim that well typed programs won’t get stuck—a property we show in our proof of normalization, Lemma 1. First, we define entirely standard typing contexts, \( \Gamma \). We will only run policies typed in the empty environment, i.e., with all of their tables filled in. Before offering typing rules for policies, we define well formedness of types and typing of packet i.e., with all of their tables filled in. Before offering typing rules for policies, we define well formedness of types and typing of packet
Negations \( \neg a \) are well typed at \( \tau = (R, W) \) by (Not) when \( a \) is well typed at the read-only version of \( \tau \), i.e., \((R, \emptyset)\). We restrict the type to being read-only to reflect the fact that (a) only predicates can be negated, and (b) predicates never modify fields.

If \( p \) is well typed at \( \tau_1 \) and \( q \) is well typed at \( \tau_2 \), then their parallel composition \( p + q \) is well typed at \( \tau_1 \cup \tau_2 \). Union on types is defined in Figure 4 as taking the highest privileges possible: the writable fields of \( \tau_1 \cup \tau_2 \) are those that were writable in either \( \tau_1 \) or \( \tau_2 \); the readable fields of the union are those fields that were readable in one or both types but weren’t writable in either type. We give their sequential composition the same type.

Concurrent composition has the most complicated type—we must add (conservative) conditions to prevent races. Suppose \( \Gamma \vdash p : (R_p, W_p) \) and \( \Gamma \vdash q : (R_q, W_q) \). We require that:

- There are no write-write dependencies between \( p \) and \( q \) (\( W_p \cap W_q = \emptyset \)), a requirement of (ConEnter).
- There are no read-write or write-read dependencies between \( p \) and \( q \) (\( W_p \cap R_q = \emptyset \) and \( R_p \cap W_q = \emptyset \)). This guarantees that (Match) won’t get stuck trying to read a field that isn’t present.

If these conditions hold, then we say the concurrent composition is well typed: \( \Gamma \vdash p W_p || q W_q : (R_p, W_p) \cup (R_q, W_q) \). Note that this means that the \( W \) stored in the con packet tree will be \( W_p \cup W_q \), and well typed programs meet the \( W_p \cup W_q \subseteq W \) requirement of (ConEnter) exactly. These conditions are conservative—some concurrent compositions with overlapping reads and writes are race-free. We use this condition for a simple reason: switches make similar disjointness restrictions on concurrent tables.

Two metatheorems yield a strong result about our calculus: strong normalization. We first prove well typed policies are normalizing when run on well typed leaves (PK, W)—they reduce to the terminal state \((\text{id}, (PK', W))\) with some other, well typed set of packets PK’ and the same write permissions W.

**Lemma 1** (Normalization). If

\[ \vdash \tau = (R, W) \text{ and } \vdash \text{PK} \vdash \tau \text{ and } \vdash p \vdash \tau \]

then \( \langle p, (\text{PK}, W) \rangle \rightarrow^* \langle \text{id}, (\text{PK}', W) \rangle \) such that

1. \( \vdash \text{PK'} \vdash \tau \), and
2. \( \text{PK'} \setminus W \subseteq \text{PK} \setminus W \).

**Proof.** By induction on the policy \( p \), leaving \( \tau \) general. The only difficulty is showing that (ConEXIT) can always successfully merge the results of well typed concurrency, which can be seen by a careful analysis of the cross product, using part (2) of the IH to show that fields that were not in the write permission W are “read-only”. □

Next we show that our calculus is confluent—even for ill typed terms. This result may be surprising at first, but observe that concurrency is the only potential hitch for confluence. A concurrent composition with an annotation that conflicts with the reads and writes of its sub-policies will get stuck before ever running (ConEXIT). Even ill typed programs will be confluent—they just might not be confluent at terminal states. We can imagine an alternative semantics, where concurrency really worked on shared state—in that formulation, only well typed programs would be confluent.

**Lemma 2** (Confluence). If \( \sigma \rightarrow^* \sigma_1 \) and \( \sigma \rightarrow^* \sigma_2 \) then there exists \( \sigma' \) such that \( \sigma_1 \rightarrow \sigma' \) and \( \sigma_2 \rightarrow \sigma' \).

**Proof.** By induction on the derivation of \( \sigma \rightarrow^* \sigma_1 \), proving the (stronger) single-step diamond property first. □

Normalization and confluence yield strong normalization. Even though our small-step operational semantics is nondeterministic, well typed policies terminate deterministically. We can in fact do one better: our small-step semantics (without confluence) coincides exactly with the denotational semantics of NetKAT [3], though we (a) do away with histories, and (b) make the quantification in the definition of sequencing explicit. Since our policies are “switch-local”, we omit Kleene star.

**Lemma 3** (Adequacy). If \( \vdash \tau = (R, W) \) with no concurrency, then for all packets \( \vdash \text{PK} \vdash \tau \), if \( \langle p, (\text{PK}, W) \rangle \rightarrow^* \langle \text{id}, (\text{PK}', W) \rangle \) then \( \text{PK}' = \bigcup_{pk \in \text{PK}} \{ p \} \).

**Proof.** By induction on \( \vdash \tau \). □

The set-based reasoning principles offered by the denotational semantics are quite powerful. We can in fact characterize the behavior of well typed concurrent compositions as:

\( \left[ p W_p \right] q W_q \triangleq \left[ q W_q \right] p W_p \) (Lemma 5)

(4) (Lemma 4)

(5) (Lemma 4)

(4) (Lemma 4)

**Lemma 4** (Concurrency commutes). If \( \vdash \text{PK} \vdash \tau \) then

\[ \vdash p W_p || q W_q : \tau \text{ and } (p W_p || q W_q, PK) \rightarrow^* \langle \text{id}, \text{PK}' \rangle \]

\[ \iff \vdash q W_q || p W_p : \tau \text{ and } (q W_q || p W_p, PK) \rightarrow^* \langle \text{id}, \text{PK}' \rangle. \]

**Proof.** We reorder the congruence steps so that whenever we use CONL in one derivation, we use CONR in the other, and vice versa. Confluence (Lemma 2) proves the end results equal. □
Lemma 5 (Concurrency serializes). If \( \vdash p \wedge \neg q : (R, W) \) and \( \vdash PK : \tau \) then \( \langle p \wedge \neg q, (PK, W) \rangle \rightarrow^* \langle \text{id}, (PK', W) \rangle \) iff \( \langle q, (PK, W) \rangle \rightarrow^* \langle \text{id}, (PK', W) \rangle \).

Proof. Rewriting derivations by confluence (Lemma 2) to run \( p \) using (CONL/SEQL) and then \( q \) (nesting in ConR under concurrency). We rely on auxiliary lemmas relating, for all \( p, p \)'s behavior on \( PK \setminus W \) and on \( PK \) (when \( R_p \cap W_q = W_p \cap W_q = \emptyset \)).

5. Modeling RMT and FlexPipe architectures

In addition to serving programmers at a user level, our language of network policies can model the hardware layout of a switch’s packet-processing pipeline. When we interpret Concurrent NetCore policies as pipelines, table variables represent TCAM or SRAM tables, and combinators describe how tables are connected.

Figure 6 presents models for the RMT and FlexPipe architectures at a finer level of detail than in Section 2.2. Both the RMT and FlexPipe architectures share some physical characteristics, including the physical layout of hardware tables. These physical tables are built from SRAM or TCAM memory and hold rules that match on packet header fields and, depending on the results of the match, modify the packet header. Each table has a fixed amount of memory, but it can be reconfigured, in the same way the height of memory, but it can be reconfigured, in the same way the height of

Physical tables. Each variable mapped to a physical table by the binding \( b(x : \tau) \) comprises three stages. The \textit{match} stage is first. A single match \( \text{match, } \) sets the metadata field act, based on a subset of fields drawn from the packet header. These fields implicitly determine the width of the match. The metadata field act, holds an action identifier \( A_{j,k} \), a stand-in for the slightly more structured action identifiers of the RMT and FlexPipe chips. By convention, the \( j \) index of action identifiers groups updates to the same fields. For example, \( A_{11} \ldots A_{1k} \) might correspond to updating the src field, \( A_{21} \ldots A_{2j} \) the dst field, and so on. By construction, action selection is written to a metadata field act, that is unique to that match, allowing for the match stage to execute multiple matches concurrently. Once the act, fields are set, the physical table has a \textit{crossbar} that combines the metadata fields and selects the actions to execute—which we model with metadata fields \( do_{A_{j,k}} \), one for each \( A_{j,k} \). Each field \( do_{A_{j,k}} \) is consumed by an \textit{action} stage, which runs the corresponding actions on the packet. Each \textit{action} stage tests for actions denoting updates to field \( f \), which allows actions to execute concurrently.

As an example, suppose we would like to compile the routing and firewall policies \( r \parallel w \) from Figure 2 as a single physical table.

\[
\begin{align*}
r &= \text{in} = 1; \text{out} \leftarrow 2 + \text{in} = 2; \text{out} \leftarrow 1 \\
w &= \text{in} = 1; (\text{typ} = \text{ssh} + \text{typ} = \text{http}) + -(\text{in} = 1)
\end{align*}
\]

First, let’s fix four concrete action values—we’ll say that a value of 11 means “modify the out field to 1” (out \( \leftarrow 1 \)); a value of 12 means “modify the out field to 2” (out \( \leftarrow 2 \)); a value of 31 means “do nothing” (id); and a value of 41 means “drop the packet” (drop). We begin by defining two concurrent match stages, one for \( r \) and \( w \).

match\(_r\) = if \( \text{in} = 1 \) then act\(_r\) \( \leftarrow 12 \) else if \( \text{in} = 2 \) then act\(_r\) \( \leftarrow 11 \) else act\(_r\) \( \leftarrow 41 \)  
match\(_w\) = if \( \text{in} = 1 \) then typ \( \leftarrow \text{ssh} \) then act\(_w\) \( \leftarrow 31 \) else if \( \text{in} = 1 \) then typ \( \leftarrow \text{http} \) then act\(_w\) \( \leftarrow 31 \) else if \( \text{in} = 1 \) then act\(_w\) \( \leftarrow 41 \) else act\(_w\) \( \leftarrow 31 \)

matches = match\(_r\) || match\(_w\)

The match, construct mirrors the structure of \( r \), but rather than directly modifying the out field directly, it assigns an action identifier to the act, metadata field. Encoding \( w \) is slightly more complex, thanks to the presence of disjunction (+) and negation. But it follows a similar pattern: In addition to converting \( w \) to a sequence of nested if statements, match\(_w\) assigns an action identifier to the act\(_w\) metadata field in place of taking an action directly. The matches stage is made up of match\(_r\), and match\(_w\) composed concurrently.

The crossbar stage collects the action values assigned in the matches stage in order to communicate them to the actions stage, where modifications to the packet header fields occur.

crossbar = if act\(_r\) = 11 then act\(_w\) = 11 then do_{11} \leftarrow 1 else if act\(_r\) = 12 then act\(_w\) = 12 then do_{12} \leftarrow 1 else if act\(_r\) = 31 then act\(_w\) = 31 then do_{31} \leftarrow 1 else if act\(_r\) = 41 then act\(_w\) = 41 then do_{41} \leftarrow 1 else drop

The actions stage consumes the output of the crossbar in order to effect modifications to the header fields. Actions on the same field are grouped; in this case, modifications to the out field are handled by action\(_{out}\). This allows each action group to be executed concurrently, because they operate on different fields by construc-
Figure 6. Modeling RMT and Intel FlexPipe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical tables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>matchᵢ = if fᵢ₁ = vᵢ₁; ⋮; fᵢₙ = vᵢₙ then actᵢ ← Aᵢ₁ else if fᵢ₁ = vᵢ₂; ⋮; fᵢₙ = vᵢₙ then actᵢ ← Aᵢ₂ else ⋮ matches = match₁</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crossbar = if act₁ = A₁₁ + act₂ = A₁₂ + ⋯ then do₁₁ ← 1 else if act₁ = A₁₂ + act₂ = A₂₁ + ⋯ then do₁₂ ← 1 else ⋮ actionⱼ = if do₁ⱼ = 1 then perform A₁ⱼ’s writes else if do₂ⱼ = 1 then perform A₂ⱼ’s writes ⋮ actions = action₁</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RMT model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>multicast = (out₁ = 1; fᵢ₁ = vᵢ₁; out₂ = 1) + (out₂ = 2; fᵢₙ = vᵢₙ; outₙ = 2) + ⋯ pipeline = physical₁; ⋯; physicalₖ; multicast; physicalₖ₊₁; ⋯; physicalₙ where k ≤ 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FlexPipe model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mirror = m = 0 + ∑ₘᵢ = 1; m ← i egress = if f₁₁ = v₁₁; ⋮; f₁ₙ = v₁ₙ then f₁₁ = v₁₁; ⋮; f₁ₙ = v₁ₙ else if f₂₁ = v₂₁; ⋮; f₂ₙ = v₂ₙ then f₂₁ = v₂₁; ⋮; f₂ₙ = v₂ₙ else ⋮ flood = ∑ₙ outᵢ = 1; out ← i pair = physical₁; physical₂ diamond = pair₁; (pair₂</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FlexPipe. While physical tables have built-in concurrency within match and action stages, the FlexPipe architecture also makes use of concurrency between physical tables. The ingress pipeline is arranged in a diamond shape. Each point of the diamond is built from two tables in sequence, with incoming packets first processed by the first pair, then concurrently by the next two pairs, and finally by the last pair. This built-in concurrency is optimized for common networking tasks, such as checking packets against an access control list while simultaneously calculating routing behavior—as in our firewall example of Figure 2.

The FlexPipe architecture breaks multicast into two stages separated by a single egress stage. The mirror stage makes up to four additional copies of the packet. Each copy sets a unique identifier to a metadata field m and writes to a bitmap out corresponding to the ports on which this copy will eventually be emitted—this allows for up to four potentially modified packets to be emitted from each port for each input packet. The egress stage matches on the metadata field m and various other fields to determine which modifications should be applied to the packet, and then applies those corresponding updates. Finally, the flood stage emits a copy of each mirrored packet on the ports set in its out bitmap.

6. Compilation

Compilation consists of several passes, each of which addresses a discrepancy between the expressivity of the high-level policy and the physical restrictions of the hardware model. In this section, we target the RMT architecture.

- Multicast consolidation transforms a policy with arbitrary occurrences of multicast (+) into a pipelined policy wherein multicast occurs at just a single stage.
- Field extraction moves modifications of a given field to an earlier stage of a pipelined policy.
- Table fitting partitions a pipelined policy into a sequence of tables, possibly combining multiple policy fragments into a single table.

Each pass takes a well-typed policy as input and produces an equivalent, refactored policy as well as a binding transformer as output.

Separating tables into three stages may seem excessive, but suppose r also modified the typ field. In this case, r || w is no longer well typed (because r writes to typ while w reads from it), but we may still extract concurrency from w; r. By splitting reading and writing into separate phases, the match stage for applying the access control policy (matchₜ) can run concurrently with the match determining the output port (matchᵢ) with little change from the example above. Concurrent processing like this is a key feature of both the RMT and FlexPipe architectures.

RMT. The RMT chip provides a thirty-two table pipeline divided into ingress and egress stages, which are separated by a multicast stage. As a packet arrives, tables in the ingress pipeline act upon it before it reaches the multicast stage. To indicate that the packet should be duplicated, ingress tables mark a set of metadata fields corresponding to output ports on the switch. The multicast stage maintains a set of queues, one per output port. The chip enqueues a copy of the packet (really a copy of the packet’s header and a pointer to the packet’s body) into those queues selected by the metadata, optionally marking each copy with a distinct tag. Finally, tables in the egress pipeline process each copy of the packet.

We model the multicast stage as the parallel composition of sequences of tests on header and metadata fields followed by the assignment of a unique value tag and an output port, where each summand corresponds to a queue in the RMT architecture. We model the ingress and egress pipelines as sequences of tables, where each of the thirty-two tables may be assigned to one pipeline or the other, but not both. The RMT architecture makes it possible to divide a single physical table into pieces and assign each piece to a different pipeline. We leave modeling this as future work.
Definition 2 (Binding transformer). A binding transformer $\theta$ is an operator on table bindings $b$.

$$\theta \in (\text{Var} \rightarrow \text{Policy}) \rightarrow \text{Var} \rightarrow \text{Policy}$$

Binding transformers play the role of the “generated rule translator” from Figure 1. In other words, during the switch population phase, the controller will issue table bindings $b$—essentially, closing substitutions, see Definition 1—in terms of the original policy, pre-compilation. It is the binding transformer $\theta$’s job to transform these table bindings so that they can be applied sensibly to the post-compilation pipeline configured on the switch.

### 6.1 Multicast consolidation

There are two important differences between the kind of multicast that Concurrent NetCore offers and the kind supported by the RMT pipeline. First, multicast may not occur arbitrarily in the RMT pipeline; rather, there is a fixed multicast stage sandwiched between two pipelines. Second, the multicast stage must know the destination output port of each packet copy at the time the packet is copied. We use multicast consolidation to rewrite a high-level policy into a form with a distinct multicast stage. The next section describes how we use field extraction to extract potential modifications to a given field from a subpoly—which we will use to isolate writes to the output port to the multicast stage.

Informally, multicast consolidation works as follows. Suppose a policy $p$ contains two instances of parallel composition, along with subpolicies $q$ and $r$, and $s$ that do not contain parallel composition.

$$p = q + r + s$$

Multicast consolidation rewrites $p$ into two stages: the consolidation stage makes three copies of the packet and sets a fresh metadata field unique to each packet.

$$p_c = f_1 \leftarrow 1 + f_2 \leftarrow 1 + f_3 \leftarrow 1$$

Next, the egress stage replaces the original occurrences of multicast in $p$ with a sequence of tests on the new metadata fields.

$$p_e = \begin{cases} 
    \text{if } f_1 = 1 \text{ then } q \text{ else } \text{id}; \\
    \text{if } f_2 = 1 \text{ then } r \text{ else } \text{id}; \\
    \text{if } f_3 = 1 \text{ then } s \text{ else } \text{id}
\end{cases}$$

The consolidation and egress stages are composed sequentially. By convention, fresh metadata fields are initialized to zero. Hence, $p_c; p_e$ acts equivalently to $p$, producing at most three packets: one processed by $q$, another by $r$, and a third by $s$.

To capture this formally, we define syntactically restricted forms for the consolidation and egress stages that model consolidated packet duplication and tagging. The consolidation form is similar to the multicast stage presented in Figure 6 but slightly higher-level, in that it may contain table variables and additional field modifications—later compilation phases will factor these out.

Definition 3 (Multicast consolidation stages).

Consolidation sequence $s$ ::= $\Pi f_i \leftarrow 1 | (x : \tau); \Pi f_i \leftarrow 1$

Consolidation stage $m \in M$ ::= $\sum a_i s_i$

Egress stage $n \in N$ ::= $\text{id} | x : \tau | n; r$

$\mid n; \text{if } \Pi f_i = 1 \text{ then } r \text{ else } \text{id}$

An consolidation stage is the sum of zero or more predicated consolidation sequences, each of which assigns to a set of fields (used for tagging each packet copy for later processing). We use the product notation $\Pi f_i \leftarrow v_i$ to stand for a sequence of field modifications $f_1 \leftarrow v_1; \ldots; f_n \leftarrow v_n$. Sequences may optionally begin with tables, which allows for multicast to be increased or decreased at run time.

An egress stage consists of a sequence of smaller policies. The sequence may begin with a table, which allows the egress stage to grow or shrink at population time; otherwise, it begins with $id$. Each remaining subpolicy takes one of two forms. Either it is drawn from the fragment of CNC that does not contain multicast, which we represent with the metavariable $r$, or it may be a multicast-free fragment embedded within an if statement that tests some subset of the metadata fields set in the consolidation stage. Intuitively, $r$ alone represents a part of the original policy to be applied to all multicast copies of the packet, whereas an if statement selectively applies the policy it wraps to some copies of the packet, leaving others untouched.

Definition 4 (Multicast consolidation).

$$\text{pipeline } ::= (\text{Var} \rightarrow \text{Nat}) \rightarrow \text{Policy} \rightarrow (M \times N \times \Theta)$$

Given an arbitrary policy $p$, the function pipeline $s \rightarrow p$ factors the policy into a consolidation stage $m$ followed by an egress stage $n$. The argument $s$ is a user-supplied hint mapping each table to the number of copies it may make of a packet. The pipeline function is syntax-directed and presented in its entirety in the technical appendix; we highlight two interesting cases here. As one might expect, the bulk of the work takes place in the multicast case:

$$\text{pipeline } s (p + q) =
\begin{cases} 
    \text{let } f = \text{a fresh metadata field in}
    \text{let } (\sum m_i), n_3, \theta_0 = \text{pipeline } s \rightarrow p \in
    \text{let } (\sum m_i), n_2, \theta_0 = \text{pipeline } s \rightarrow q \in
    \text{let } n_3, \theta_3 = \text{qualify}(f = 0, n_3) \text{ in}
    \text{let } n_4, \theta_4 = \text{qualify}(f = 1, n_2) \text{ in}
    (\sum m_i; f \leftarrow 0 + (\sum m_i; f \leftarrow 1), n_3; n_4; \theta_0 \circ \theta_2 \circ \theta_3 \circ \theta_4)
\end{cases}$$

Given a policy $p + q$, our strategy is as follows. First, recursively consolidate $p$ and $q$. Then, pick a fresh field $f$ that neither $p$ nor $q$ use. For each summand in the consolidation stage produced from $p$, set $f = 0$, and assign $1$ to $f$ in summands produced from $q$. Finally, predicate each egress pipeline from $p$ with $f = 0$ and from $q$ with $f = 1$—the qualify function transforms if $a$ then $n$ else $id$ into an egress pipeline $n’$ with the predicate $a$ conjoined to the guard in each subsequent if statement. Finally, note that by construction, $\theta$ functions extend the domain of table bindings to accommodate new table variables. Hence, we can simply compose the $\theta$ functions produced by recursive compilation.

Table variables are the other tricky case—we must use the $s$ argument to see how much more multicast has been reserved, deferring some of the multicast consolidation to rewrites that will occur during the population phase.

$$\text{pipeline } s (x : \tau) =
\begin{cases} 
    \text{let } fs = s(x) \text{ fresh metadata fields in}
    \text{let } t_m = y : (\{fs\} \text{ in})
    \text{let } t_n = z : (\tau.1 \cup fs, \tau.2) \text{ in}
    \text{let } \theta’ = (\lambda b, w. \text{let } m, n, \theta = \text{pipeline } s \rightarrow (b x) \text{ in})
    \text{if } w = y \text{ then } n \text{ else if } w = z \text{ then } n \text{ else } T_{\theta, b, w} \text{ in}
\end{cases}$$

Applied to a table variable, the pipeline function produces a $\theta$ function that, in turn, compiles all future table updates—using the $s$ map to preallocate metadata fields for future updates. A key property of table updates is that they produce closed terms—hence, invoking pipeline inside $\theta$ on the updated table $b x$ runs no risk of divergence.

Example. As a brief example, let’s look at how multicast consolidation will work on the $r + m$ fragment of the example policy from Section 2. Recall that $m$ contains a table variable—which may introduce more multicast later. The compiler relies on a hint, $s$, that pre-allocates metadata fields corresponding to the amount of multicast that future updates may contain. Let $fs = s x$ be a set of such
fields. The policy produced by pipeline \( s \ (r + m) \) will be
\[
(f \leftarrow 0 + y : \{(\text{typ, src}) : fs\}; f \leftarrow 1);
\]
(\( f = 0 \) then \( r \) else id);
(\( f = 1 \) then \( z : \{(\text{typ, src}) \cup fs, \{\text{out}\}\} \) else id),
and the binding transformer \( \theta \) will be
\[
(\lambda b, w. \text{let } q, r, \theta' = \text{pipeline } s (Tb x) \text{ in }
\begin{cases}
\text{if } w = y \text{ then } q \text{ else if } w = z \text{ then } r \text{ else } Tb w \end{cases}.
\]
We introduce a fresh metadata field \( f \) to consolidate multicast in a single stage and tag each packet copy, and the remainder of the policy uses the tag to determine whether to apply \( r \) or \( m \) to each fragment. Because \( m \) contains a table variable \( x \), we also add new tables \( y \) and \( z \) to handle any multicast that \( m \) can contain in the future—and we produce a function \( \theta \) to ensure this.

Suppose an update arrives to \( x \) in as part of a table binding, \( b \). Applying \( \theta \) to the compiled policy will consolidate any multicast present in \( b \) and install appropriate policies in \( y \) and \( z \). Since \( Tb x \) produces a closed policy, \( \theta' \) is always the identity function.

**Proof of semantic preservation.** Finally, we prove that the original policy is equivalent to the compiled policy for all table updates. We use \( z \) to model the fact that metadata is initially assigned a value of 0 when the packet arrives at the switch, and that metadata is not observable once the packet has left the switch. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of the policy \( p \).

**Lemma 6** (Multicast consolidation preserves semantics). Let \( fs \) be the metadata fields used to tag multicast packets, and let \( z = \Pi_{f \in fs} f \leftarrow 0 \). If \( \vdash p : \tau \) and \( m, n, \theta = \text{pipeline } s p \), then \( Tb (z; p; z) \equiv Tb_b (z; m; n; z) \).

**Proof.** By induction on the structure of \( p \), relying on Lemmas 4 and 5 and the axioms of NetKAT [3] to establish equivalence. \( \square \)

### 6.2 Field extraction

The RMT architecture also requires that the output port of each packet be set during the multicast stage. Field extraction examines a policy to determine all the conditions under which a given field modification may take place, and then rewrites the policy so that modifications to that field happen first. For example, suppose we wish to extract modifications to the field \( f \) from this policy.

\[
(\text{if } b \text{ then } f \leftarrow v_1; p \text{ else } f \leftarrow v_2; q)
\]

Either \( f \) is set to \( v_1 \) or \( v_2 \), and the predicate \( b \) determines which occurs. Using a fresh field \( f' \), we can rewrite this policy.

\[
(b; f \leftarrow v_1; f' \leftarrow 0 + \neg b; f \leftarrow v_2; f' \leftarrow 1); \text{if } f' = 0 \text{ then } p \text{ else } q
\]

Introducing \( f' \) is necessary because \( b \) may depend on the value of \( f \). For example, suppose \( b = f = v_1 \). The clause \( f' = 0 \) in the if statement ensures that \( p \) is executed if \( f \) was set to \( v_1 \).

We define a **modification stage** as a sum of all the conditions leading to a given field being modified, coupled with the modification. The function \( \text{ext}_f \) splits a policy \( p \) into a modification stage for the field \( f \) followed by the remainder of the policy.

**Definition 5** (Modification stage).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{modification sequence} & : s \quad ::= \quad \Pi_i f_i \leftarrow v_i \\
\text{modification sum} & : e \in E \quad ::= \quad \sum_i a_i j; s_i
\end{align*}
\]

**Definition 6** (Field extraction).

\[
\text{ext}_f : \text{Policy} \rightarrow (E \times \text{Policy} \times \Theta)
\]

The interesting case lies in extracting modification conditions from within an if statement.

\[
\text{ext}_f (\text{if } b \text{ then } p \text{ else } q) =
\]
\[
\text{let } f' = \text{a fresh metadata field in } \text{let } \big(\sum_j a_{1j}; m_{1j}\big), \theta_1 = \text{ext}_f p \text{ in } \text{let } \big(\sum_j a_{2j}; m_{2j}\big), \theta_2 = \text{ext}_f q \text{ in }
\]
\[
\text{let } e = \sum_j \neg b; a_{1j}; m_{1j}; f' \leftarrow 0 + \sum_j b; a_{2j}; m_{2j}; f' \leftarrow 1 \text{ in } \text{(if } f' = 0 \text{ then } p \text{ else } q_2, \theta_2 \circ \theta_1)
\]

In this case, we begin by recursively extracting any modifications from the branches of the if statement. We then sequence the predicate \( b \) with the conditions produced from the true branch and \( \neg b \) with those from the false branch. However, modifications \( m_{1j} \) (from the recursive call \( \text{ext}_f p \)) or \( m_{2j} \) (from the recursive call \( \text{ext}_f q \)) might affect the predicate \( b \). We therefore save \( b \)'s pre-modification value in a fresh field \( f' \). After we've run the modification sums from \( p \) and \( q \), we produce a conditional that now tests \( f' \), which holds the original result of the predicate \( b \).

As with multicast consolidation, we show that when metadata has been zeroed at the beginning and end of the policy, the interpretation of the original and compiled forms are equivalent for all table updates.

**Lemma 7** (Field extraction preserves semantics). Let \( fs \) be the metadata fields used to tag field extraction, and let \( z = \Pi_{f \in fs} f \leftarrow 0 \). If \( \vdash r : \tau \) and \( e, r', \theta = \text{pipeline } s r \), then \( Tb (z; r; z) \equiv Tb_b (z; e; r'; z) \).

**Proof.** By induction on the structure of \( p \), relying on Lemmas 4 and 5 and the axioms of NetKAT [3] to establish equivalence. \( \square \)

Composing multicast consolidation with field extraction (on the output field) produces two large summations. The next step is to factor the summations and group summands by output port. It is unclear whether/how the RMT architecture supports emitting multiple copies of a packet out the same output port, and so we reject programs of that shape here—we stick to a set semantics, though we can simulate a bag semantics with metadata fields. Now, valid policies consist of a single large summation of tests followed by modifications, ending with modification of the output field.

\[
\sum_i \Pi_{j, f_{ij}} = v_{ij}; \Pi_{k, f_{ik}} \leftarrow v_{ik}; \text{out} \leftarrow i
\]

A final transformation splits this summation into a sequence of three smaller summations, of which the middle aligns precisely with the multicast stage of the RMT pipeline.

\[
\sum_i \Pi_{j, f_{ij}} = v_{ij}; \text{out}_i \leftarrow 1;
\]
\[
\sum_i \Pi_{f_{ik}} = i; \Pi_{k, f_{ik}} \leftarrow v_{ik}
\]

We have not yet proved that this transformation is semantics preserving, although we expect that doing so is straightforward. The next section presents techniques for compiling these, and other policies, to physical table format.

### 6.3 Table fitting

At this stage of the compilation process, every occurrence of parallel composition has been consolidated to a single multicast stage, appropriate for deployment to the RMT’s multicast stage. What remains are table variables, predicates, field modifications, and if statements joined by sequential and concurrent combinators. Two tasks remain to match the policy with the architecture model. First, predicates, field modifications, and if statements must be replaced...
by table variables. A binding transformer will reinstate these policy fragments into the tables at population time. Second, the table variables in the user policy must be fitted to the table variables in the architecture model.

Both steps depend on a second compilation algorithm to compile a table-free user policy to a single physical table. With a few small modifications, we can adapt the compilation algorithm described in [3] for compiling policies to a physical table format. We call this single table compilation.

single_table :: Policy → Policy

The resulting policy fits the shape of the matches; crossbar; actions table format described in Figure 6. The extension to the algorithm described in [3] is straightforward, and we defer a complete presentation to a technical report.

Table insertion. At configuration time, the RMT switch consists solely of tables arranged via sequential and concurrent composition. Non-table elements in the user policy are fixed—i.e., the topology of tables cannot at population time (when the switch is “running”)—but they cannot be installed directly on the switch at configuration time. Rather, they must be replaced by table variables, and then reinstalled at population time by a binding transformation. As a small example, consider the policy typ http x τ. No matter which policies are installed into x at population time, they will always be preceded by the filter on the typ field. Hence, we can produce a new policy with a fresh table variable, y : ( p , q ) ; x : τ , and a binding transformation

( λ b , w . if w = y then typ = http else T b w ) .

Definition 7 (Table insertion).

insert_table p ; q = let p ’ , θ p = insert_table p in
let q ’ , θ q = insert_table q in
(p ’ ; q ’ ; θ p o θ q )
insert_table p || q = let p ’ , θ p = insert_table p in
let q ’ , θ q = insert_table q in
(p ’ || q ’ ; θ p o θ q )
insert_table p = ( x : τ , ( λ b , w . if w = x then single_table ( T b p )
else T b w ) )

After completing this step, the transformed user policy consists of table variables and sequential and concurrent combinators. We don’t define a case for parallel composition because all of the multicast has already been consolidated.

Table fitting. Single-table compilation comes with a cost—the number of rules in the compiled table grows exponentially with the number of sequential combinators in the original policy. However, thanks to the concurrency inherent within physical tables, the policy p || q does not incur any overhead when installed in a single table. This leads to a choice. Suppose we have a policy ( p ; ( q || r ) ) : τ that we would like to compile to a sequence of two tables, ( x 1 : τ ) ; ( x 2 : τ ) . Recall that concurrency is commutative (Lemma 4) and equivalent to sequential composition (Lemma 5). Hence, there are four ways we might compile this policy.

In the first case, p is compiled to x 1 and q || r to x 2 . The cost of p (written |p|) refers to the number of TCAM or SRAM rows the compiled policy fills. The cost of placing q and r in the same table is |q| + |r| . In the next, the division is p ; q and r, and here, the cost of placing p and q in the same table is multiplicative in their sizes. Similarly, p r might be placed in x 1 and q r in x 2 at the cost |p| + |q| + |r| . Finally, the RMT chip has the capability to join its physical stages together to emulate a single, larger “logical stage.” That capability provides a final option, which is to compile p, q, and r to a single table (paying the largest overhead of |p| + |q| + |r| ). If p, q, and r are of equal size, then the first option is most efficient.

But when p is small and x 1 has space remaining, it may make sense to pay the cost of compiling p; q or p; r to x 1 . The RMT “logical table” feature is suitable for cases in which p, q, or r are too large to fit in a single physical table. The RMT chip has a limited number of bits a table can match and the number of rules it can hold—each match stage stage has sixteen blocks of 40b by 2048 entry TCAM memory and eight 80b by 1024 entry SRAM blocks—so deciding how to partition a policy into tables matters.

Since there are many choices about how to fit a collection of tables, we have defined a dynamic programming algorithm to search for the best one. The goal of the algorithm is to fit a well-typed policy, without parallel composition, into as few tables as possible.

Definition 8 (TCAM cost measurement).

| Table cost | ∈ | Var → N |
| height x | = | table_cost x |
| height p ; q | = | height p + height q |
| height p || q | = | height p + height q |
| blocks p | = | ((width p) / 40) + ( ( height p ) / 2048 ] |

As input, the algorithm relies on a user-supplied annotation predicting the maximum size of each user table at population time, written table_cost x. We also rely on several utility functions. The width of a policy (width p) returns the number of bits it matches, while the height (height p) uses the user-supplied annotation to gauge the number of entries that will ever be installed into the policy at population time. Together, they calculate the number of TCAM blocks necessary to implement a policy (blocks p).

Similar measurements exist for compiling to SRAM, but we focus on TCAM here.

As input, the algorithm also takes a policy containing only sequences of tables. The policy AST is a tree with combinators at the nodes and tables at the leaves. We need to flatten this tree into sequences of tables. The policy AST is a tree with combinators at the nodes and tables at the leaves. We need to flatten this tree into a single sequence. The policy AST is a tree with combinators at the nodes and tables at the leaves. We need to flatten this tree into a single sequence. The policy AST is a tree with combinators at the nodes and tables at the leaves. We need to flatten this tree into a single sequence. The policy

Algorithm 1: Table fitting.

input : A sequence of t 1n
input : table_cost
1 let m [ 1 . . . , n ] and s [ 1 . . . , n − 1 , 2 . . . , n ] be new tables;
2 for i = 1 to n do
3 m [ i , i ] = ( [ blocks t 1 i ] / 16 ] ;
4 end
5 for l = 2 to n do
6 for i = 1 to n − l + 1 do
7 j = i + l − 1 ;
8 m [ i , j ] = ∞ ;
9 for k = i to j − 1 do
10 q = min ( m [ i , k ] + m [ k + 1 , j ] , [ blocks t 1 i j ] / 16 ] ;
11 if q < m [ i , j ] then
12 m [ i , j ] = q ;
13 s [ i , j ] = k ;
14 end
15 end
16 end
17 return m and s
The algorithm proceeds by building a table \( m \), where each cell \( m[i, j] \) holds the smallest number of tables into which the sequence \( t_{ij} \) can fit. The crux of the algorithm lies on line 10. Given a sequence \( t_{ij} \), for which the optimal fit for each subsequence has been computed, either the entire sequence may be compiled to a single logical table that can be deployed across \( \lfloor \frac{t_{ij}}{16} \rfloor \) physical tables, or there exists a partitioning \( t_{ik}, t_{kj} \) where both subsequences fit into sets of tables, and so the entire sequence fits into the sum of the size of the sets. The algorithm contains three nested loops iterating over \( t_{ik} \), giving it a complexity on the order of \( O(n^3) \), where \( n \) is size of the policy AST’s fringe. The table \( s \) records the best partition chosen at each step, from which we can reconstruct the sets of subsequences to compile to each table.

It remains to convert a user policy with concurrent and sequential composition to one without concurrent composition. We apply a brute-force approach. For each concurrent operator \( p \parallel q \), produce two sequences, \( p, q \) and \( q, p \). Apply Algorithm 1 to each, and select the smallest result. There are on the order of \( O(2^m) \) sequences, where \( m \) is the number of concurrency operators, and so this final determination step runs in \( O(2^m n^3) \). Fortunately, in our experience, policies tend to have on the order of tens of tables, although the tables themselves may hold many more rules.

7. Related work

NetCore \([7,11,12]\) is a simple compositional language for specifying static data plane forwarding policy. NetKAT \([3]\) extended NetCore with Kleene star, and a sound and complete equational theory for reasoning about networks. Concurrent NetCore shares a common core with NetCore (and NetKAT), but adds table specifications, concurrency, and a type system. These additions necessitate a new approach to the semantics—the denotational techniques used for NetCore and NetKAT do not extend easily to models of concurrency. Moreover, these new features make it possible to express controller requirements as well as next generation switch hardware features. We have focused on specifying the properties of individual switches here, so Kleene star is unnecessary, but it would be interesting to investigate adding it in the future to facilitate reasoning about networks of multi-table switches.

Concurrent Kleene Algebra (CKA) \([8]\) is a related calculus that latter offers four composition operators: sequential composition, alternation, disjoint parallel composition and fine-grained concurrent composition. One key difference between NetCore/KAT and CKA (as well as other interpretations of Kleene algebra we are aware of) is that NetCore interprets “alternation” (disjunction) in a non-standard way as “copying parallel” composition. This leads to new and interesting interactions with our concurrent composition, which is most similar to CKA’s disjoint parallel composition. Concurrent NetCore also has a type system and interpretation specialization to network programming, while CKA is presented at an extremely high level of abstraction.

Bossart et al. \([4]\) recently proposed an architecture for programming OpenFlow 2.0 switches, which we follow in this paper. Bossart’s configuration language includes components for programming the packet parser as well as the match-action packet processing. We focus on just the match-action processing here, but provide a formal semantics and metatheoretic analysis of our work, whereas they provide no semantics. We also consider concurrent and parallel composition, which they do not. Another important inspiration is the ONF’s ongoing work on typed table patterns \([2]\).

8. Conclusion

Concurrent NetCore offers at once (a) a language for specifying routing policies and (b) packet-processing pipelines. It’s novel operational semantics and type system recover strong reasoning principles. As such, it is an excellent intermediate language for compiling routing policies—since CNC can express both high-level policies and low-level pipelines, a multipass compiler can use the same reasoning principles throughout.

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