COS 318: Operating Systems Storage and File Hierarchy

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(http://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/cos318/)



Project 5

- New extension to December 8, Sunday 11:55pm
- Tonight: Q&A session in CS 105 7:30-830pm




Topics

- Storage hierarchy
- File system abstraction
- File system protection




Traditional Data Center Storage Hierarchy








Evolved Data Center Storage Hierarchy




New Data Center Storage Hierarchy





"Public Cloud" Storage Hierarchy





Revisit File System Abstractions

- Network file system
 - Map to local file systems
 - NFS, CIFS, etc
- Local file system
 - Implement file system abstraction on block block storage
- Volume manager
 - Logical volume of block storage
 - Map to physical storage
 - RAID and reconstruction
- Physical storage
 - Previous lectures

Network File System

Local File System

Volume Manager

Physical storage





Volume Manager

- Group multiple storage partitions into a logical volume
 - Grow or shrink without affecting existing data
 - Virtualization of capacity and performance
- Reliable block storage
 - Include RAID, tolerating device failures
 - Provide error detections at block level
- Remote abstraction
 - Block storage in the cloud
 - Remote volumes for disaster recovery
 - Remote mirrors can be split or merged for backups
- How to implement?
 - OS kernel: Windows, OSX, Linux, etc.
 - Storage subsystem: EMC, Hitachi, HP, IBM, NetApp



Block Storage vs. Files

Disk/Volume abstraction

- Block oriented
- Block numbers
- No protection among users of the system
- Data might be corrupted if machine crashes
- Support file systems, database systems, etc.

File abstraction


- Byte oriented
- Named files
- Users protected from each other
- Robust to machine failures


 Emulate block storage interface



File Structures

- Byte sequence
 - Read or write N bytes
 - Unstructured or linear
- Record sequence
 - Fixed or variable length
 - Read or write a number of records
- Tree
 - Records with keys
 - Read, insert, delete a record (typically using B-tree)







File Types

- ASCII
- Binary data
 - Record
 - Tree
 - An Unix executable file
 - header: magic number, sizes, entry point, flags
 - text
 - data
 - relocation bits
 - symbol table
- Devices
- Everything else in the system



File Operations

- Operations for "sequence of bytes" files
 - Create: create a file (mapping from a name to a file)
 - Delete: delete a file
 - Open: authentication
 - Close: finish accessing a file
 - Seek: jump to a particular location in a file
 - Read: read some bytes from a file
 - Write: write some bytes to a file
 - A few more on directories: talk about this later
- Implementation challenges
 - Few disk accesses
 - Minimal space overhead



Access Patterns

- Sequential (the common pattern)
 - File data processed sequentially
 - Example: Editor writes out a file
- Random access
 - Access a block in file directly
 - Example: Read a message in an inbox file
- Keyed access
 - Search for a record with particular values
 - Usually not provided by today's file systems
 - Examples: Database search and indexing



VM Page Table vs. File System Metadata

Page table

- Manage the mappings of an address space
- Map virtual page # to physical page #
- Check access permission and illegal addressing
- TLB does all in one cycle

File metadata

- Manage the mappings of files
- Map byte offset to disk block address
- Check access permission and illegal addressing
- Implement in software, may cause I/Os



File System vs. Virtual Memory

Similarity

- Location transparency
- Oblivious to size
- Protection
- File system is easier than VM
 - File system mappings can be slow
 - Files are dense and mostly sequential
 - Page tables deal with sparse address spaces and random accesses
- File system is more difficult than VM
 - Each layer of translation causes potential I/Os
 - Memory space for caching is never enough
 - File size range vary: many < 10k, some > GB
 - Implementation must be reliable



Protection Policy vs. Mechanism

- Policy is about what
- Mechanism is about how
- A protection system is the mechanism to enforce a security policy
 - Same set of choices, no matter what policies
- A security policy defines acceptable behaviors and unacceptable behaviors
 - Example security policies:
 - Each user can only allocate 4GB of disk storage
 - No one but root can write to the password file
 - A user is not allowed to read others' mail files



Protection Mechanisms

Authentication

- Identity check
 - Unix: password
 - Credit card: last 4 digits of credit card # + SSN + zipcode
 - Airport: driver's license or passport
- Authorization
 - Determine if x is allowed to do y
 - Need a simple database
- Access enforcement
 - Enforce authorization decision
 - Must make sure there are no loopholes



Authentication

- Usually done with passwords
 - Relatively weak, because you must remember them
- Passwords are stored in an encrypted form
 - Use a "secure hash" (one way only)
- Issues
 - Passwords should be obscure, to prevent "dictionary attacks"
 - Each user has many passwords
- Alternatives?



Protection Domain

- Once identity known, provides rules
 - E.g. what is Bob allowed to do?
- Protection matrix: domains vs. resources

	File A	Printer B	File C
Domain 1	R	W	RW
Domain 2	RW	W	•••
Domain 3	R		RW



By Columns: Access Control Lists (ACLs)

- Each object has a list of <user, privilege> pairs
- ACL is simple, implemented in most systems
 - Owner, group, world
- Implementation considerations
 - Stores ACLs in each file
 - Use login authentication to identify
 - Kernel implements ACLs
- Any issues?



By Rows: Capabilities

- For each user, there is a capability list
 - A lists of <object, privilege> pairs
- Capabilities provide both naming and protection
 - Can only "see" an object if you have a capability
- Implementation considerations
 - Architecture support
 - Capabilities stored in the kernel
 - Capabilities stored in the user space in encrypted format
- Issues?



Access Enforcement

- Use a trusted party to
 - Enforce access controls
 - Protect authorization information
- Kernel is the trusted party
 - This part of the system can do anything it wants
 - If there is a bug, the entire system could be destroyed
 - Want it to be as small & simple as possible
- Security is only as strong as the weakest link in the protection system



Some Easy Attacks

- Abuse of valid privilege
 - On Unix, super-user can do anything
 - Read your mail, send mail in your name, etc.
 - If you delete the code for COS318 project 5, your partner is not happy
- Spoiler/Denial of service (DoS)
 - Use up all resources and make system crash
 - Run shell script to: "while(1) { mkdir foo; cd foo; }"
 - Run C program: "while(1) { fork(); malloc(1000)[40] = 1; }"
- Listener
 - Passively watch network traffic



No Perfect Protection System

- Only make it difficult to do bad things
 - It cannot prevent bad things
- There are always ways to defeat
 - burglary, bribery, blackmail, bludgeoning, etc.
- Every system has holes



Summary

- Storage hierarchy can be complex
 - Reliability, security, performance and cost
 - Many things are hidden
- Primary storage
 - Volume of block storage
 - Local file system
 - Network file system
- Protection
 - ACL is the default in file systems
 - More protection is needed because we are in the cloud

