


# **Computer Security**

Prof. David August COS 217

## Interacting with the world



# **Protection mechanisms**



Keypress goes to OS kernel	• Not to user process directly!	TCP packet goes to OS kernel
OS looks up which window has "keyboard focus," routes to appropriate user process's stdin	• Not to — unauthorized user — process!	OS looks up which process is listening on that port, sends data to stdin
User process does fprintf (asks OS to write to disk)	• User process can't access disk directly!	User process does fprintf (asks OS to write to disk)
OS writes to disk	• OS writes only to files that user process has privileges to open!	OS writes to disk

## What prevents user process from directly accessing keyboard & disk?



- Input/output instructions are privileged instructions, attempting to execute them in unprivileged mode will result in trap to operating system
- Input/output device registers may be memory-mapped; virtual-memory system doesn't map those pages into user space
- Virtual-memory system prevents user process from modifying OS memory (can't fool OS into performing unauthorized services)
- Virtual-memory prevents user processes from modifying each others' memory (can't fool other process into writing bad data to its files on disk)

## How attackers defeat protection



- Make the protection mechanism fail
   D (exploit bugs in protection software)
- Operate politely through the protection mechanism, manipulate semantics of application to obtain services
   D (exploit bad design of application)

# Why did this program crash?



#### % a.out

What is your name?

adsli57asdkhj5jklds;ahj5;klsaduj5klysdukl5aujksd5ukals;5uj;akukla
Segmentation fault

```
segi
%
```

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char buffer[30]; int i;
    printf("What is your name?\n");
    for (i=0; ; i++) {
        int c = getchar();
        if (c==`\n' || c ==EOF) break;
        a[i] = c;
    }
    a[i]=`\0';
    printf("Thank you, %s.\n",a);
    return 0;
}
```

# A nice little program



#### % a.out

What is your name?

#### John Smith

Thank you, John Smith.

#### #include <stdio.h>

int main(int argc, char \*\*argv) {
 char buffer[30]; int i;
 printf("What is your name?\n");
 for (i=0; ; i++) {
 int c = getchar();
 if (c==`\n' || c ==EOF) break;
 a[i] = c;
 }
 a[i]='\0';
 printf("Thank you, %s.\n",a);
 return 0;
}



#### **Stack frame layout**


```
% a.out
```

What is your name?

John Smith

Thank you, John Smith.

#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char \*\*argv) {
 char buffer[30]; int i;
 printf("What is your name?\n");
 for (i=0; ; i++) {
 int c = getchar();
 if (c==`\n' || c ==EOF) break;
 a[i] = c;
 }
 a[i]=`\0';
 printf("Thank you, %s.\n",a);
 return 0;



#### **Buffer overrun**



% a.out


What is your name?


abcdefghijklmnopqrstu

Segmentation fault

8

#### #include <stdio.h>





#### Innocuous? buffer overrun



#### % a.out


What is your name?

abcdefghijkl????!!!!



#### #include <stdio.h>

int main(int argc, char \*\*argv) {
 char buffer[30]; int i;
 printf("What is your name?\n");
 for (i=0; ; i++) {
 int c = getchar();
 if (c==`\n' || c ==EOF) break;
 a[i] = c;
 }
 a[i]=`\0';
 printf("Thank you, %s.\n",a);
 return 0;
}



# Cleverly malicious? Buffer overrun

% a.out

What is your name?

abcdefghijkl????&&&&executable-machine-code...

How may I serve you, master?


#### %

#include <stdio.h>

int main(int argc, char \*\*argv) {
 char buffer[30]; int i;
 printf("What is your name?\n");
 for (i=0; ; i++) {
 int c = getchar();
 if (c==`\n' || c ==EOF) break;
 a[i] = c;

}


a[i]=`\0';
printf("Thank you, %s.\n",a);
return 0;



# **Buffer-overrun vulnerabilities**



#### Keypress goes TCP packet goes to E-mail Web to OS kernel OS kernel tent Browser OS looks up which OS looks up which window has process is listening es Kerne "keyboard focus," on that port, sends data to stdin routes to appropriate user **Vard**ware process's stdin User process does User process does fprintf (asks OS to fprintf (asks OS to write to disk) write to disk) OS writes to disk OS writes to disk Internet




• *Any* application that ever sees input directly from the outside

# OK, that's a B...



#### % a.out

What is your name?



#### How about an A?



#### % a.out

What is your name?


%ESP John Smith \0.?7k7@\*&%}3k1n115018 Thank you, John Smith. es buf ocal n h o J I recommend ... a grade of A ... variat % i m S char grade = 'D'; . \0 h t %EBP int main(void) { 7 k + 7 - ? printf("What is your name?\n"); \* @ Old FIP readString(Name); if (strcmp(Name, "Andrew Appel")==0) grade='B'; new printf("Thank you, %s.\n\ machine I recommend ... grade of %c \ code ...nment.\n", Name, grade); exit(0); 18

A simpler solution	≪ESP →	
% a.out < getA	i	
What is your name?	buf	<u>n</u> hoJ
Thank you, John Smith. I recommend a grade of <mark>A</mark>		i m s
s		<u>. \0 h t</u>
0	$\frown$	grade='A'
char grade = 'D';		
<pre>int main(void) {</pre>	%EBP	7 k • A ?
<pre>printf("What is your name?\n");</pre>	Old EXP	} % * @
readString(Name);		
<pre>if (strcmp(Name, "Andrew Appel")==0)</pre>		
printf("Thank you, %s.\n\		
I recommend grade of %c \		
nment.\n", Name, grade);		)
<pre>exit(0);</pre>		•
}		19

# The file getA

#### % a.out < getA</pre>

What is your name? Thank you, John Smith. I recommend a grade of A %	<u>n h o J</u> <u>i m S </u> . \0 h t grade='A' 
getA:	_} _% _* _@_
John Smithmovl 'A',grade; jmp wherever0000?Ak7@*%}	
New machine code	return adre
	dress 20



# **Defenses against this attack**



- Best: program in languages that make array-out-of-bounds impossible (Java, C#, ML, ....)
- Good: use discipline in C programming always to check bounds of array subscripts
- Better than nothing: Operating system randomizes initial stack pointer

#### DHow to attack it:

John Smith\0.....nop;nop;nop;nop;...;nop;do\_bad\_things;exit(0)

Can jump anywhere in here, so don't have to know exact value of stack pointer

Use gdb t	o find out		0/ F O D			ever.
% gdb a.out			%ESP	i		
GNU gdb Red Ha		buf	0030a898	1		
Copyright 2004			bfffbb64			
(gdb) <b>break re</b>			bfffbad8			
Breakpoint 1 a	at 0x804843d				080484c3	
(gdb) <b>run</b>					08049770	
Starting progr					0000001	
	symbols found).				0000007	
What is your r			%EBP		0030a898	
Breakpoint 1, 0x0804843d in readstring ()				EBP	bff <b>fbb64</b>	
(gdb) <b>x/10x \$</b> 0xbfffbab0:	0x0030a898	0xbfffbb64	01.1		00000001	
· UXDIIIDADU	0xbfffbad8	0x080484c3	Old	EIP	0000001	
0xbfffbac0:	0x08049770	0x000000001				
UNDITEDUCU-	0x00000007					1
0xbfffbad0:	0xbfffbb64					-
(gdb)						
						<b> </b> ~
						22

# **Defenses against this attack**



- Best: program in languages that make array-out-of-bounds impossible (Java, C#, ML, ....)
- Good: use discipline in C programming always to check bounds of array subscripts
- Better than nothing: Operating system randomizes initial stack pointer

DHow to attack it:

John Smith\0.....nop;nop;nop;nop;...;nop;do\_bad\_things;exit(0)

For this assignment, you don't need such a fancy attack.

The hello.c program copies the buffer to the global bss data space (into the **Name** array) so you can just jump there, don't have to know the stack height.

# **Defenses against this attack**



- Best: program in languages that make array-out-of-bounds impossible (Java, C#, ML, ....)
- Good: use discipline in C programming always to check bounds of array subscripts
- Better than nothing: Operating system randomizes initial stack pointer
- Better than nothing: Prohibit execution of machine code from the stack and data segments
  - Problem 1: backward compatibility
  - Problem 2: need VM hardware with "exec/noexec" bit on a page by page basis; x86/Pentium family lacks this
  - Amazing hack solution: use obsolete "segment registers" left over from 80286.


# At your service...



25

27


• For your convenience in this programming assignment, we have turned off the segment-register defense



#### Segment register defense



- In normal (modern) usage, all segment registers point to entire range of addressable memory, 0 to 0xfffffff
- Amazing hack is to have code segment point just to Text area
- Problem: what if program wishes to create executable code on the fly?
- Solution: undo protection



# How to get started



To succeed on this programming assignment,

- Use gdb to map out where things are
  - D Stack frame of "readString"
  - D Stack frame of "main" underneath it
  - D Global data area containing "grade" and "Name"
  - D Machine code for "main"
  - Take notes of all these things, by address.
- Write a little assembly-language program
   D Set the "grade" variable to 'A'; jump to wherever
  - D Assemble it, maybe even link it into a copy of hello.c, and examine what it looks like using gdb
- Prepare your attack data
  - $\ensuremath{\mathbb{D}}$  I found it helpful to write a C program to print out the data string
  - D useful functions: printf, putchar, putw

## **Start early**



#### • Use gdb to map out where things are

- D Stack frame of "readString"
- D Stack frame of "main" underneath it
- D Global data area containing "grade" and "Name"

D Machine code for "main"

Take notes of all these things, by address.

If possible, get this part done by the time your Weds/Thurs precept meets this week. Feel free to work jointly with another student on this part. Bring your notes with you to precept.