CRYPTOGRAPHIC PATH HARDENING: HIDING VULNERABILITIES IN SOFTWARE THROUGH CRYPTOGRAPHY

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Abstract
We propose a novel approach to improving software security called Cryptographic Path Hardening, which is aimed at hiding security vulnerabilities in software from attackers through the use of provably secure and obfuscated cryptographic devices [5] to harden paths in programs.

By “harden” we mean that certain error-checking if-conditional statements in a given program P are replaced by equivalent obfuscated if-conditional statements in an obfuscated version of P. By “hiding vulnerabilities” we mean that adversaries cannot use semi-automatic program analysis techniques to reason about hardened program paths and thus cannot discover as-yet-unknown errors along those paths, except perhaps through black-box dictionary attacks or random testing (which we can never prevent). Other than these unpreventable attack methods, we can make program analysis aimed at error-finding provably hard for a resource-bounded attacker, in the same sense that cryptographic schemes are hard to break. We want to point out that Cryptographic Path Hardening is not security-through-obscurity, because we use provably-secure crypto devices to hide errors and our mathematical arguments of security are the same as the standard ones used in cryptography.

One application of Cryptographic Path Hardening is that software patches or filters often reveal enough information to an attacker that they can be used to construct error-revealing inputs to exploit an unpatched version of the program [3]. By hardening the patch we make it difficult for the attacker to analyze the patched program to construct error-revealing inputs, and thus prevent him from potentially constructing exploits.

1. Cryptographic Path Hardening
In Cryptographic Path Hardening we adopt the approach that one effective strategy for dealing with security vulnerabilities is to make finding errors along hardened paths in a program as computationally difficult as breaking some very strong cryptographic assumption, such as the hardness of the discrete log problem or factorization of large composite numbers whose factors are large primes. We propose that we can achieve such guarantees by developing a Cryptographic Path Hardener.

A Cryptographic Path Hardener takes as input a program P, and uses provably-secure obfuscations, or generalizations thereof, to synthesize a path hardened program \( \mathcal{H}(P) \) such that \( \mathcal{H}(P) \) has the following properties:

1. Correctness: \( \mathcal{H}(P) \) displays the same behavior as P on all inputs with very high probability.
2. Polynomial Slowdown: It is efficient to compile P into \( \mathcal{H}(P) \), and also to run \( \mathcal{H}(P) \) on any input.
3. Security: Parts of \( \mathcal{H}(P) \), such as certain kinds of conditionals, are obfuscated in a provably-secure manner. As a consequence, program analysis of \( \mathcal{H}(P) \) aimed at constructing error-revealing inputs along hardened paths is provably hard, in the same sense that cryptographic schemes are hard to break.

A Cryptographic Path Hardener can synthesize \( \mathcal{H}(P) \) by identifying classes of conditionals that can be re-implemented with off-the-shelf provably obfuscated components. For example, the if-conditional if (x == a) can be reimplemented with an obfuscated hash function [4], yielding an \( \mathcal{H}(P) \) that compares the hash of x with the pre-computed hash of a.

2. Case Study
A recent, high-profile vulnerability in PHP illustrates how a Cryptographic Path Hardener could be used to quickly develop a hardened input filter that can be distributed to protect an application and that, at the same time, does not reveal what type of input can exploit the application.

PHP 5.3.3 contains a vulnerability that can lead to denial-of-service attacks on servers running web services implemented in PHP [1]. The vulnerability is in PHP’s routine for converting the string representation of a decimal number into a floating point value. In particular, the routine computes the floating point value via an iterative approximation algorithm; the algorithm terminates when it reaches the floating point value that is nearest to the decimal value of the string.

Due to the semantic differences between 80-bit extended precision floating point registers and 64-bit IEEE doubles on 32-bit x86 architectures, this computation does not terminate when given a string that represents the decimal number 2.2250738585072011e-308. Therefore, if a malicious user passes such an input string to a vulnerable server, then the PHP process will loop infinitely, consuming 100% of the available CPU resources.

PHP’s developers eventually resolved this issue with a source patch, but before the development of this resolution, some system administrators publicly identified that they could quickly and effectively block the attack with an input filter to their application that rejected any web service request that contained the 128-bit substring “2250738585072011” [2]. An astute attacker could use this information to exploit the unpatched versions of PHP, before the developers could release and fully deploy a source patch.

A Hardened Filter. A Cryptographic Path Hardener can synthesize a hardened filter for this vulnerability that satisfies our definitions by using one of a number of strong hash functions (e.g., an obfuscated hash function [4], or SHA-256). Given such a hash function—which we denote by hash—we can construct a filter by pre-computing the hash of the string “2250738585072011”; let us denote this value by s_hash. Given s_hash, we can then implement the substring check with a function that tests if each 16-byte substring of the input matches s_hash:
bool input_matches(string input) {
    for (int i = 0; i < length(input); ++i) {
        string str = input.substring(i, 16);
        if (hash(str) == s_hash)
            return true;
    }
    return false;
}

This simple implementation satisfies each of three properties of a path hardened program:

Correctness. The implementation is correct with very high probability. There are two ways in which the implementation could be incorrect: it could report that the input string contains the malicious substring when it does not (a false positive), or it could report that the input string does not contain the malicious substring when it does (a false negative). The second case does not occur when the hash function is deterministic. The first case occurs with the same probability that there is a collision in the selected hash function. However, by selecting an appropriate hash function and hash output length, we can make this probability very small or zero.

Polynomial Slowdown. The implementation satisfies the polynomial slowdown requirement of our definition. Both an unhardened implementation and the hardened implementation of this filter run in time linear in the length of the input string. However, the hardened implementation will be some constant factor slower than an efficient unhardened implementation because of the use of a hash function rather than a simple bit-wise equivalence test.

Security. The implementation is also secure in that an attacker cannot determine the malicious substring without inverting the hash function or guessing the 128-bit substring.

2.1 Another Example

Another simple generalization of the above application of Cryptographic Path Hardening is to harden patches or filters where the filter checks inputs against a small set or range of values \( a < x < b \). Here small refers to the fact that the number of error-triggering values checked by the filter is much smaller than the total number of values that the input variables can take. It is also assumed, in this context, that these error-triggering values are difficult to guess. For example, below is a patch that checks if the input variable \( x \) can take any value from a small set of values \( v_i \). If the answer is YES, then reject the input else accept.

```c
if (C)
    { exit (1); }
```

Such a filter is a prime candidate for Cryptographic Path Hardening. Specifically, distributing a patch that reveals the exact semantics of the conditional would give attackers exactly the condition they need to exploit the vulnerability. Moreover, a Cryptographic Path Hardener can easily construct a hardened implementation of the filter by disjunctively comparing the hash of the input variable \( x \) with pre-computed hashes of \( v_i \). Let \( \text{hard}(C) \) denote \( \bigvee \text{hash}(x) = \text{hash}(v_i) \), where \( \text{hash}(v_i) \) are the pre-computed hash values of the \( v_i \)'s. Then the hardened filter is:

```c
if (hard(C))
    { exit (1); }
```

3. Discussion

Cryptographic Path Hardening has a number of points of discussion concerning its applicability and practicality.

Hardness of Inversion. The notion of Cryptographic Path Hardening is well-defined for all conditionals, but it is only meaningful for conditionals that are difficult to dictionary attack in a black-box manner. Specifically, if the conditional \( \phi \) has the form that it is easy for an adversary to find a satisfying assignment given only a black box that implements \( \phi \), then there is no hope of hardening \( \phi \). For example, if \( \phi(x) \) is the conditional that implements an inequality check of the form \( 0 < x < c \) or \( \text{MAX} > x > c \) for some constant \( c \), where the range of values of \( x \) checked by the inequality is large, then it is easy to find a satisfying assignment (and indeed, \( c \)) by binary search. Similarly, if \( \phi \) is a conditional that checks whether a small-sized substring (say, one character) is present in its input string, then it would also be simple to find a satisfying assignment just by searching through all possible characters (which is a small enough set that it is quick to do).

Correctness. According to our definition, a target conditional and its hardened counterpart may semantically differ. In particular, our definition accepts hardened implementations that may, with some probability, evaluate to true in instances where the original conditional evaluates to false (i.e., false-positives). Therefore, a user of a Cryptographic Path Hardener must be able reason about whether it’s acceptable for the resulting hardened program to be overly conservative in, for example, rejecting inputs.

For simple conditionals that can be directly implemented with hash functions (such as testing a variable against a constant), the probability of error is equivalent to the probability of collisions for the chosen hash function.

Performance. A cryptographic implementation of a conditional can be slower than its standard implementation. In general, standard performance analysis considerations must be taken in account when applying Cryptographic Path Hardening. For example, hardening conditionals on hot loops may incur more whole-program performance slowdown than hardening conditionals in infrequently executed code.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, we demonstrated how Cryptographic Path Hardening can be used to enable developers to distribute hardened patches that hide the exact conditions of an exploit. Furthermore, we propose that hiding vulnerabilities through Cryptographic Path Hardening presents a new approach to software security that is fundamentally different from traditional software engineering approaches such as formal methods that focus on proving the absence of errors in programs, or testing techniques that focus on establishing the presence of errors.

References