

Interdomain Routing Security

Mike Freedman
COS 461: Computer Networks

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/spr14/cos461/

Interdomain Routing

- AS-level topology
  - Nodes are Autonomous Systems (ASes)
  - Edges are links and business relationships



Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)

- ASes exchange reachability information
  - Destination: block of addresses (an "IP prefix")
  - AS path: sequence of ASes along the path
- Policies configured by network operators
  - Path selection: which of the paths to use?
  - Path export: which neighbors to tell?

BGP Session Security

TCP Connection Underlying BGP Session

- BGP session runs over TCP
  - TCP connection between neighboring routers
  - BGP messages sent over TCP connection
  - Makes BGP vulnerable to attacks on TCP



Attacks on Session Security



- Confidentiality
  - Eavesdropping by tapping the link
  - Inferring routing policies and stability
- Integrity
  - Tampering by dropping, modifying, adding packets
  - Changing, filtering, or replaying BGP routes
- Availability
  - Resetting the session or congesting the link
  - Disrupting communication and overloading routers

Defending Session Security is Easy

- BGP routing information is propagated widely
  - Confidentiality isn't all that important
- Two end-points have a business relationship
  - Use known IP addresses and ports to communicate
  - Can agree to sign and encrypt messages
- Limited physical access to the path
  - Direct physical link, often in same building
- Low volume of special traffic
  - Filter packets from unexpected senders
  - Can give BGP packets higher priority

Validity of the routing information: Origin authentication

IP Address Ownership and Hijacking

- IP address block assignment
  - ICANN -> Regional Internet Registries -> ISPs
- Proper origination of a prefix into BGP
  - By the AS who owns the prefix
  - … or, by its upstream provider(s) in its behalf
- However, what's to stop someone else?
  - Prefix hijacking: another AS originates the prefix
  - BGP does not verify that the AS is authorized
  - Registries of prefix ownership are inaccurate

Prefix Hijacking



- Blackhole: data traffic is discarded
- Snooping: data traffic is inspected, then redirected
- Impersonation: traffic sent to bogus destinations

Hijacking is Hard to Debug

- The victim AS doesn't see the problem
  - Picks its own route, might not learn the bogus route
- May not cause loss of connectivity
  - Snooping, with minor performance degradation
- Or, loss of connectivity is isolated
  - E.g., only for sources in parts of the Internet
- Diagnosing prefix hijacking
  - Analyzing updates from many vantage points
  - Launching traceroute from many vantage points

Sub-Prefix Hijacking



- Originating a more-specific prefix
  - Every AS picks the bogus route for that prefix
  - Traffic follows the longest matching prefix

13

How to Hijack a Prefix

- The hijacking AS has
  - Router with BGP session(s)
  - Configured to originate the prefix
- Getting access to the router
  - Network operator makes configuration mistake
  - Disgruntled operator launches an attack
  - Outsider breaks in to the router and reconfigures
- Getting other ASes to believe bogus route
  - Neighbor ASes do not discard the bogus route
  - E.g., not doing protective filtering

14

YouTube Outage on Feb 24, 2008

- YouTube (AS 36561): 208.65.152.0/22
- Pakistan Telecom (AS 17557)
  - Government order to block access to YouTube
  - Announces 208.65.153.0/24 to PCCW (AS 3491)
  - All packets to YouTube get dropped on the floor
- Mistakes were made
  - AS 17557: announce to everyone, not just customers
  - AS 3491: not filtering routes announced by AS 17557
- Lasted 100 minutes for some, 2 hours for others

15

Timeline (UTC Time)

- 18:47:45: First evidence of hijacked /24 route in Asia
- 18:48:00: Several big trans-Pacific providers carrying route
- 18:49:30: Bogus route fully propagated
- 20:07:25: YouTube advertising /24 to attract traffic back
- 20:08:30: Many (but not all) providers are using valid route
- 20:18:43: YouTube announces two more-specific /25 routes
- 20:19:37: Some more providers start using the /25 routes
- 20:50:59: AS 17557 starts prepending ("3491 17557 17557")
- 20:59:39: AS 3491 disconnects AS 17557
- 21:00:00: Videos of cats flushing toilets are available again!

16

Another Example: Spammers

- Spammers sending spam
  - Form a (bidirectional) TCP connection to mail server
  - Send a bunch of spam e-mail, then disconnect
- But, best not to use your real IP address
  - Relatively easy to trace back to you
- Could hijack someone's address space
  - But you might not receive all the (TCP) return traffic
- How to evade detection
  - Hijack unused (i.e., unallocated) address block
  - Temporarily use the IP addresses to send your spam

17

BGP AS Path

18

Bogus AS Paths

- Remove ASes from the AS path
  - E.g., turn "701 3715 88" into "701 88"
- Motivations
  - Attract sources that normally try to avoid AS 3715
  - Help AS 88 look like it is closer to the Internet's core
- Who can tell that this AS path is a lie?
  - Maybe AS 88 *does* connect to AS 701 directly



19

Bogus AS Paths

- Add ASes to the path
  - E.g., turn "701 88" into "701 3715 88"
- Motivations
  - Trigger loop detection in AS 3715
    - Denial-of-service attack on AS 3715
    - Or, blocking unwanted traffic coming from AS 3715!
  - Make your AS look like is has richer connectivity
- Who can tell the AS path is a lie?
  - AS 3715 could, if it could see the route
  - AS 88 could, but would it really care?



20

Bogus AS Paths

- Adds AS hop(s) at the end of the path
  - E.g., turns "701 88" into "701 88 3"
- Motivations
  - Evade detection for a bogus route
  - E.g., by adding the legitimate AS to the end
- Hard to tell that the AS path is bogus…
  - Even if other ASes filter based on prefix ownership

21

Invalid Paths

- AS exports a route it shouldn't
  - AS path is a valid sequence, but violated policy
- Example: customer misconfiguration
  - Exports routes from one provider to another
- Interacts with provider policy
  - Provider prefers customer routes
  - Directing all traffic through customer
- Main defense
  - Filtering routes based on prefixes and AS path

22

Missing/Inconsistent Routes

- Peers require consistent export
  - Prefix advertised at all peering points
  - Prefix advertised with same AS path length
- Reasons for violating the policy
  - Trick neighbor into "cold potato"
  - Configuration mistake
- Main defense
  - Analyzing BGP updates or traffic for signs of inconsistency



23

BGP Security Today

- Applying "best common practices"
  - Securing the session (authentication, encryption)
  - Filtering routes by prefix and AS path
  - Packet filters to block unexpected control traffic
- This is not good enough
  - Depends on vigilant application of practices
  - Doesn't address fundamental problems
    - Can't tell who owns the IP address block
    - Can't tell if the AS path is bogus or invalid
    - Can't be sure the data packets follow the chosen route

24

Proposed Enhancements to BGP

25

Secure BGP

Origin Authentication + cryptographic signatures



Public Key Signature: Anyone who knows v's public key can verify that the message was sent by v.

26

"Secure BGP"

- Route attestations
  - Distributed as an attribute in BGP update message
  - Signed by each AS as route traverses the network
- Address attestations
  - Claim the right to originate a prefix
  - Signed and distributed out-of-band
  - Checked through delegation chain from ICANN
- S-BGP can validate
  - AS path indicates the order ASes were traversed
  - No intermediate ASes were added or removed
  - Proper ASes originate prefixes

27

S-BGP Deployment Challenges

- Complete, accurate registries of prefix "owner"
- Public Key Infrastructure
  - To know the public key for any given AS
- Cryptographic operations
  - E.g., digital signatures on BGP messages
- Need to perform operations quickly
  - To avoid delaying response to routing changes
- Difficulty of incremental deployment
  - Hard to have a "flag day" to deploy S-BGP

28

Incrementally Deployable Solutions?

- Backwards compatible
  - No changes to router hardware or software
  - No cooperation from other ASes
- Incentives for early adopters
  - Security benefits for ASes that deploy the solution
  - … and further incentives for others to deploy
- What kind of solutions are possible?
  - Detecting suspicious routes
  - … and then filtering or depreferencing them

29

Detecting Suspicious Routes

- Monitoring BGP update messages
  - Use past history as an implicit registry
- E.g., AS that announces each address block
  - Prefix 18.0.0.0/8 usually originated by AS 3
- E.g., AS-level edges and paths
  - Never seen the subpath "7018 88 1785"
- Out-of-band detection mechanism
  - Generate reports and alerts
  - Internet Alert Registry: http://iar.cs.unm.edu/
  - Prefix Hijack Alert System: http://phas.netsec.colostate.edu/

30

Avoiding Suspicious Routes

- Soft response to suspicious routes
  - Prefer routes that agree with the past
  - Delay adoption of unfamiliar routes when possible
- Why is this good enough?
  - Some attacks will go away on their own
  - Let someone else be the victim instead of you
  - Give network operators time to investigate
- How well would it work?
  - If top ~40 largest ASes applied the technique
  - … most other ASes are protected, too

31

What About Packet Forwarding?

32

Control Plane vs. Data Plane

- Control plane
  - BGP security concerns validity of routing messages
  - I.e., did the BGP message follow the sequence of ASes listed in the AS-path attribute
- Data plane
  - Routers forward data packets
  - Supposedly along path chosen in the control plane
  - But what ensures that this is true?



33

Data-Plane Attacks, Part 1

- Drop packets in the data plane
  - While still sending the routing announcements
- Easier to evade detection
  - Especially if you only drop some packets
  - Like, oh, say, BitTorrent or Skype traffic
- Even easier if you just slow down some traffic
  - How different are normal congestion and an attack?
  - Especially if you let traceroute packets through?

34

Data-Plane Attacks, Part 2

- Send packets in a different direction
  - Disagreeing with the routing announcements
- Direct packets to a different destination
  - E.g., one the adversary controls
- What to do at that bogus destination?
  - Impersonate the legitimate destination
  - Snoop on traffic and forward along to real destination
- How to detect?
  - Traceroute? Longer than usual delays?
  - End-to-end checks, like site certificate or encryption?

35

Data-Plane Attacks are Harder

- Adversary must control a router along the path
  - So that the traffic flows through him
- How to get control a router
  - Buy access to a compromised router online
  - Guess the password, exploit router vulnerabilities
  - Insider attack (disgruntled network operator)
- Malice vs. greed
  - Malice: gain control of someone else's router
  - Greed: say, Verizon DSL blocks Skype to encourage me to use (Verizon) landline phone

36

What's the Internet to Do?

37

BGP is So Vulnerable

- Several high-profile outages
  - http://merit.edu/mail.archives/nanog/1997-04/msg00380.html
  - http://www.renesys.com/blog/2005/12/internetwide_nearcatastrophela.shtml
  - http://www.renesys.com/blog/2006/01/coned_steals_the_net.shtml
  - http://www.renesys.com/blog/2008/02/pakistan_hijacks_youtube_1.shtml
  - http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/04/09/china_bgp_interweb_snafu/
- Many smaller examples
  - Blackholing a single destination prefix
  - Hijacking unallocated addresses to send spam
- Why isn't it an even bigger deal?
  - Really, most big outages are configuration errors
  - Most bad guys want the Internet to stay up

38

BGP is So Hard to Fix

- Complex system
  - Large, with around 40,000 ASes
  - Decentralized control among competitive Ases
- Hard to reach agreement on the right solution
  - S-BGP with PKI, registries, and crypto?
  - Who should be in charge of running PKI & registries?
  - Worry about data-plane attacks or just control plane?
- Hard to deploy the solution once you pick it
  - Hard enough to get ASes to apply route filters
  - Now you want them to upgrade to a new protocol

39

Conclusions

- Internet protocols designed based on trust
  - Insiders are good guys, bad guys on the outside
- Border Gateway Protocol is very vulnerable
  - Glue that holds the Internet together
  - Hard for an AS to locally identify bogus routes
  - Attacks can have very serious global consequences
- Proposed solutions/approaches
  - Secure variants of the Border Gateway Protocol
  - Anomaly detection, with automated response
  - Broader focus on data-plane availability